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Abstract
Almost every human activity in recent years relies either directly or indirectly on the
smooth and efficient operation of the Internet. The Internet is an interconnection of
multiple autonomous networks that work based on agreed upon policies between various
institutions across the world. The network policies guiding an institution’s computer
infrastructure both internally (such as firewall relationships) and externally (such as
routing relationships) are developed by a diverse group of lawyers, accountants, network
administrators, managers amongst others. Network policies developed by this group of
individuals are usually done on a white-board in a graph-like format. It is however the
responsibility of network administrators to translate and configure the various network
policies that have been agreed upon. The configuration of these network policies are gen-
erally done on physical devices such as routers, domain name servers, firewalls and other
middle boxes. The manual configuration process of such network policies is known to
be tedious, time consuming and prone to human error which can lead to various network
anomalies in the configuration commands. In recent years, many research projects and
corporate organisations have to some level abstracted the network management process
with emphasis on network devices (such as Cisco VIRL) or individual network policies
(such as Propane).
The research conducted in this thesis will be introducing a range of network man-
agement process abstraction models in a more holistic manner. The abstraction models
proposed in this research are expressed in a graph-like format and ensures the network
management process is much easier and faster to deploy for network administrators
compared to the manual process. The research work carried out in this thesis builds
on current research in the field of network automation. There are two levels of abstrac-
tions that are discussed in this thesis - network policy abstractions and network layout
abstractions. The abstract specifications that have been implemented in this research
work include: inter domain routing (BGP) relationships, firewall relationships and cyber
security competitions. A system called Network Policy Abstraction System (NePAS)
has been developed in order to evaluate the abstraction models proposed in this research.
NePAS is composed of four phases: policy intention; network layout; anomaly resolu-
tion and compilation. Experiments are conducted in order to showcase our abstraction
models’ flexibility, scalability and their various strengths and weaknesses.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The corporate setting of various institutions, both public and private, rely on information
systems for their operational activities. These information systems are usually dispersed
across large geographical regions and connected via the Internet. The Internet is an
interconnection of multiple autonomous networks connected using various network
policies. These networks that make up the Internet are implemented using various
network devices (such as firewalls, routers, servers, etc.) and governed by an array of
network policies. These network policies guide how the various users of such networks
interconnect, access resources or secure critical data amongst other functionalities.
Computer network policies such as routing relationships, firewall rules and many other
network policies are typically proposed and designed based on a network-wide policy
developed by a group of network administrators, lawyers, accountants, managers, etc.
At the onset, this group of individuals first design a whiteboard high-level policy to
have an understanding of how the proposed network will operate once deployed. The
design of these proposed high-level policies are usually done on the white board in a
graph-like format. This approach is used to aide understanding of proposed settings
for routing, security and many other network policy requirements between the various
devices and users of a proposed network. Once the network-wide high-level policies
have been agreed upon, the various network policy intentions have to be translated
into low level platform-specific configurations. These policies are usually statically
configured in low-level configuration languages or triggered post deployment due to
changes in the network intention such as the need to change firewall rule relations due to
prevailing circumstance. For example, an institution might want to deny its employees
from accessing a particular website after monitoring its network traffic and observing a
decline in employee productivity over a given period. These sets of platform specific
configurations are required to be implemented on network devices such as routers,
firewalls, switches and other middle-boxes. A number of issues arise during the manual
configuration of low level vendor specific network devices that are used to implement
various network policies needed for the connectivity, security and other networking
12
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requirements. These issues are discussed in the following section.
1.1 Problem Statement
Researchers and/or network administrators design and deploy experimental networks in
a virtual environment so as to run tests either as part of measurement project or ensure
the suitability of such policies before been deployed on physical devices. The task of
manually configuring such experimental networks takes hours or days in some instances
even though its not the core objective of such individuals. This set of individuals most of
the times spend more time designing and configuring such networks than on their core
objective. The following section describes the problems of configuration of networks and
also the research gaps inherent in the proposed projects looking to abstract the network
management process.
One of the issues that arise from the manual configuration process of network policies
on devices is the time consuming nature of such an approach. This issue arises due to
the fact that a network administrator needs to configure many network devices in order
components is the time consuming nature of such an approach. . This process is known
to be long, tedious and time consuming due to the number of command syntax needed
to be configured on various devices. This issue can be exacerbated when the network
administrator is dealing with a very large network that employs multiple network policies
as part of the network’s operational requirement.
The second known issue that arises due to the manual configuration process has to
do with the complacency and possibility of human error in the process. This issue arises
due to the fact that configuring network devices requires the network administrator to
implement virtually the same set of command syntax except for a few variable changes.
This repeated process especially when dealing with multiple similar network devices can
lead to complacency, human error and in the long run a deployed network with numerous
anomalies that deviates from the intended network policy requirement.
The third issue that arises due to the manual configuration process occurs when a
network has different vendor products network devices. The presence of multiple vendor
network devices makes it imperative for network administrators to learn multiple low
level configuration languages. For example when a network to be configured has network
devices from both Cisco and Juniper, the network administrator has to learn both low
level languages. Learning multiple low level languages can be time consuming and very
confusing.
The fourth issue that arises due to the manual configuration process of networks
has to do with the lack of a real-time automated debugging and anomaly resolution in
the process. This can lead to a deployed network with numerous anomalies. These
inconsistencies and/or anomalies can end up rendering users of the network partially
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 14
or completely disconnected from network resources. Debugging such problems in a
deployed infrastructure is usually very difficult and may end up consuming as much time
as the configuration in the first place.
The fifth issue has to do with the research gap left by recent network management
process abstraction projects. In recent years, many projects such as [4], [32] have to
some level abstracted the network management process typically on the network device
level or individual network policies (such as Propane). There is still a research gap for
abstracting a higher level of network management process concepts so as to help network
administrators deploy networks from a combination of high level policies and network
topologies. Some of the current network management process abstraction projects only
support one network policy. This limitation makes it difficult for network administrators
designing and deploying complex networks with multiple network policies to utilise.
The network administrators that use such tools have to manually configure physical
devices deployed with policies not supported by such projects. This introduces the same
manual configuration issues described above.
1.2 Outline of Areas of Research
The research carried out in this thesis can be categorised into three broad areas: net-
work policies; network anomaly resolution (or configuration consistency) and network
abstraction.
1.2.1 Network Policies
This section of the research deals with the various policies that guide network connectivity
and access control amongst many others. A rudimentary understanding of what policies
entail and how they are specified is necessary to appreciate the research conducted in
this thesis. The following section defines and looks at the categories of policies in the
sense of usage, triggers and how they are applied.
A policy rule can be defined as a set of conditions that need to be met in order for an
action to be taken. A policy document is a collection of policy rules that controls certain
aspects of an activity. A network policy document hence can be defined as a collection
of rules to be implemented by an administrator to manage network devices. According
to Stone et al[89], policies can be grouped into three areas: (i) how the policy is used
(ii) how the policy is triggered (iii) at which level the policy is applied. The following
section discusses these three policy areas.
1. A usage policy describes which services will be used to maintain the current state
of the network or to transition to a new state. Services which may be available
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in the network include differentiated service classes, routing and connectivity,
virtual private networks, encryption capability, and so on. A usage policy also
describes how those services will be used. For example, the ability to differentiate
the handling of separate flows of traffic based on the service class in which they
reside or to which virtual channel they belong describes how a service is used.
2. Policies can be triggered in two ways, either statically or dynamically. Static
policies apply a fixed set of actions in a pre-determined way according to a set of
pre-defined parameters that determine how the policy is used. Examples of static
policies are:
• Transit traffic is not permitted during normal working hours
• For security reasons certain network addresses are denied access to network
components.
Dynamic policies are enforced when needed, and are based on changing conditions
of the network such as congestion, packet loss, or the loss of a network router. To
support the dynamic and sometimes unexpected nature of the network, actions
can be triggered when an event causes a policy condition to be met. Examples of
dynamic polices are:
• When the network gets congested, streaming video traffic is disallowed
• When a particular service class of user is utilising the network, lower best-
effort traffic to only 25 percent of link capacity.
The research conducted in this thesis will be using both static and dynamic policies
in such a manner that abstracts the network management process. Static policies
are first implemented for firewall access control configurations while BGP policies
are known to be dynamically configured after the routers within a proposed network
converges based on agreed upon intentions.
3. Lastly, the level of the policy is applied as a category. These policies are differenti-
ated by their granularity, such as the application level, user level, class level, or
service level. For example, a mission-critical application may be given priority
over all other network traffic, or all users in the silver class (differentiated services)
have priority over the bronze class, but must succumb to the gold class.
There are three policies that will be the focus of the research in this thesis and will
be discussed in-depth in the following chapters. These policies include - inter-domain
routing protocol or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), firewall rule relations and cyber
security competitions. These policies have been chosen for the research work conducted
in this thesis because they cover a diverse level of networking concepts. BGP deals with
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network layer manipulation, firewall relationships deal with both transport and network
layer while domain name systems are applied on the application layer.
1.2.2 Network Anomaly Resolution
Network anomalies can be defined as the circumstance when the operation of a network
deviates from its intended policy requirement. Network anomalies can arise due to
numerous reasons including amongst others - configuration mistakes or errors; mal-
functioning network devices; network intrusions that disrupt delivery of services, etc.
We posit that network anomalies can be categorised into two groups - configuration
anomalies and post deployment anomalies.
Configuration anomalies typically occur during low level configuration of network
devices based on the policy requirements developed by an organisation and to be con-
figured by network administrators. Manually configuring network policies on network
devices is known to be susceptible to anomalies (or conflicts). An example of such an
anomalies is when a network administrator mistakenly configures two identical firewall
rules in a firewall device. This is the category of anomalies that are relevant to the
research work done in this thesis and hence will be discussed in-depth in each network
policy abstraction chapter.
Post deployment anomalies generally occur after the network has been configured
and is up and running. An example of this type of anomaly is when hackers malicious
inject bogus BGP prefixes into a network. The anomalies in this category are outside the
context of this research and will not be discussed in this thesis.
1.2.3 Network Abstractions
Abstraction is the process of deciding the details of an activity that need to be highlighted
and those that need to be hidden or ignored. The rationale behind abstraction is to
make complex ideas much easier or simplistic to users by getting rid of reoccurring
concepts. Network abstraction can therefore be defined as the process of hiding of net-
work management details from the administrator. Current abstraction research projects
have successfully abstracted details such as IP address allocation, names of network
devices and basic configuration of network components from administrators. An in-depth
discussion of the two network abstraction techniques including their advantages and
disadvantages will be carried in the following chapter of this thesis.
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1.3 Aims and Objectives
The research proposed in this thesis aims to simplify the network management process
by providing a scalable and flexible method of expressing high level network policies
by abstracting (or reducing) the non-essential details. The proposed research hopes to
abstract the network management process on a higher level (policy) than current projects.
The following outlines the aims and objectives of the research conducted in this thesis.
• The main aim or objective of the research conducted in this thesis is to simplify the
network management process for network administrators. A set of network policy
level abstractions independent of network layouts are proposed in a format (graph)
that network administrators are familiar with. The level of network abstraction that
we hope to achieve here will be higher than any other network management process
that has been proposed using template design approach. The policy intentions that
have been implemented to showcase policy level abstractions have to do with inter
domain routing relationships, firewall relationships and the relationships between
the various teams participating in a cyber security competition. The abstraction
technique can be easily used for specifying various other policies that govern
networks.
• The second objective of the research work conducted in this thesis is de-coupling
the policy intentions from the network layout. This is important because network
administrators can use the policy intentions or network layouts for different pro-
jects. De-coupling the policy intentions from network layouts make it easier to
isolate and correct mistakes by network administrators.
• The third objective of the research work conducted is to integrate a network
anomaly resolution system that ensures the networks proposed by administrators
behave as intended. This is very important because resolving network anomalies
post deployment can be a very tasking job for administrators.
• The fourth objective of the research work conducted has to do with developing
a network management process abstraction system called (NePAS) that will be
used to read various network abstractions in any proposed experiment. The system
developed is composed of four phases: policy intention phase which is used for
specifying network policies independent of network layouts; network layout phase
which is used for expressing the topology of network devices that will be used
during experiments; anomaly resolution phase which will be used to ensure low
level configurations are conflict free; and the compilation phase which is where
the actual low level configuration commands are generated for deployment.
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• The last objective of the research work conducted in this thesis is to present a
series of experiments and show how network policy anomalies in abstraction
models will be resolved by the system developed. Network policy anomalies will
be purposefully injected in the experiments presented so as to show how they can
be resolved before low level deployment. The experiments presented will also be
used to show the strengths and weaknesses of our abstraction models.
1.4 Contribution of Thesis
The research conducted in this thesis builds on current projects that provide abstract
network layout specification for network administrators. The contributions hope to use
template design approach of network abstractions and implemented using graph theory.
Graph theory has been adopted because organisations propose and design their networks
using such methods. This will make the job of network administrators tasked with
configuring networks much easier. The contributions of this thesis can be summarised as
follows:
• The first contribution of the research proposed in this thesis is providing a set
of abstract specifications that will enable network administrators configure their
networks from high level BGP business relationships. The abstractions proposed
enables the generation of anomaly-free low level configuration for routers us-
ing community filters from a graph of high level policy intentions of business
relationships. The abstractions are designed independent of network topology
effectively raising the network management process of configuring BGP policies
from network devices (or routers) to business relationship specification. The BGP
abstractions enable network administrators to specify business relationships such
as provider, customer, peer and sibling between autonomous systems.
• The second contribution of the research proposed in this thesis is providing a
scalable and highly flexible set of firewall policy intentions. The abstractions
that were developed can be specified (or expressed) on the policy intention level
or network layout level. The firewall policy abstract specification enables the
generation of anomaly-free low level rules from a graph of high level policies
independent of the network layout. The network layout firewall intentions will
give network administrators flexibility and granularity by allowing actual network
devices to have isolated rules from other devices within their high level realm
when deploying firewall enabled networks.
• The third contribution of the research proposed in this thesis is providing organisers
of cyber security competitions a set of abstract competition intentions from high
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level graph specifications. The research conducted presents a set of abstractions
that allow organisers to specify the various participating teams and the relationship
between them. The policy intention of team relationships expressed on a graph
can be used with a slice (or cookie dough) of network topology to replicated for
all the participating teams so as to generate low level competition infrastructure.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 looks at the background rationale of
the research work presented in this thesis. The first two sections of the chapter detail
the various network abstraction and virtualisation techniques. The next three sections
discusses some policy abstraction projects that have been implemented in the past for
Border Gateway Protocol, Firewall Rule Relations and Cyber Security Competitions
respectively.
Chapter 3 will present a philosophical overview of template design approach to the
network abstraction design process. The chapter will begin with a brief overview of why
abstracting the network management process is important. The chapter is then split into
three sections looking at network management process abstraction on two levels - policy
level and network topology level.
Chapter 4 will present our approach for abstracting network policies using template
design. The chapter will present a detailed assessment of our system’s four phases which
are: (i) network policy intention abstraction, (ii) network layout abstraction, (iii) anomaly
resolution and (iv) compilation. This chapter will explain the design consideration for
each phase and how they co-depend.
Chapter 5 will present Border Gateway Protocol policy abstraction technique imple-
mented for our proposed system. The chapter begins with a detailed overview of BGP,
its path attributes and the various business relationships supported by the protocol. The
subsequent sections of the chapter is used to discuss how the various phases (with simple
example) of our system have been used to abstract BGP policies with an example every
step of the way.
Chapter 6 will present firewall rule relation abstraction technique implemented for
our proposed system. The chapter begins with a detailed explanation of firewalls, three
classifications of firewalls and how firewalls work. The subsequent sections of the
chapter is used to discuss how the various phases (with simple example) of our system
have been to abstract firewall policies.
Chapter 7 will present cyber security competition abstraction technique implemented
for our proposed system. The chapter begins with an in-depth assessment of the step-
by-step guide of organising cyber security competitions. This entails different concepts
from team formations and objectives to infrastructure components used in typical cyber
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security competitions. The subsequent sections of the chapter is used to discuss how the
various phases (with simple example) of our system have been used to abstract cyber
security competition infrastructures.
Chapter 8 will present a critical assessment of our proposed system. The chapter
is composed of two sections - experimentations and evaluation. The first section is
used for in-depth complex experiments of the network policies abstracted in this thesis.
The second section is used to evaluate our proposed system based on its performance,
usability, flexibility and scalability.
Chapter 9 will detail conclusions drawn from our work and directions of any future
work.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Network Abstraction Design
Network abstraction is the process of hiding the details or reducing the complexity
of a network management process so that the administrator can focus on the high
level relationships of the network. By abstracting or hiding details from the network
administrator when designing and deploying high-level policies, some of the network
anomalies that deal with the configuration process listed in Chapter 1.2.3 can be greatly
minimised. Current network abstraction systems allow administrators to concentrate
on individual network devices at the topology level through to generation of low level
configuration commands without complex network policy intentions implemented on
them. Network configuration especially when dealing with large scale networks is known
to lead to large outages when small but critical mistakes are made. Critical mistakes of
large scale configuration is caused by the long and repetitive nature of such a process.
Manual configuration on large scale networks is known to be prone to human errors and
consume time. These factors amongst others have made researchers to look at ways of
abstracting the network management process in recent years. Some of the benefits of
abstracting the network configuration and management include among others:
• Automating the network management process will reduce misconfiguration due
to human errors to the minimum and ensure end-to-end connectivity of network
devices [92].
• Automating the network management process will make it easier for operators
to deploy networks containing devices from different vendors without learning
multiple low level languages[77].
• Automating the network management process will drastically reduce the cost and
time it takes to configure networks [92].
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Even though abstracting the network management process has many benefits, some
researchers however think otherwise for the following reasons amongst others:
• Automating the network management process can lead to an increased cost of IT
operation when the overhead of creating and executing the automation software is
high when the task being automated does not need to be repeated often.
• By using automation, some valuable information necessary for decision making
can be hidden to the network administrator.
• Lee et al [66] argue that automating simple and intuitive tasks can hurt network
operations in the long run. This is because the network administrator will lose
context of what is going on in the network.
Some things that designers of automated configuration tools need to be aware of
when creating such software include the following among others:
• Lee et al [66] argue that automated configuration tools should provide peepholes
to the low level details of a network even when the normal requirements by the
operators is to hide them.
• Designers of automated configuration tools should choose the right level of ab-
straction while hiding the unnecessary details [26].
• Designers of automated configuration tools should ensure that their tools sup-
port the semantics of various vendor devices and not be bound to a particular
implementation [40].
• Designers of automated configuration tools should ensure their tools meld together
different services with varying degrees of interactions and dependencies.
There are two approaches to designing network abstraction tools - template design
approach and language design approach. These two techniques will be discussed in the
following section.
2.1.1 Template Design
The template design approach for designing automated configuration tools uses a bottom-
up methodology[62]. This approach uses a combination of template snippets and contents
from a network information data base(NIDB) so as to generate low level configuration
commands. The template snippets which are for various network management processes
such as BGP policies contain variables that will be substituted with contents from the
NIDB so as to generate configuration files for specific vendor devices. This approach
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is known to be simple, flexible and extensible [62]. Bellovin and Bush [18] created an
automated configuration tool using template snippets for various network configuration
processes such as BGP peering, packet over SONET(POS) interfaces etc. The tool is
used to generate configuration files by substituting some of the variables in the template
snippets with data retrieved from a database.
The template snippets support different models and vendor devices including routers
and switches. Some of the advantages of the template design approach include amongst
others: (i) there is increased consistency as data items only need to be entered once,
(ii) new configurations can be pushed out to nodes very quickly, (iii) it reduces costs of
having to correct errors arising due to manual configurations.
Many other developers have used template design approach to create automated
configuration tools in the past. Some major disadvantages of using this approach include
among others:
• Efficiently allocating network resources such as IP address blocks and BGP
community attributes can become very complex when dealing with large scale
networks [77].
• Another major disadvantage of this approach is that it is fundamentally device
centric in nature. This is due to the template snippets required for low level
configuration commands that will be generated and configured on network devices
are for specific vendors.
2.1.2 Language Design
The Languages design approach for designing automated configuration tools use a
top-down methodology [62]. Designers taking this approach to design an automated
configuration tool need to write an assembler that can be used by network operators to
specify high-level network policies that will be compiled into network configuration
files. Examples of how this approach has been used to create automated configuration
tools include:
• Chen at al [26] created an automated configuration tool using this approach where
they used Mosaic, a variant of Datalog to program automated network operations.
Their tool provides network operators a flexible way of programming network-
wide management and high-level task schedule using recursive queries. Some
advantages of their automated configuration tool include the following: (i) it is
straightforward to write queries that configure routers based on network conditions
(ii) the tool can roll back to previous consistent state when a failure or policy
violation occurs (iii) provides network administrators an easy way of specifying
high-level policies
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• Voellmy and Hudak [97] have also used language design approach to create their
automated configuration tool. The tool uses a compiler created using Haskell
language to translate Nettle programs used to generate routing configuration files
for XORP routers. This allows network administrators to specify network-wide
BGP policies and vendor-specific router details in a uniform language. The tool
only supports two routing protocols, BGP and static routes. Nettle only supports
XORP routers but the designers intend to support all major router platforms.
Some advantages of this automated configuration tool include the following: (i)
provides a flexible and safe way to merge multiple routing policies (ii) a single
policy specification can be given for a heterogenous collection of routers (iii) it
allows operators to specify one cohesive policy for the entire local network routing
configuration
Many other developers have used language design approach to create automated
configuration tools in the past. Some major disadvantages of using this approach include
among others:
• The language design approach leads to another language that network administrat-
ors need to learn just to use the tool
• When dealing with a compiler that does not support all aspects of the network in
use, it might lead to the network not behaving as intended.
2.2 BGP Policy Abstraction
There has been extensive research regarding various aspects of network routing especially
on inter domain routing. This research covers a wide range of fields including but
not limited to security, traffic engineering, inferring AS relationships and anomaly
resolution. However there has not been such extensive research on inter domain routing
policy abstraction especially on the business relationship level. The following section
summarises some projects that have sought to abstract BGP policy intentions on the
business level in the past.
Vanbever et al propose in [93] a hierarchical structured model that uses chains
and filters to specify various levels of BGP policy abstraction. The proposed model
uses two chains of high-level routing filters to express BGP routing policies. The tool
implemented was developed in Java and composed of three components: (i) a data
repository containing BGP session descriptions, import and export policy chains; (ii)
a predicate matching engine which relies on regular expressions to represent various
attributes and BGP relationships; (iii) a generation engines that iterates over all BGP
sessions and applies import and export chains to generate low-level import and export
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filters for the sessions. One of the major drawbacks of the abstraction developed is its
lack of a very expressive level of BGP business relationship abstraction. Another major
problem with this project is the lack of information with regards to which BGP business
relationships are supported if any by this project.
Gottlieb et al proposed in [51] a tool that uses provisioning databases to build
configurations of large ISP eBGP sessions. This project only configures customer
sessions using a set of technical questionnaires used by the provider to identify unique
identifiers on behalf of the customer. The customer-specific information provided in
the technical questionnaires are then used by a set of provisioning rules to generate a
sequence of Cisco IOS configuration commands for adding the new connection to the
network. A database schema is then used for storing and accessing customer-specific
data that populates a template for capturing the syntax of the router commands. One of
the major drawbacks of this project is its lack of support for other BGP routing business
relationships such as transit, peering and siblings.
Autonetkit [4] is a tool that takes high-level network representations and compiles it
into a choice of emulated and simulated environments. It uses a graphical editor such
as yED to visualise the intended network layout and policy representation within the
graph. The network topology graph created is read using NetworkX graph library for
python with nodes and edges representing routers and physical connections respectively.
Attributes such as AS numbers, link speed or weight for edges can be easily represented
just as additional custom attributes such router type, local preference value amongst
others are supported. One of the major limitations of this project is that the level
abstraction provided is at the device level or network layout abstraction. Abstract
representations of BGP business relationships at a level higher than the network layout
level is not supported.
Cisco VIRL [32] is a vendor-specific proprietary simulation platform developed
by Cisco. The project uses VM Maestro which is a powerful cross-platform GUI
environment that allows a user to drag and drop various network devices in order
to represent complex topologies. The versatile tool provided in the project allows a
network administrator to either manually configure various network devices or leverage
Autonetkit to create bootstrap configurations using official Cisco images for components
in the workspace. The project allows network administrators to perform different network
measurement activities which includes amongst others: (i) ability to see path taken by
network using tools such as traceroutes; (ii) ability to set the latency, packet loss and
jitter on links so as to model complex network environments. As the automation engine
of Cisco VIRL depends on Autonetkit, they share the same limitations. Cisco VIRL just
like Autonetkit neither supports a higher level of abstraction on the business relationship
level nor a network-wide firewall enabled network such as the one proposed in this
project. However, we view Cisco VIRL/Autonetkit and our work as complementary
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research projects, with each focusing on a different level of abstraction.
2.3 Firewall Policy Abstraction
There has been extensive research about firewalls over the years. The research encom-
passes configuration management, conflict resolution and visual analysis. The literature
on firewall policy abstraction that is scalable, modular, conflict free and easy to use is
however very limited. The following section discusses some of the work carried out in
field of firewall policy abstraction.
Firewall Builder [2] is a GUI based application that can be used to configure firewalls
on various platforms such as Cisco (ASA, PIX, router access lists); Linux iptables; HP
ProCurve ACL firewalls amongst others. Firewall Builder can be used to configure
firewalls using the following five steps: create firewall; define objects; configure policy;
compile rules and deploy configuration. This tool does not support automatic generation
of IP addresses and hence can be prone to error and tedious consuming. The lack of
automatic generation of IP addresses makes Firewall Builder time consuming and prone
to error especially when dealing with large enterprise networks. The tool also does not
have support for any other network policies such as inter domain routing and hence when
dealing with a network that is composed of both firewall and routing policies, it will not
be suitable.
The Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (Cisco ASDM) [31] is a web-based
tool used for configuring, monitoring and troubleshooting Cisco firewall appliances.
This tool uses a setup wizard that guides network administrators on how to configure and
manage firewall devices. It also provides a built-in packet trace and packet debugging
tools for troubleshooting the device. This tool is restricted to configuring only Cisco
firewalls and does not support any other platform. It can only configure firewall devices
on a per-device basis and not from a network-wide policy abstraction basis. Similar to
Firewall Builder, it does not support other network policies such as the ones for inter
domain routing and hence is rather limited when dealing with enterprise networks with
various network policies.
Firmato [17] is a tool used in generating low-level firewall ACLs from high-level
policies. The high-level policies are modelled using Entity-Relationship Diagrams that
will be used to generate the low-level firewall rules. This tool is highly complex and
similar to many existing low-level languages and does not support many vendor hardware
devices. This makes it highly unsuitable for network administrators because it is not easy
to use. Firmato also does not support NAT which is a very important network policy in
the world today. Firmato also cannot express negative ("drop" action) rules. This can
make expressing exceptions highly complex as a lot of rules will be needed in order to
express negative rules. Similar to the above tools, Firmato does not support any other
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network policy abstraction and hence is highly limited when it comes to configuring a
network with various policies.
Mignis [9] is a semantic based tool used for firewall configurations. Mignis uses
a top-down approach that allows the network administrator to specify firewall rules
which are then translated into Netfliter firewall configuration commands. The tool takes
an abstract firewall rule configuration file which it then uses to generate a series of
low-level iptables rules. Mignis supports NAT and the notion of grouping multiple host
devices into a security policy group that have similar firewall configurations. One of
the major limitations of the Mignis tool is its lack of support for various platforms as it
currently only generates iptables rules. Mignis does not support a separated high-level
policy and the network policy which makes automatic allocation of IP addresses to the
various devices easier to generate. This means the network administrator has to specify
the IP addresses of the various devices and hence makes the entire process more time
consuming. Mignis also does not support any other network policy abstraction which
makes it highly limited and unsuitable for configuring large scale enterprise networks.
2.4 Cyber Security Competitions Abstraction
There is a wide range of organisations from academic, government and private institutions
that host various kinds of cyber security competitions (CDX) on a yearly basis. There has
also been a lot of research and publications on organising CDX events and experiences
learnt during such events. However, there are limited proposals on abstracting these
events in such a way that will enable organisers to deploy such events with ease and
flexibility. The following are the major projects proposed in the past that hope to abstract
CDX events so as to make it easy for organisers to design, configure, deploy and manage.
The SecLab Group of University of California in Santa Barbara developed a frame-
work called iCTF [6] that can be used to create customisable interactive security com-
petitions. The iCTF architecture is split into two - the game and admin networks. The
game network hosts all the virtual machines running the vulnerable software of various
participating teams. The virtual machines are VirtualBox appliances which can either be
hosted by the various participating teams and connected using a VPN concentrator VM
generated by the iCTF. They use VirtualBox in order to be able to leverage its internal
networking feature. The admin network is composed of a central database, scorebot and
web server. The primary function of the central database is enforcing game rules and
keeping track of the competition’s state.The scorebot’s function is to monitor the status
of services running in the game network. The web server is used to host the scoreboard,
chat messenger, hints and challenges.
The Tele-Lab [103] project provides an e-learning system for practical security
training. The Tele-Lab server developed for the project consists of two major parts:
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(i) web-based tutoring system; and (ii) a training environment composed of virtual
machines. The tutoring system consists of three kinds of content: information chapters;
introduction to security and hacking tool; and practical exercises. The information
chapters and introduction to security and hacking tool content of the tutoring system is
used to introduce the user to the theoretical aspects of several networking concepts such
as "wireless networks", "reconnaissance" and "malware" amongst others. The practical
exercises section are carried out on the training environment (using virtual machines)
which can be accessed by users via remote desktop access.
The iTEE project [41] is an open-source platform that enables creation of interactive
cyber security competitions. The iTEE platform developed is composed of three layers:
virtualisation layer; virtual lab layer; and virtual learning space layer. (i) The virtual-
isation layer is used to host the virtual machines created and all the upper layers of the
platform depend on this layer. The hypervisor used for this project is based on Oracle
VirtualBox Headless run on an Ubuntu Server. (ii) The virtual lab layer is used to provide
remote access, control functions for the virtual machines and executing the competitions.
The virtual machines are provisioned automatically using a template-based abstraction
approach. This leverages on puppet configuration manager, shell and Python scripts to
customise the virtual machines and networks. (iii) The virtual learning space layer is
used to provide the competition scenario, objectives, automated scoring and automated
attacks during the competition.
2.5 Closing Remarks
Template design approach will be employed in abstracting the complex network policies
in this thesis. This method was chosen because we believe it will be easier for network
administrators to express and deploy experiments in a seamless manner similar to white-
board style design currently employed. The network policies chosen in this thesis are
complex and designing a low level abstraction language will force network administrators
to learn another language which defeats one of the major objectives of this project which
is to simplify the network management process.
The projects described as part of the related work in the above section all fall short
of the level of abstraction we have achieved in this thesis. Some of the projects such as
Autonetkit and Cisco VIRL only allow network administrators to express networks on a
network layout level without complex policies such as inter domain routing relationships
and firewall relationships configured on the deployed devices. This limitation means net-
work administrators will have to manually configure such network devices with complex
network policy configurations which can be timing consuming, tedious, complacency
and likely to introduce anomalies in such networks. Also, to the best of our knowledge
there is no proposed inter domain routing abstraction project that uses template design
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approach that gives network administrator the functionality of expressing network with
complex policies such as transit, peer and sibling relationships. This limitation makes
it difficult for network administrators to utilise such projects because they would have
to manually configure network routers with the other routing relationships that are not
supported by the tools being used. This also introduces complacency, time wasting and
possibilities of having anomalies in deployed experiments by the network administrat-
ors. Lastly, all the network policy abstraction projects currently proposed support only
one network policy such as firewall builder for firewalls or propane for inter domain
routing. This limitation we posit defeats the purpose of network management process
simplification because most networks having two or more network policies working
seamlessly together. This limitation forces network administrators to deploy partially
configured networks with such tools and having to manually configure the unsupported
network policies which can is counterintuitive for network administrators. The focus
of the research conducted in this thesis is to develop a set of high level network policy
abstractions beyond the network layout level that network administrators can use to
design and deploy experiments that have a combination of both firewall and inter domain
routing policies. This will be an improvement to current projects and will enable network
administrators to design and deploy anomaly free complex networks that have such
network policies with ease.
This chapter of the thesis has introduced the two known techniques for network
abstractions: language and template design approaches. The chapter also highlighted and
discussed some of the major related research projects conducted on the three network
policies focused in this thesis: BGP, firewall relationships and cyber security competi-
tions. The next chapter of this thesis will be exploring the philosophical background of
template design abstraction technique which has been adopted for the research conducted
in this thesis.
Chapter 3
Philosophy of Network Abstractions
3.1 Introduction
A solution to computer network complexity especially when trying to simplify the
management process problem is abstraction. Abstraction can make a seemingly complex
network less so by removing or reducing details such as network devices, network
services, few protocols and anything that can be removed without tempering with the
behaviour of the network once deployed. Network abstraction models should be able
to deploy high level policy intentions that matches down into low level vendor specific
configuration commands easily. The low level configuration commands generated from
the abstract representation of the network specified should be conflict free and behave
as intended by the network administrators. Abstraction can also greatly simplify and
minimise errors in the network management process when updating deployed enterprise
networks. For example, a user can change or update a single firewall intention that
reverberates across a large set of network devices. This chapter is broken into four major
subsection as follows:
• Section 3.2 of this chapter is used to examine the various ways network information
can be obtained from administrators and why graph theory was preferred over
other data structures in this research.
• Section 3.3 of this chapter is used to state the deployment environment of proposed
experimental network models.
• Section 3.4 of this chapter showcases how computer network policies can be
abstracted by removing details such as the network devices in the proposed layout
to be deployed. The abstractions proposed in this section have no bearing the
network layout and/or devices that such policies will be implemented on during
deployment. Inter-domain (BGP) routing policies, firewall intention policies and
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cyber security infrastructure relationships will be introduced in this section, with
more in depth discussions presented in Chapter 5 , 6 and 7 respectively.
• Section 3.5 of this chapter showcases how the network layout of a proposed
experiment can be abstracted either as re-usable blocks (or collection of devices)
or slices (cookie dough) of network layouts as the case maybe. It should be noted
that the abstractions presented in this section remove details such as the vendor
product being used, IP addresses and others from the network administrator.
3.2 Graph Theory
This chapter of the research conducted hopes to give a philosophical background of how
abstractions based on template design approach be used to simplify and/or improve the
network management process for network administrators. The following section will be
used in showcasing how our proposed abstraction methodologies can be implemented in
order to achieve the aim of simplifying the network management process.
There are multiple ways in which the network information of a proposed experiment
can be gotten from a network administrator, these include amongst many others data
structures, sets, mathematical algebraic expressions and graph theory. All these and
many others can be used to get details of a network experiment from an administrator.
Graph theory is the study of graphs which are used as a way to formally represent
networks or inter-connected devices. The inner-workings of graph theory is beyond the
scope of work conducted in this research and hence will not discussed in-depth. The
graph in Figure 3.1 below shows a basic graph with two nodes labelled A and B. The
nodes (also called vertices) are connected using an edge (also called link) in the diagram
below.
Figure 3.1: A Basic Graph
We use the nodes of a graph similar to the example in Figure3.1 above to represent
either a collection of network devices (realms) or an individual network device. The
edges of the graph in this research is used to represent the relationship between two
realms or as a link between two network devices. Graph theory have been adopted in
this research for expressing both high level network policy intentions and the intended
network layout of any given experiment. An overview of how graph theory was used to
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abstract the network management process will be conducted in this chapter and a more
detailed discussion of it will be carried out in subsequent chapters.
The abstractions proposed in this research will be adopted in graph-like formats
(using graph theory) similar to white board representations in order to simplify and make
the network management process easier to showcase and understand. The proposed
network abstractions presented in this research will be based on template design approach
discussed in Chapter 2.1.1. Graphs will be used to abstract network policy intention
and layout information of experiments which will be parsed to template snippets in
order to generate low level configuration commands. There are two types of graphs used
for the proposed abstractions in this research, these are: policy intention and network
layout graphs. The first graph type is used to express high level network policy intention
abstractions that are independent of the proposed network layout of the experiment.
The second graph type is used to express an abstraction of the network layout that is
independent of the network device vendor such as Juniper or Cisco. The nodes and
edges of the graphs have custom properties that are used in populating the NIDB of
the proposed network. A more detailed and comprehensive discussion of the graph and
properties in them will be carried out in the next Chapter 4. This chapter will be looking
at network abstraction from two angles: network policy intention level and network
layout level. The policy intention level of network abstraction is the highest level where
the relationships between group of devices with identical intentions are specified. The
network layout level of network abstraction is on a lower level than the policy intention
and deals with how network layouts of proposed experiments can be simplified and
expressed.
3.3 Deployment
The progression of the research work conducted in this thesis is to propose high level
network policy abstractions that will implemented in a virtualised environment and
then move on to real work or physical hardware deployments. There is a number of
issues that manifest with the deployment of networks in the real world such as BGP
wedgies (discussed in the next chapter) that are beyond the scope of work conducted.
Also, BGP policies are implemented based on multiple service provider agreements
that are opaque and not readily available to individuals outside the organisation. This
makes configuring BGP policies in the real world much more complex for the various
network administrators managing those networks. All the work carried out in this thesis
is therefore envisaged to be deployed in a controlled virtualised environment.
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3.4 Policy Intention Level Abstraction
This is the first part of our philosophical research contribution on network abstraction.
This section will be focusing on the highest level of the network abstraction process,
network policy intention abstraction. This level of network abstraction sought to view the
network management process from a policy specification angle. As stated in chapter 1 of
this research, network policies are a collection of rules used to govern the connectivity,
routing and/or access requirements of the devices within a proposed network layout. At
this level of abstraction, the network layout or infrastructure devices are not in contention
or specified. The network policy of devices with identical behaviour are grouped together
expressed in this section. Two network policies dealing with network routing (BGP)
and access control (firewall) will be introduced in this section. It should be noted that a
more comprehensive discussion of the network abstraction process for network inter-
domain routing and access control will be detailed in Chapter 5 and 6 of this research
respectively.
3.4.1 BGP Abstractions
This section will be giving a brief overview at our proposed high level inter domain
routing intention abstractions. A comprehensive review of BGP and what it entails is be
discussed in Chapter 5.1. However, a brief introduction regarding BGP will be given in
the following section.
Border gateway protocol, BGP, is an inter domain routing protocol that is used in
selecting the best route to any given destination; advertising reachability of prefixes;
and accepting routes from neighbouring internet service providers (ISP) or autonomous
systems. An autonomous system is a network or group of networks whose prefixes and
routing policies are under a common administration. The following are some of the BGP
business relationships that can be implemented between adjoining ISPs.
• Peer relationship - This relationship occurs when two or more similar sized
autonomous systems establish a mutually reciprocal agreement where their net-
work traffic pass through each others’ networks without charging any fee.
• Provider relationship - This relationship occurs when an AS agrees to route the
network traffic of another AS based on an agreed upon fee. The AS charging the
fee is said to be the provider.
• Customer relationship - This relationship occurs when an AS solicits the help of
another AS to route its network traffic after paying some agreed on fee. The AS
paying the money is said to be the customer of the other AS.
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• Sibling relationship - This relationship usually occurs when an organisation owns
multiple autonomous systems. This relationship typically occurs when an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) buys another ISP via acquisitions or mergers. In a sibling
relationship, an AS can export its routes, customer routes as well as provider and
peer routes.
• Hybrid relationship - This BGP business relationships occur when two ASes
agree to have a combination of more than business relationship either based on
geographical location or IP version.
These relationships are implemented on network routers using BGP path attributes
such as the community attribute. The community attribute provides a way of grouping
destination that have similar routing decisions applied on them.
As stated earlier, the abstraction proposed in this section hopes to concentrate
on the high level BGP business relationship between autonomous systems. Network
abstractions are only good if the proposed devices in the experiments are configured and
behave as intended by the high level policy specification. A graph is used to express the
high level BGP business relationship between autonomous systems. The nodes in the
BGP policy intention graph are used to specify the autonomous systems involved in the
proposed network. The edges between the nodes (or autonomous systems) are used to
indicate the BGP business relationship using the edge label which can be peer, provider,
customer or any of the other relationships mentioned above.
The example in figure 3.2 below shows a high level abstraction of a hypothetical
relationship between five autonomous systems and their various business relationships.
The example in figure 3.3 below shows the network layout diagram of the hypothet-
ical experiment from the high level BGP routing relationship discussed above. Routers
rOrange1 and rOrange2 belong to Orange autonomous system; rTata belongs to Tata
autonomous system; rBT belongs to BT autonomous system; rVodafone belongs to
Vodafone autonomous system and rVirgin1, rVirgin2 and rVirgin3 belong to Virgin
autonomous system.
From the diagram above, all links between routers in the same autonomous sys-
tem will have internal BGP sessions configured. Links between routers in different
autonomous system will however have external BGP sessions configured according to
the business relationship from Figure 3.2 above. In order to implement the business
relationship between routers in different autonomous systems, we configure community
attributes of BGP to achieve low level implementation. The community attribute will be
used to tag prefixes belonging to customer, peer and provider routes. The appropriate
prefixes depending on the business relationship between the routers are then exported
according to the high level policy intentions.
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Figure 3.2: Abstraction of a hypothetical Internet
Figure 3.3: Hypothetical Internet Layout
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3.4.2 Firewall Abstractions
This section will be giving a brief overview of our proposed high level firewall (or access
control) abstractions. A comprehensive review of firewalls, how they work and where
they are placed in networks will be discussed in Chapter 6. However, a brief introduction
regarding firewalls will be given in the following section.
A firewall is a computer hardware or software that is used to protect individual
computers and/or corporate networks from hostile attacks. A firewall achieves this by
filtering (or blocking) the passage of undesirable data traffic from crossing into or out of
a network. Firewalls block or allow network traffic based on a set of rules established by
the organisation in its security policy and configured by the network administrator. The
rules define a specific pattern based on a tuple that the firewall detects and an action to
be taken. Therefore a firewall rule has the following tuple options: <action> <protocol>
<source IP> <source port> <destination IP> <destination port> Firewalls try to match
network traffic patterns from the first rule to the last as contained in the rule base in
a sequential order. Firewalls always enforce the first rule that matches and hence rule
ordering in the rule base is very important. The most important and utilised rules should
be at the top of the rule base so as to ensure the firewall works efficiently. Firewall rules
designed and configured by network administrators may be prone to anomalies that can
render parts of the network either unaccessible or open to malicious attacks. There are
two categories in which firewall anomalies can be grouped into, these are: intra firewall
anomalies and inter firewall anomalies. Intra-firewall anomalies include: shadowing,
irrelevance, correlation, generalisation and redundancy. Inter-firewall anomalies include:
redundancy, spuriousness, shadowing and correlation.
As stated earlier, the abstraction proposed in this section hopes to concentrate on the
high level access control policies using firewalls between network device or group of
network devices (or realms) with identical policy intentions. Similar to the abstractions
proposed for inter domain routing, graphs will be used to express the high level access
control policies between two realms.
The nodes in the firewall policy intention graphs are used to specify realms (a device
of group of network devices with identical policies) which transforms on the network
layout level as a network firewall enabled device or an IP address in the firewall tuple
information during low level firewall commands. For example, universities can choose to
group network devices in their networks according to students, staff, campus, laboratory
and such. Likewise an organisation can choose to group their network according to staff,
visitors, management and departments amongst many others.
The edges in our firewall policy intention abstraction graphs are used to specify the
remaining firewall tuple information between the two realms such as protocol; source
and destination ports; and action to be taken on the matched network traffic pattern.
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Labels of edges are used in specifying whether the action to be taken on the network
traffic is either "permit" or "deny". It should be noted that any other phrases used
during proposed experiments for abstractions will not work. There are five edge custom
properties that have been developed for specifying the other firewall tuple information
needed for firewall rules with default values in case a network administrator omits any
of them. These edge properties are service (service), protocol (protocol), source port
(sPort), destination port (dPort) and an external source/destination IP address or network
(dest).
• The protocol edge property has been developed to give network administrators
an avenue of specifying the protocol which can be either TCP, UDP or any other
type of protocol value accepted by the firewall vendor product to be used during
the experiment. This edge property has a default value of "IP" if a network
administrator does not specify any value here.
• The dPort edge property is used to specify the destination port value for a given
firewall tuple as a way of giving network administrators additional granularity
during firewall policy abstraction specification. It should be noted that this value
when specified along with the service property option discussed above, the pre-
configured port number of a service will be overridden with the dPort value. For
example, if a network administrator enters www (for web service pre-configured
with TCP on ports 80 and 8080) and specifies a dPort value of 52435, ports 80 and
8080 of the pre-configured service value will be overridden with the new dPort
value of 52435. This edge property has a default value of "NULL" if a user does
not specify any value here.
• The sPort edge property is used to specify the source port value for a given
firewall tuple as a way of giving network administrators additional granularity
during firewall policy intention specification. This edge property has a default
value of "NULL" if a network adminstrator does not specify any value here.
• The service edge property is used as an abstraction of the protocol and destination
port number of a firewall tuple information. This gives the network administrator a
way of specifying various network services such as dns (for domain name service),
www (for web service using TCP on ports 80 and 8080), torrent (for torrent service
using UDP on ports such as). This edge property has a default value of "NULL" if
a network administrator does not specify any value here.
• The dest edge property is used to specify a network device or group of network
devices not within the experimental network layout to be deployed. This edge
property can either be a source or destination IP address of a network device or
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group of network devices. This edge property has a default value of "NULL" if a
user does not specify any value here. Additional information of how an external
source or destination address is specified will be covered in Chapter 6.
The example in Figure 3.4 below shows a high level abstraction of a firewall policies
with three realms (group of network devices that have similar policies) and the various
access control relationships between them. There are fourteen firewall university network
experiment.
Figure 3.4: Abstraction of a hypothetical university network
The full detail of the edge properties used for each firewall rule abstraction is outlined
in Table below.
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Table 3.1: Proposed University Firewall Policy Intention Details
Source
Realm
Destination
Realm
Action Protocol
Destination
Port
Destination
Address
Source
Port
any any permit ICMP NULL NULL NULL
any any deny TCP 80, 8080
d www.gorillavid.in,
d www.twitter.com
NULL
management any permit TCP
40728,
3689
NULL NULL
management management deny ICMP NULL NULL NULL
management management permit IP NULL s 1.2.3.4 NULL
management research deny IP NULL NULL NULL
research management permit TCP 54321 NULL 54321
campus any deny TCP telnet, ftp NULL NULL
campus campus permit IP 80, 8080
d www.gorillavid.in,
d www.twitter.com
NULL
any campus permit TCP ssh NULL NULL
3.5 Network Layout Level Abstraction
The second level of the network management process abstractions showcases how net-
work layouts can be abstracted. It should be noted that the abstractions presented in
this section hide details such as IP addresses and proprietary network devices from the
network administrator. The abstractions proposed in this section allow network adminis-
trators to specify network layouts using graphical editors for proposed experiments.
The nodes in the network layout graph are used to represent various network devices
such as firewalls, servers, routers and others during any proposed experiment. Network
devices within the graph can be assigned into various BGP or firewall intention policy
realms within any proposed experiment. The policy intention selected at this phase
is used in configuring policies that network devices will be using in the proposed
experiment. Node options have been developed to specify which firewall or BGP realm
a network device belongs to in a proposed experiment. This node option takes a string
value of the policy intention realm’s label of the proposed experiment. The value entered
must be an exact match of the characters used as the policy intention realm’s label.
The edges between the devices in this graph are used to represent the link connecting
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two network devices. The only set of edge options implemented for our research
abstractions on the network layout level has to do with manually specifying IP addresses
so as to support the varying degrees of flexibility for network administrators. Edge
options called sIP and dIP are used to specify custom addresses for each link within
the proposed network. It should be noted that by default IP addresses are automatically
generated for the entire network devices in an experiment.
This section outlines how to abstract a network topology in two ways - as a chunk of
networks and/or slices of networks.
3.5.1 Chunks of Network Topologies
This section outlines how to abstract a collection of network devices that can be used in
multiple instances of an experiment or different experiments by a network administrators.
This abstraction has been designed in order to further reduce the time spent by a network
administrator when developing an experiment that has multiple instances of the same
block or group of network devices during the design process of a proposed experiment.
For example, when designing an enterprise firewall network for a university, there might
be a need for multiple instances of a laboratory network. A number of departments can
all have a laboratory network with the same number of computers; services running
on the computers; wireless routers and firewalls as the case maybe. Abstracting this
collection of network devices can amongst others: reduce the time needed to design this
block of devices whenever the network administrator encounters such a collection of
network devices; reduce the likelihood of mistakes during the design process and ensure
the high level policies of this block is the same throughout the proposed network. This
motivated us to provide a way of abstracting such blocks for network administrators in
an easy and modular way.
This set of abstractions can be used by a network administrator by creating a graph
of the proposed block (group of network devices) in exactly the same way as the
network layout phase of the system that has been developed for validating our research
abstractions. This graph is as described in the Phase II of our system detailed in the
previous chapter. Nodes labeled ext are used to indicate where the collection of network
devices will be connected to a proposed experiment. It should be noted that there can be
more than one connection points for network blocks in any experiment. The following
sections show how this can be achieved.
The collection of network devices, or block, can be placed within the network layout
graph during the design process. A sample university network will be used to showcase
our proposed abstraction technique in this section. The high level firewall policy intention
described in Figure 3.4 above will be used in the example detailed in this section. The
network layout graph of the proposed hypothetical university network is depicted in
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Figure 3.5 below.
Figure 3.5: Proposed Hypothetical University Network Layout Diagram
The departments of the proposed university have identical network layouts hence
the nodes eDept and cDept have block custom property value of department as they
abstractions of such infrastructures. These nodes are abstraction of a collection of
network devices used in representing entire departmental networks of the proposed
university. Figure 3.6 below shows the network layout of the collection devices abstracted
for the departmental networks.
As indicated in Figure 3.6 below, all departmental networks will have a set of servers
that will be used by staff members of hypothetical university in our example designated
as S1, S2 and S3. The network will also have a set of servers for research members
of the department designated as R1, R2 and R3 in the same diagram. There is also
another abstract network layout representation called Lab for all departmental networks.
It should be noted that all the departments in our hypothetical university example have
these exact network devices and links as represented in figure 3.6 below.
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Figure 3.6: Department Block Net-
work Layout Diagram
Figure 3.7: Department Block Net-
work Layout Diagram
The laboratory network depicted in Figure 3.6 is another abstract representation of
a collection of network devices specified as node, Lab in the diagram. The laboratory
network of our proposed hypothetical university is also representation of lecture halls
where students are taught within departments. The network is composed of student
laptops/tablets represented as l1, l2 and l3 in figure 3.7 above. The network also has a
server which is a machine connected to a projector typically used by the instructor for
teaching. The devices www and nfs are used to represent a web server where students can
access course materials directly and a storage server for submitting projects respectively.
It is expected that all departmental networks in the university have a similar setup for
their laboratories.
The diagram in figure 3.8 shows the network of how our hypothetical university will
look like during low level deployment. As can be seen, both blocks, cDept and eDept,
have been added into the final network layout. Likewise the laboratory networks of block
Lab nested within the departmental networks has also been added into the final network
topology.
Additional departmental networks can be easily integrated into the existing infrastruc-
ture by adding more blocks in figure 3.5 to represent new departments commissioned
by the hypothetical university. The network administrators of the university can easily
update agreed upon firewall policy intentions or network infrastructures using abstrac-
tions on blocks of departments or laboratories. For example, if the management of
the university wants to change the network layout of laboratory networks to include
additional network devices or change the firewall policy intention realm of some devices
within the infrastructure, they can do so easily without disrupting the university network.
The single change will also be replicated across all departmental networks.
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Figure 3.8: Final Rendered Hypothetical University Network Layout Diagram
3.5.2 Slices of Network Layouts
The second part of our abstractions in the network layout abstraction level looks at
designing network layout slices that will be replicated as the high level network policy
intention requires. This enables the replication of identical network layouts except for
the allocation of IP addresses for the network devices in the proposed experiment. A
good example of where slices of network layouts are used has to do with cyber security
competitions abstractions. This is because all participating teams in such competitions
need to have identical layouts so as to ensure a level playing field for all participants. A
more comprehensive assessment of this network layout abstraction will be carried out in
chapter 7.
3.6 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis introduced how network concepts can be abstracted so as
to make the network management process easier. The chapter introduced template
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design approaches to abstracting firewall policies; inter domain routing policies and
network layout abstraction. This chapter was written so as to show how network
processes can be abstracted for the user’s benefit. Many other network concepts such as
tunnelling, datacenter and other services such as DNS, DHCP can be easily abstracted
using techniques detailed in this section of the thesis. The layout diagram in Figure
3.9 below details how many other network concepts can be abstracted for network
administrators. For example, policies such as all network traffic between the branch
networks in the diagram and the HQNet will be encrypted using IPSEC or any other
tunnelling protocols can be abstracted on a policy intention level using a between the
realms and having a encryption property option.
Figure 3.9: Illustrational Topology Showcasing Network Concepts
The next chapter of the thesis will be used to introduce and give an overview of the
system we developed to evaluate the scalability, flexibility and limitations of the network
policy abstraction techniques proposed.
Chapter 4
NePAS Framework Design
This section discusses the design consideration of a system that will be used to evaluate
the abstraction techniques proposed for various network policies called Network Policy
Abstraction System (NePAS).
NePAS is a framework that is used in compiling and deploying conflict free vendor-
specific configuration from abstract high level network policy intentions and associated
network topology graphs. The graphs that are generated for the high-level policy
intentions are designed to be independent of the network layout devices. Likewise the
graphs generated for the representation of the proposed network layout are independent
of vendor-platform that will be used for compiling low-level configuration commands.
Both the policy intention and network layout graphs are produced using graphical editors
such as yED. The graphs to be generated use nodes and edges to express both the intended
policy consideration and network layouts. The NePAS framework was developed using
template design approach discussed in chapter 2.1.1. NePAS uses a combination of
network policy template snippets and NIDB gotten from the various in order to generate
Cisco VIRL configuration files that can be used to deploy the proposed network in Cisco
VIRL. The NePAS framework is designed around five phases as follows:
• Phase I - Policy Intention: the first phase of NePAS is where the network policy
intention is described independent of the network topology layout. Inter-domain
routing policy intention, firewall access policy intention, cyber security exercise
intentions are expressed in an abstract, simple, and easy manner using graphs in
this case.
• Phase II - Network Layout: the second phase of NePAS is where the actual layout
of the proposed network is represented in a vendor-independent manner using
graphs. The various network policies designed in Phase I can then be assigned to
various network devices in this phase of NePAS.
• Phase III - Anomaly Resolution: the third phase of NePAS is where the network
layout devices with their respective high level policy intentions are passed through
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various network anomaly resolution algorithms before low level configuration
commands are compiled. This is to ensure the final deployments are conflict free
and behave as intended by network administrators.
• Phase IV - Compilation: the fourth phase of NePAS is where a Cisco VIRL
XML file with a set of conflict free vendor-specific device-centric configuration
commands for all the devices of the proposed network are generated.
Figure 4.1: NePAS Framework
Figure 4.1 above illustrates the sequencing of phases of the system proposed in this
thesis. A combination of high level network policy intention and a vendor-independent
network layout are processed using template design approach so as to automatically
generate Cisco VIRL configuration files that can then be deployed in VM Maestro
workspaces. The following section provides and in-depth discussion of the design of the
various phases of NePAS.
4.1 Policy Intention Abstraction Phase
This is the first phase of NePAS where the network policy intention of the proposed
network is expressed. At this level of abstraction, network devices such as routers,
firewalls, switches, and many other middle-boxes that are used in enterprise networks
are in contention. NePAS is able to abstract that level of detail so as to give a network
administrator the freedom of representing various network policy intentions such as
firewall relationships, BGP routing policies or cyber security exercise approaches using
graphical editors without thinking about how the actual layout of the network will
look like or the type of devices that will be used for the proposed experiment. The
following are the two major aspects used in specifying any type of network intention
policy implemented by NePAS in this phase.
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4.1.1 Realms
The nodes of a policy intention graph are used by NePAS to represent realms which can
either be a single network device (such as a servers, firewalls, routers, etc.) or a group of
devices that form a network (such Autonomous Systems, CDX teams or devices with
identical access control policies) as the case maybe. It should be noted that a device or
group of devices within a realm must have identical network policy intentions. Realms
need to be labeled as their labels will be useful in the network layout phase of NePAS
to be discussed in the following section of the thesis. The only reserved NePAS label
for realms in a policy intention graph is the keyword ’any’. This label, any, has been
reserved for expressing firewall relationships in NePAS and can only be used in that
context. The use of the keyword ’any’ for a purpose other than firewall relationships
will be ignored by NePAS. Detailed explanation of the usage of the keyword any will
be covered in Chapter 6.2. There are additional details needed to fully represent realms
in a network policy intentions graph of a proposed network such details are referred to
as realm options. Realm Options - are policy details that will be used on the nodes (or
realms) of a given network policy intention graph to further express additional details
of the proposed network experiment. For example a realm in a BGP network policy
intention graph can have custom optional values that will allow a user to specify the
autonomous system number. These custom attributes can either have default values
while in other cases it is imperative to declare a specific value. This is to enable NePAS
to abstract a lot of network policy specification details while providing a very flexible
setup so as to express various levels of network abstractions.
4.1.2 Relationships
The edges that connect realms are used by NePAS to represent the network policy
relationship between the two associated realms. The labels on the edges between realms
state the exact network policy relationship between the two realms. For example in
firewall intentions, the edges are either accept or deny to reflect the action that will be
taken by the firewall rule. Edges at this level of abstraction do not have the typical default
values that are popular with network graph abstraction which activates a default value if
details have been omitted on edges in the graph. This is because NePAS uses the label
on edges between realms to know what type of network policy relationship it is dealing
with during the compilation process. Hence if any edge label is omitted intentionally or
unintentionally, an error message will be generated automatically. There are additional
details needed to fully represent realm relationships in the network policy intentions
graph of a proposed network. The additional details are called edge or relationship
options. Edge Options - are policy details that are used on the edges (or relationships) of
a given graph to further express additional details of the network policy intention. Some
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of these details such as the destination port of a firewall rule which represents the port
numbers or service names can be abstracted and expressed in a very easy manner for
the network administrator in the form of custom properties. For example, service with
value www in a given firewall relationship can be used to represent web server running
on port 80. These custom attributes can either have default values while in other cases it
is imperative to declare a specific value. This is to enable NePAS to abstract network
policy specification details while providing a very flexible setup so as to express various
network policies.
4.2 Network Layout Abstraction Phase
This is the second phase of NePAS where the actual network infrastructure devices
of the proposed network are expressed in a vendor independent manner. The network
layout is expressed in a graphical format in a way similar to the policy intention detailed
in the previous section. The abstraction at this level is similar to current automated
configuration systems that use graphical editors for their input such as Autonetkit
amongst many others. It should be noted that the abstractions proposed in this phase
allow network administrators to express re-usable blocks and network slices as stated in
the previous chapter. The level of abstraction in this phase of NePAS is lower than the
policy intention abstraction as routers, switches and other network devices are featured
here. The network policies defined in the previous section will be assigned to the various
network devices as the proposed network dictates in this phase of NePAS. It should be
noted that low level configurations such as IP addressing can still be abstracted at this
level depending on the requirements of the proposed network. In this phase of NePAS,
nodes within a graph are used to represent various network devices such as routers,
firewalls, servers, switches and many others. The edges of a network layout graph are
used to specify the logical structure (or link) of the connected network devices.
4.2.1 Network Devices
The nodes of a network layout graph in this phase are used to represent network devices
such as routers, firewalls and servers amongst others. The label of a node in the network
layout graph is used to denote the name of the network device during the low level
configuration process. The nodes used to express various network devices in this phase
are designed to have node options for additional properties. Node options are essential
for expressing the network device and the policy group a node belongs to in the network
layout abstraction phase of NePAS. There are three node options that have been provided
for devices during the expression of the network layout in NePAS. These node options
are as follows: (i) the type of network device the node represents within the graph (ii)
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the firewall realm the network device belongs to from the policy intention graph supplied
(iii) the BGP realm a router belongs to in the policy intention graph supplied.
The first node option used as a custom property for network devices in the network
layout graph is called dtype. This node option is used in specifying the type of network
device NePAS will be dealing with. The optional a device type can take include server,
router, kali and many others. The device type selected influences the disk image to be
used during the low level configuration process as some servers have applications off until
activated at this stage by selecting the appropriate node option. A very good example
here are servers selected with various vulnerabilities during a cyber security competition.
The option selected at this point also influences the type of network interface type to be
used for low level configuration of the various device types in the network. The interface
used by servers is different from the ones used by network devices such as routers or
firewalls.
The second node option used as a custom property for network devices is called
fwpol. This option is designed to indicate the firewall policy intention realm a network
device belongs to in the policy intention graph. The value selected in this phase is
used in configuring the firewall policies of the various network devices in the proposed
network. It should be noted that devices such as switches, firewalls and routers are not
expected to have firewall policies. Hence NePAS has been designed to ignore firewall
policies assigned to such devices during low level configuration command compilation.
A detailed description of how this node option is to be implemented is carried out in
chapter 6 of this thesis.
The third and last node option used as a custom property designed in this phase
for network routers is called bgppol. This option has been designed to indicate the
BGP policy intention realm the network router belongs to in the policy intention graph.
This option determines the autonomous system a router belongs and the type of BGP
relationship it has with other routers in the proposed network as expressed in the policy
intention graph. It should be noted that only routers are designed to have this option
and if a server or switch is assigned this value, NePAS will ignore it during processing.
A detailed description of how this node option is to be implemented is carried out in
chapter 5 of this thesis.
4.2.2 Links
The edges of a network layout graph are used to specify the logical structure between
the two connected network devices. The edges of a network layout graph do not make
use of its label and hence will be ignored if specified during the low level configuration
process. The edges between two nodes in a network layout graph has been designed
with two custom edge options. These set of options have to do with specification of
CHAPTER 4. NEPAS FRAMEWORK DESIGN 50
low level IP addressing for the network devices connected by the edge. This is so as to
give network administrators greater abstraction flexibility when deploying a proposed
network. The two edge options designed in this phase can either be manually assigned
or generated and allocated to connected devices are called sIP and dIP. The two options
are designed by default to take ’NULL’ values and hence a pair of IP addresses will be
generated automatically.
4.3 Network Anomaly Resolution Phase
This is the third phase of NePAS where the policy intention and network layout graphs
are combined and passed through various anomaly resolution algorithms. This phase is
designed to resolve anomalies that arise after the low level configuration process. During
the merger of the policy intention and network layout graphs, a number of anomalies
can come up that will impact the final deployment of the proposed networks. The
various network policy anomaly resolution algorithms designed in this phase ensure
final networks deployed do not suffer issues of network connectivity, performance and
security lapses amongst others. Network policy anomalies that are handled are those that
occur during the generation of network configuration commands. Anomalies that occur
after the proposed network has been deployed due to network changes are out the scope
of our research and are not handled.
4.4 Compilation Phase
The fourth and last phase of NePAS is designed to generate a set of vendor specific
policy configuration commands for all devices of the proposed network. NePAS is
designed to use template design approach to generate the low-level vendor specific
configuration commands that will be used for configuring the devices of the proposed
network with their respective network policies supported by NePAS. Using the template
design approach of automated configuration, a number of snippets have been developed
for NePAS to generate the appropriate low-level configuration commands of the network
policies for the various devices within the proposed network. The configuration snippets
will be using the output from the anomaly resolution section such as IP addresses and
also handles the ordering of filters so as to generate consistent and anomaly-free low-
level configuration commands for the proposed network. Finally, NePAS will generate
an XML file that can be easily exported into Cisco VIRL for the deployment of the
proposed experiment. The file generated is designed to be used for deployment of the
proposed network in Cisco VIRL with configuration snippets for the high level network
policy intentions.
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During the compilation process, NePAS generates a number of log messages that is
used to show what is going on behind the scene and reporting the progress. These log
messages can be broadly categorised into three groups: information messages; warning
messages and error messages.
4.5 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis gives a detailed overview of the system developed to evaluate
the limitation of the network policy abstractions that are proposed for our research
project. The system developed is composed of four phases: policy intention; network
layout; anomaly resolution and compilation. The next chapter will be used to introduce
the concept behind inter domain routing protocol, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The
chapter will move on to discuss the network policy abstraction that we have developed
for BGP business relationships.
Chapter 5
BGP Abstraction
5.1 Background
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) interconnect with each other using routing protocols
in order to provide global connectivity to their respective customers based on a set of
routing policies. A routing policy defines how routing information is exchanged between
ISPs. Routing protocols are used to find the best path between two nodes either within
an ISP network or between multiple ISP networks. There are two categories of routing
protocols used by ISPs to provide connectivity to their customers, these are as: internal
(or intra domain) routing protocols and external (or inter domain) routing. The research
done in this project focuses on external routing protocol Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
and hence internal routing protocols will not be discussed. BGP is the standard protocol
used for inter domain routing. BGP allows an ISP to choose a routing policy that will be
used in (i) selecting the best route to any given destination, (ii) advertising reachability
of prefixes and (iii) accepting routes from neighbouring ISPs.
An autonomous system (AS) is a network or group of networks whose prefixes and
routing policies are under a common administration. Autonomous systems help reduce
huge routing information by reducing the number of entries of networks. Autonomous
systems interconnect at dedicated points of presence(POPs) or public Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs)[82]. An IXP is a collocation crafted with networking equipment where
participating ASes can connect to each other.
An autonomous system is identified using a unique 16-bit number called an autonom-
ous system number. In recent years projects such as [98] are proposing a 32-bit autonom-
ous system numbers The details of this project is beyond the scppe of the research
conducted in this thesis and hence will not be discussed. Autonomous system numbers
can be categorised into private and public autonomous system numbers. Private autonom-
ous system numbers range between 64,512-65,534 and are used by organisations to
implement BGP within their network. Public autonomous system numbers on the other
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hand range between 1-64511 and are used to connect multiple autonomous systems
together. Autonomous system numbers are not needed for networks that have only one
block of IP addresses (single prefix) or a single connection to their ISP[59]. Figure 5.1
below shows a hypothetical network of autonomous systems with their corresponding
AS numbers.
Figure 5.1: Typical BGP Network
BGP as stated earlier is a protocol used by autonomous systems to decide how
to get traffic from a user within an AS network to another user in a different AS
network. BGP is a path vector (and also distance vector) protocol featuring a set of
complex metrics used in exchanging network reachability information within an AS
network and between multiple autonomous systems. BGP being a path-vector protocol,
allows an AS to add its AS number to the beginning of the AS path before advertising
the route to the next AS[22]. In order to reduce the size of the BGP routing tables
and improve scalability, BGP can supernet an address block. BGP is concerned with
exchanging routing information between autonomous systems in a scalable manner.
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BGP is an application layer protocol that works over TCP on port 179 and is used to
allow autonomous systems to implement their respective routing policies for selecting
and propagating IP prefixes. Network router peers need to have BGP configured and
form a TCP connection in order to begin exchange of routing information. Once a TCP
connection between the two BGP router peers is active, a router can then send or receive
list of routes from configured neighbouring peers. The router will scrutinise the routes
to be sent or received using a route selection algorithm specified by the AS routing
policy. BGP route updates are stored in a Routing Information Base (RIB) with only one
route per destination stored. BGP routers do not send periodic routing updates because
BGP is an incremental protocol and hence only changes to routing table information are
exchanged. The route configuration process with BGP have two types of messages upon
initialisation, these are - update messages[63] and keep alive messages[34].
BGP used within an autonomous system is referred to as Internal BGP or iBGP. BGP
routers use internal BGP sessions to communicate within an AS. This is essentially used
to distribute routes learned from external autonomous systems among border routers[33].
These sessions are not IGP-like and cannot be used in isolation for routing between
nodes within the autonomous system. Internal BGP sessions provide a way in which
routers inside an autonomous system can use BGP to exchange information about
external routes. These sessions are routed via whatever IGP is being used within the
autonomous system. The first router to introduce a route into internal BGP sets the
next hop attribute to its loop-back address and all other internal BGP routers within
the AS preserve the setting. IGPs do not scale as well as internal BGP and cannot
implement the rich attributes present in BGP and hence IGP cannot be used in place
of internal BGP[42]. The scalability of internal BGP is limited due to the requirement
that internal BGP routers be connected via a complete mesh[64]. The technique used in
improving the quadratic scaling of internal BGP sessions include: Route reflectors[20];
and Confederations[39]. The above techniques are out of the scope of this research and
hence will not be discussed.
BGP used between autonomous systems is referred to as External BGP or eBGP.
External BGP sessions are used between BGP speaking routers in different autonomous
systems. This is the standard mode in which BGP is used. The external BGP sessions
operate over a one-hop IP path. An external BGP router must disseminate routes of
external prefixes to all the other routers in the autonomous system[16]. This external
BGP dissemination must meet two important goals: (i) loop-free forwarding: routes
picked by all routers should be free of deflections and forwarding loops. (ii) complete
visibility: BGP should allow each autonomous system to be treated as a single monolithic
entity. The external BGP speaking routers within an autonomous system must exchange
external route information so that they have a complete view of all external routes.
Listing 5.1 below shows a sample Cisco BGP configuration based on the business
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relationships depicted in Figure 5.1 above.
Listing 5.1: Basic Cisco BGP Configuration for AS6435
! (this is a comment)
router bgp 6435
neighbor 10.0.0.6 remote-as 6435
neighbor 10.0.0.6 description TATA-iBGP-Router
neighbor 20.0.0.1 remote-as 1239
neighbor 20.0.0.1 description eBGP-to-Sprint
neighbor 30.0.0.1 remote-as 38930
neighbor 30.0.0.1 description eBGP-to-FiberRing
neighbor 40.0.0.1 remote-as 3292
neighbor 40.0.0.1 description eBGP-to-RDC
neighbor 50.0.0.1 remote-as 7321
neighbor 50.0.0.1 description eBGP-to-TATA2.0
!
5.1.1 BGP Path Attributes
BGP path attributes are the characteristics an advertised BGP route uses to influence the
autonomous system’s routing policies. BGP attributes can be set in the following three
possible locations: locally; neighbour and neither. BGP path attributes are categorised
into either (i) well-known or (ii) optional attributes[23].
Well-known attributes: the attributes under this category must be recognised during
every update message to peers. The well-known attributes can be further broken down
into two: Mandatory (also called well-known mandatory) are attributes that are always
included and carried in both iBGP and eBGP update messages to peers. Discretionary
(also called well-known discretionary) are attributes that may or may not be included in
BGP update messages. The network administrator decides whether or not to use these
attributes on update messages to its peers.
Optional attributes: the attributes under this category are not required or expected
to be supported by all BGP implementations. The optional attributes can be further
broken down into two: Transitive (also called optional transitive) are attributes that
are recognised by some BGP speaking routers but not all. However if the attributes
transitive flag is set, the attribute should be accepted and advertised to its other BGP
peers. Non-transitive (also called optional non-transitive) are attributes that can be
ignored if their transitive flag is not set. A BGP speaking router that receives an update
from its neighbouring peer with this attribute can ignore the attribute if its transitive flag
is not set and the router will not advertise the attribute to its peers.
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Attribute Name Category
Next_Hop Well-known mandatory
Local_Preference Well-known discretionary
Origin Well-known mandatory
AS_Path Well-known mandatory
Multi_Exit_Disc (MED) Optional non-transitive
Community Optional transitive
Table 5.1: BGP Path Attributes and Categorisation
Table 5.1 above shows the BGP path attributes discussed in this research and their
various categorisation. The following section discusses some of the major BGP path
attributes supported by BGP-enabled routers in a network.
• Next Hop[83]
The next hop address specifies the IP address that will be used to reach the
destination being advertised. The following set of rules are used to govern various
BGP implementation scenarios on using the next hop address. (i) A BGP speaking
router advertising a route in an update message uses its address as the next hop IP
address if the peer it is sending the update message is in a different AS. (ii) A BGP
speaking router will use its address when advertising a route that is within the AS
in an update message to a router within the same AS. (iii) A BGP speaking router
that is advertising a destination network in another AS in an update message to a
BGP speaking router within its AS will use the IP address of the external BGP
speaking router that sent the advertisement to the AS.
• Origin[11]
The origin attribute is a well-known mandatory attribute generated by a BGP
speaking router that originates reachability information. This attribute is used to
indicate how BGP learned about a particular route. There are three possible values
the origin attribute can have, these are: 0 refers to an update originating from IGP;
1 refers to an update originating from EGP; and 2 for INCOMPLETE, when a
route originates from another routing protocol instead of BGP.
• Weight[87]
This is a Cisco-defined attribute that is applied locally within a router. This
attribute is not advertised to neighbouring router peers. The value of a weight
ranges between 0 and 65,535 and used when a router learns about more than one
route to a destination. The route with the highest weight value is preferred over
others. All routes learnt from a BGP peer have values of 0 and all routes generated
by a local router have values of 32,768 by default. Figure 5.2 below shows a
sample network that employs a weight attribute on the router in AS1239. In the
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figure, the traffic destined to AS3292 will be routed via AS6435 because the BGP
session has a higher weight value compared to the path via AS38930.
Figure 5.2: Example of a BGP Network Employing Weight Attribute
Listing 5.2 below shows an excerpt of how to configure Cisco Weight attribute
using the neighbor command. This is one of three methods used in configuring
Cisco weight attribute.
RT3#
router bgp 1239
neighbor 1.1.1.1 remote-as 6435
neighbor 1.1.1.1 weight 100
!--- The route to 4.0.0.0/16 via AS6435 has a 100 weight.
neighbor 2.2.2.2 remote-as 38930
neighbor 2.2.2.2 weight 0
!--- The route to 4.0.0.0/16 via AS38930 has a 0 weight.
Listing 5.2: Using neighbor Command to Configure Cisco Weight
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• Local Preference[52] The local preference attribute is included in all update
messages a BGP speaking router sends to other internal peers. Local preference is
the internal cost of a destination used to ensure AS-wide consistency. It is used
to prefer a particular exit point from the local AS. It is propagated throughout
the local AS and used to select the exit point of a specific route. This attribute
will be ignored if it is included in an update message to external peers except in
BGP confederations. The route with the highest local preference value is preferred
over all others and is used to ensure revenue generating routes are preferred over
expensive routes. Figure 5.3 below shows a sample network that employs a local
preference attribute. In the figure, the traffic from AS38930 will exit via AS1239
because that route has a higher local preference value compared to the path via
AS6435.
Figure 5.3: Example of a BGP Network Using Local Preference
Listing 5.3 below shows an excerpt of how to configure local preference attribute
on a Cisco router.
Listing 5.3: Excerpt Cisco Local Preference Configuration
RT4#
router bgp 38930
neighbor 1.1.1.1 remote-as 6435
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neighbor 2.2.2.1 remote-as 38930
bgp default local-preference 150
RT5#
router bgp 38930
neighbor 3.3.3.3 remote-as 1239
neighbor 2.2.2.2 remote-as 38930
bgp default local-preference 200
• AS Path[60]
The AS-Path attribute is used to identify the autonomous systems through which
the reachability information in the update message have passed. Every BGP
speaking router when advertising a route to its neighbour will prepend its AS
number to an ordered list of AS numbers called the AS-Path attribute. The
subsequent BGP speaking routers that receive this update will also prepend their
own AS numbers to the list. The shorter AS-path lengths are preferred over longer
ones. AS-path is a mechanism through which BGP uses to achieve the following
two purposes: (i) routing loop avoidance; (ii) help pick suitable path amongst
multiple choices. Figure 5.4 below shows a sample network that employs an AS
Path attribute.
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Figure 5.4: Example of a BGP Network Showing AS Path Attribute
• Multi-Exit Discriminator[53]
The MED attribute is used by an AS to suggest the preferred entry or exit point
into an autonomous system when it has multiple options to its eBGP peers. The
MED attribute allows an AS with multiple entry or exit points to influence an
entry or exit point that is preferred by a neighbouring AS. The value of the MED
attribute is a four octet unsigned number called metric. The exit or entry point
with the lowest metric is preferred over others. This attribute is propagated over
internal BGP to other BGP speaking routers within the AS when it is received over
external BGP. The MED attribute however cannot be propagated by the receiving
AS because it is used to influence traffic between the two connected autonomous
systems. Figure 5.5 below shows a sample network that employs a Multi-Exit
Discriminator attribute.
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Figure 5.5: Example of a BGP Network Using MED Attribute
Listing 5.4: Excerpt Cisco MED Configuration
RT1#
router bgp 6435
neighbor 1.1.1.2 remote-as 38930
neighbor 6.6.6.6 remote-as 38930
neighbor 5.5.5.3 remote-as 1239
bgp bestpath as-path ignore
....
RT4#
router bgp 38930
neighbor 1.1.1.1 remote-as 6435
neighbor 1.1.1.1 route-map setmetricout out
neighbor 2.2.2.1 remote-as 300
route-map setmetricout permit 10
set metric 120
....
RT5#
router bgp 38930
neighbor 6.6.6.7 remote-as 6435
neighbor 6.6.6.7 route-map setmetricout out
neighbor 2.2.2.2 remote-as 38930
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route-map setmetricout permit 10
set metric 200
....
RT3#
router bgp 1239
neighbor 5.5.5.4 remote-as 6435
neighbor 5.5.5.4 route-map setmetricout out
route-map setmetricout permit 10
set metric 50
• Community[37]
The community attribute provides a way of grouping destinations that usually
have similar routing decisions applied on them. This attribute tries to simplify
policy enforcement by grouping BGP peers with common properties to share a
set of routing policy. Community attribute is a set of four octet value represented
using the hex format always. According to Chandra and Traina [25], the first two
octets are the AS-number and the last two octets are an administratively defined
identifier. An AS can use the community attribute to set the local preference
and MED attribute discussed above instead of setting these attributes individually.
Route maps are generally a good way of implementing the community attribute.
There are four major well-known community values, these are as follows:
(i) No-Export: routes received with this community value cannot be advertised to
external BGP peers. The only time routes received with this community value are
exported to external BGP peers is when using confederations. It should be noted
that these routes cannot be advertised outside the confederations.
(ii) No-Advertise: routes received with this community value cannot be advertised
at all. Routes received here cannot be advertised to both internal and external BGP
peers.
(iii) Internet: this is the default community value and routes that belong to this
community value by default can be advertised freely.
(iv) Local_AS: routes received with this community value cannot be advertised to
external BGP and peers in other autonomous systems within a confederation.
BGP routers use a three-step process to implement the routing policy that has been
developed for the autonomous system. The three step process are as follows[23]:
(1) Import Policy - determines a BGP speaking router’s decision on whether or not to
filter and/or manipulate the attribute of a route received from its BGP speaking router
peer. BGP import policies can be used for moving a portion of traffic within a network
from one link to another (traffic engineering) based on prefixes and attributes in the
route advertisement. An AS can use import policies to transform incoming route updates
which include: deny an update; permit an update; assign local preference to indicate the
favourability of a path.
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(2) Decision Process - a BGP speaking router applies the decision process to select the
best route for each prefix. The BGP decision process is a set of steps that the router
uses to select a route from a set of routes it learns from its neighbours. The ordering of
attributes allows the network administrator to influence various stages of the decision
process and engineering within and outside their network. The ordering of attributes in
the decision process also simplifies the routing policy of an organisation and makes it
easier to predict configuration changes. BGP has a 12-step decision process algorithm
used for selecting the route to a particular prefix. Table 5.2 below enumerates the various
BGP decision making steps.
Step Attribute
1 The update message is dropped if the next hop of the path specified is
inaccessible
2 The route with the highest administrative weight is preferred
3 The route with the highest LOCAL_PREF is preferred if the weights are
equal
4 The route that was generated locally is preferred over external routes if
the LOCAL_PREF are the same
5 The route that has the shortest AS-PATH is preferred if there are no
locally generated routes
6 The route with the lowest origin type is preferred if all the routes have
the same AS-PATH length. The order of the origin is: IGP < EGP <
Incomplete
7 The route with the lowest MED attribute is preferred if the origin codes
are the same
8 EGP routes are preferred over IGP routes if the MEDs are equal
9 The route through the closest IGP neighbour is preferred if the path is
equal at this point
10 The oldest route or the route that was learnt first is preferred if the path
is still the same
11 The route with the lowest BGP Router ID is preferred if the path is still
the same at this point
12 The route on the lowest interface IP address is preferred if the Router ID
is the same
Table 5.2: BGP Decision Making Steps
(3) Export Policy - an export policy determines whether or not a BGP speaking
router will advertise a prefix to neighbouring autonomous systems. Export policies use
the following methods to make this decision: permit or deny route; assign MED value;
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add community value; prepend its AS number one or more times to the AS path. The
business relationship between the autonomous systems largely determines the export
policies of an AS. Export policies are very important because no AS wants to transit
network traffic that it is not somehow making money on. An AS should hence advertise
routes with care because packets flow back using the best route advertisement to it.
There are three ways in which BGP can be used to control import or export policies
according to Caesar and Rexford [23], these are filtering, preference and tagging. (i)
Filtering eliminates certain routes from consideration and also controls who they will be
exported to,
(ii) Preference influences which BGP route will be chosen for each destination prefix,
(iii) Tagging allows a network administrator to associate additional state with a route
used to coordinate decisions made by a group of routers in an AS using community
attribute.
5.1.2 BGP Business Relationships
The seminal model of routing policies between autonomous systems was developed by
Gao and Rexford[46]. The Gao-Rexford (GR) model preference states that autonomous
systems use local preference attribute to prefer customers routes over provider or peer
routes and peer routes are preferred over provider routers. Figure 5.6 below shows a
hypothetical example of a high level BGP relationship using the GR model5.1.
The appeal for the GR model lies not only in its simplicity but also in the stability
of BGP if the model is followed adequately[45]. BGP is guaranteed to converge to
a stable routing outcome if all autonomous systems strictly adhere to the GR model.
The GR model proposes three BGP business relationships: transit, peering and sibling
relationships. Over the years however, a lot of research projects such as [69] have
expanded on the GR model and inferred additional BGP business relationships. The
BGP business relationships discussed in the following section is a combination of the
GR model and many other research projects developed over the years. The BGP business
relationships discussed for this research thesis can be broadly categorised into five:
transit; peering; sibling; hybrid and backup relationships.
5.1.2.1 Transit Relationship
This BGP business relationship is also referred to as provider-to-customer or customer-
to-provider relationship[74]. This relationship occurs when a large autonomous system
(the provider) agrees to carry the network traffic of a smaller autonomous system (the
customer). The provider typically meters the traffic on each link and charge a transit fee
for services rendered. The transit fee is typically based on reservation made upfront for
the amount of traffic measured in megabits per second (mbps). Customers enter into
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Figure 5.6: Example of a BGP Network With Various Business Relationships
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a transit agreement to be globally reachable. The situation where a provider gives a
customer access to all destinations in its routing table is called full transit. In a partial
transit relationship, the provider can provide access in one of three ways: (i) within
a limited geographical scope. In this scenario, a multi-homed customer may use a
community value to instruct a national provider to serve traffic destined in the same
country while an international provider serves international traffic. (ii) the provider only
provides access for a set of prefixes to the customer. (iii) the provider only provides
access to its peers and customers but does not provide access to its provider prefixes.
It should however be noted that providers make more from a customer if the amount
of traffic sent on their behalf increases. This is one of the major bases for a large number
of complex routing policies. The provider should advertise routes to its customers to as
many other connected autonomous systems as possible in order to make more money.
An ISP should prefer advertisements made from its customer over all other choices (over
peers or providers).
Exporting to a Customer: an AS can export its routes and customer routes as well as
provide or peer routes. This is so the provider can make more money.
Exporting to a Provider: an AS can export its routes and customer routes but usually
does not export its provider or peer routes. This is because exporting peer and provider
routes will make the provider transit more traffic and hence charge the customer more
transit fee.
5.1.2.2 Peering Relationship
This BGP business relationship is also referred to as peer-to-peer relationship[81]. This
relationship occurs when two or more similar sized autonomous systems establish a
mutually reciprocal agreement where their network traffic pass through each others’
networks without charging any fee. In a peering relationship, an AS can export its routes
and customer routes but does not export routes learned from other peers and providers
so as not to transit the traffic and pay more money. Peering happens at a location that is
most convenient for both autonomous systems. There are two locations where peering
happens, these are public peering and private peering. (i) Public peering at an Internet
Exchange Point (IXP) - this location of peering allows anyone to become a member
and in some cases, a fee might be charged. (ii) Private peering via a direct connection -
this usually involves a service level agreement (SLA) and most of the time comes with
better hardware to handle network traffic. Private peering provides a convenient way to
establish custom solutions such as trunking two links together.
Peering agreements are usually confidential and require both parties to sign a non-
disclosure document. In a peering relationship, an AS should export only selected routes
from its routing table to other peer autonomous systems. An AS in a peering relationship
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can export its routes and customer routes but usually does not export its provider or peer
routes. There are times when two peering links which together function as one virtual
peering link, called indirect peering relationship. An indirect peering relationship occurs
when two autonomous systems are peering with the same route server at an IXP such that
they gain access to each other’s network as if they have a peering link. There are three
major reasons for peering relationships: (i) Peering between tier-1 ISPs ensure that they
have explicit default-free routes to all Internet destinations, (ii) Peering relationships is
a way for ISPs to save money of not having to buy more transit services. Also as they
do not have to pay any fee for peering and hence save money, (iii) Peering relationships
have the advantage that a more direct path would lead to better end-to-end performance
for their customers.
5.1.2.3 Sibling Relationship
This relationship usually occurs when an organisation owns multiple autonomous systems
and have export policies involving each ASs’ peers, providers and customers[15]. In a
sibling relationship, an AS can export its routes, customer routes as well as provider and
peer routes.
5.1.2.4 Hybrid Relationship
These BGP business relationships occur when two ASes agree to have a combination
of two business relationships, usually a peering and transit[49]. Hybrid relationships
usually occur between tier-1 and tier-2 autonomous systems that are well connected.
There are two major categories of implementing hybrid relationships: IP version and
Location dependent.
IP version Dependent: the routing policies and path for IPv4 traffic differ signific-
antly from IPv6 traffic in this business relationship. The autonomous systems negotiate
separate relationships for the different IP version prefixes.
Location Dependent: in these BGP business relationships, two autonomous systems
collocate at more than one private network access point (NAP) or Internet Exchange
Point (IXP). The BGP business relationship at each collocated point is different from the
other.
Some hybrid relationships are dependent on both IP version and location. This occurs
when two autonomous systems at an IXP have a relationship for an IP version while at a
NAP they have another IP version relationship. This is usually achieved by tagging the
same link with different sets of community values in different BGP Update messages. It
should however be noted that setting dual meanings for a community value is not a good
practice.
CHAPTER 5. BGP ABSTRACTION 68
5.1.2.5 Backup Relationship
This relationship occurs when two autonomous systems set up a link between their
networks and is only used when the primary link becomes unavailable due to failure[50].
Backup links are invisible and do not carry any traffic until there is a failure on the primary
link. This is usually a good practice especially when an AS has limited connectivity to the
rest of the Internet. Routes involving backup link should have a lower local-preference
over other routes. BGP advertisement can use community values of NO-EXPORT and
NO-ADVERTISE to instruct providers not to advertise the routes to customers or anyone.
Backup links can also be implemented by prepending or appending the AS-path attribute
such that the link is artificially longer.
5.1.3 BGP Anomalies
The existence of contrary routing policies that are at odds with the network adminis-
trator’s intention is called a routing anomaly. Routing anomalies occur regularly in
networks and last between a few seconds to several months before they are noticed and
corrected. Routing anomalies occur due to mistakes during either the configuration pro-
cess or convergence of the network post deployment. This section discusses the routing
anomalies that are caused by router misconfigurations. Routing anomalies that occur
post deployment due to network convergence issues or network update problems are not
within the scope of this research and will not be discussed. The following are some of
the major BGP routing anomalies that can manifest due to router misconfigurations:
1. Origin Misconfiguration[71]: this anomaly occurs when an autonomous system
unintentionally injects a prefix into the global BGP table. This anomaly manifests
due to either of the following reasons - (i) announcing part of another autonomous
system’s address space; (ii) advertising prefixes that are meant to stay within the
autonomous system based on the network policy intention; (iii) injection of one or
more specific prefixes into the global BGP table due to the failure of summarising
an address space. Origin misconfiguration anomaly can be caused due to any of
the following reasons: initialisation bugs; old configuration; redistribution; use
of community attribute in some instances; forgotten filters; incorrect summary;
hijacks, e.t.c.
2. Multiple Origin AS (MOAS): this anomaly occurs when a prefix appears to
be originated from two or more autonomous systems. MOAS anomalies can
sometimes be intentionally implemented for load balancing or to minimise the
routing distance for connections to and from different locations. According to
Zhao et al [107] some of the reasons for the manifestation of these anomalies
include: exchange points; some forms of multi-homing; and faults amongst others
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are the reasons behind this anomaly.
3. Invalid Paths or Non-Existent Connectivity[61]: this anomaly occurs when some
false connectivity to an external autonomous system is advertised maliciously by
an autonomous system so as to make some or all traffic intended for a particular
destination transit through the malicious autonomous system.
4. Private AS Number Announcement[72]: the private autonomous system number
segments are usually used to divide a single AS into multiple smaller autonomous
systems as stated in Chapter 5.1 above. This anomaly occur when an autonomous
system advertises a set of prefixes with private AS numbers to the outside world
or external autonomous systems.
5. Export Misconfiguration[71]: this anomaly occurs when a prefix is intentionally
advertised to a BGP peer in violation of the network’s export policy intention.
The causes of this anomaly include erroneous prefix based configuration and bad
access control list (or ACL) or route maps. These anomalies manifests in cases
whereby: (i) routes learned from a provider are advertised to other providers or
peers; (ii) routes learned from peers are advertised to providers.
6. BGP Wedgies[101]: this anomaly occurs when the BGP configuration of a pro-
posed network leads to different end states depending on which order routes are
advertised after the network has converged. Usually when BGP is configured,
it is expected that the proposed network will correctly converge as the policy
intention dictates after all the sessions come up. However under BGP wedgies
circumstances this does not happen. Making the network converge at a state that
is not as intended by the proposed routing policy.
5.2 BGP Policy Intention Abstraction
This section outlines how BGP routing policy abstraction for our research was imple-
mented. The nodes in this policy intention abstraction are used to represent a group of
routers that belong to a particular service providers or that have identical inter-domain
routing policies. The labels on the nodes will be used in the network layout to determine
what service provides or inter-domain routing realms a network router belongs to during
the experiment. The edges in this policy intention abstraction are used to indicate the
relationship between the two interconnected nodes (realms or service providers). The
labels such as provider, sibling, peer and others on the edges states the exact inter-domain
routing policies or BGP business relationship between the two interconnected realms
connected by the edge in any given experiment.
The nodes or realms in these policy intention abstractions are used to represent
autonomous systems within a proposed experiment. The only node option that has
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been used in expressing BGP policy abstractions has to do with its autonomous system
number. This is to be applied using a node option called asn or NePAS will automatically
generate and assign a random public AS number between the range specified in Chapter
5.1 above except for numbers used by other realms within the policy intention. This
node option hence does not have a default value because an AS number will be generated
automatically by NePAS if none is specified. The edge labels in BGP policy abstractions
are used to express the routing relationship between the two realms or autonomous
systems. The current relationships supported by NePAS are as follows: peer, hybrid,
sibling and transit. It should be noted that NePAS policy intention implementation for
transit relationships is split into customer and provider relationships. The edges here have
two custom options used in expressing hybrid IP dependent relationships called v4rel
and v6rel. By default, these edge options have ’NULL’ values except when otherwise
specified. These two edge options can take any of the following options: peer, customer,
provider or sibling relationships.
Figure 5.7: Proposed Multi-Tier ISP Policy Intention
Figure 5.7 above depicts a multi-tier ISP proposed network with four ASes. The
ASes with their respective AS numbers are as follows: Sprint (AS1239); TDC (AS3292);
TATA (AS6435); FiberRing (AS38930). Table 5.3 below shows the various business
relationship between the four ASes in the proposed network.
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Table 5.3: Business Relationship of Proposed Multi-Tier ISP Network
TATA Sprint TDC FiberRing
TATA - Peer - Provider
Sprint Peer - Provider -
TDC - Customer - Peer
FiberRing Customer - Peer -
5.3 BGP Network Layout Abstraction
This section outlines how the network layout abstraction for inter-domain routing (BGP)
enabled networks in NePAS was implemented. The ellipse nodes in this network layout
abstraction are used to represent routers; rectangular nodes are used to represent user
computing devices; 6-pointed star are used to represent firewalls; and trapeziod nodes
are used to represent backend network servers. It should however be emphasised that
these devices need to specified using the custom property, dtype, explained Chapter 4.2.1
before our system will accept and know what type of network device it will be dealing
with during execution. Pointed edges between ellipse nodes are used to represent either
internal or external BGP connections in this abstracion. It should be noted that the edges
in the BGP network layout abstraction does not use any labels and any labels added will
be ignored by our system during the execution.
There are two node options and one edge option that have been provided for the
abstraction of a BGP network layout graph. The first set of policy intention custom
property is a node option called bgppol. This option is used to state the inter-domain
routing policy intention realm (AS) a network router belongs to in the policy intention
graph. This node option requires a string value of the AS’s policy intention label and
is used to show the autonomous system a network router belongs to in the proposed
experiment. The value entered must be an exact match of characters used as the AS’s
label from the network policy intention graph. It should be noted that only routers can
have this value assigned and if any other network component such as a switch, firewall
or server is assigned, NePAS will ignore it and write an informational log message
during low level configuration. A network router can only belong to one AS group and
if multiple given, NePAS will use the first value and ignore the rest. The default value
of bgppol is ’NULL’ when the network administrator does not provide any value. The
routers that have not being assigned a bgppol value and other network devices such as
firewalls and servers will be grouped into the AS and given an asn of the router that has
been assigned a bgppol value closest to them.
Figure 5.8 below shows a proposed "Internet" experiment with multiple ISP networks.
The routers in the core of the network are labeled with the same name used as their
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realms/ASs in the policy intention graph introduced in Figure 5.7. All the routers have
an eBGP connection to their neighbours based on the business relationships stated in
Table 5.3 above. It should be noted that the routers in the network layout are not required
to have the same label as the realm AS they represent but having the bgppol option value
of the AS realm they belong to is what makes them have the business relationship of that
realm/AS in relation to its neighbor.
Figure 5.8: Proposed Multi-Tier ISP Network Topology
Table 5.4: Network Layout Options
AS Networks Backup Devices
TATA FALSE iT, 15,14,13
Sprint FALSE iSprint, 12, 10, 11
TDC FALSE iTDC, 4, 5, 6
FiberRing FALSE iFR, 9, 8, 7
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The second node option implemented for NePAS is called network and is to be used
strictly by routers within a proposed experiment. It should be noted that if this option
is applied on any network device that is not a router, NePAS will disregard it when
generating low-level configurations. This option can have a network and mask or a list
of networks belonging to the router. This node option has a default value of ’NULL’
except when otherwise stated.
The only edge option that has been implemented for NePAS in BGP network layout
abstraction is called backup. This edge option is used to implement the backup relation-
ship as discussed in Section 4.1.2.5 above. This edge option takes a boolean value of
either TRUE or FALSE with the latter being the default.
5.4 BGP Anomaly Resolution
This section discusses the series of techniques implemented so as to ensure the final low
level BGP configurations generated for the proposed network are consistent and anomaly
free. The techniques contained in this section resolve all the anomalies discussed in
Section 5.1.3 above. These techniques resolve various anomalies that can disrupt the
BGP routing relationships of the proposed network. The techniques implemented in
this section ensures that final network deployments conform to the policy intention of
the proposed network. The following are some of the techniques employed by NePAS
in order to ensure BGP routing anomalies that can manifest are resolved prior to the
deployment of such networks:
1. Origin Misconfiguration: the automated configuration process of NePAS ensures
all autonomous systems only advertise prefixes within their domain. NePAS as-
sociates all IP addresses of servers or interface addresses of network devices to
the router closest to them as prefixes the router will advertise to its neighbours
according to the dictates of the network routing policy intention graph expressed.
The fact that NePAS allocates unique IP addresses for servers and interface ad-
dresses of network devices eliminates the likelihood of origin misconfiguration.
Also, NePAS generates code that conforms to the intended network routing policy
intention and hence cannot advertise prefixes to neighbours in clear contrast to the
expressed network policy intention.
2. Multiple Origin AS (MOAS): there are only two ways in which two autonomous
systems can claim to to be originating a prefix in NePAS, these are as follows: (i)
by manually specifying the same IP address using the sIP or dIP options on the
interfaces of network devices, or (ii) by specifying the same prefix to multiple
routes in different realms using the network option in the network layout graph as
part of prefix associated to the autonomous systems. NePAS has been fitted with an
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algorithm that will ensure all manually specified IP addresses and prefixes supplied
by the network administrator are unique before the configuration process begins.
By ensuring IP addresses and prefixes are unique to a specific autonomous system,
NePAS will be able to generate BGP configurations that are MOAS anomaly
free for any proposed network experiment. Whenever NePAS detects the same
IP address or prefix in two different autonomous systems, it will generate an
error message stating MOAS anomaly will occur within the proposed network
experiment and terminate the configuration process.
3. Non-Existent Connectivity: one of the ways for this to occur is by supplying bogus
prefixes using the network option in the network layout graph of the proposed
network. For now, NePAS is not equipped to avoid this sort of anomaly in any
deployed network. This is due to the fact that default routes will be configured for
all prefixes in the network option during the low level configuration process.
4. Private AS Announcement: as explained in Section 4.1.3, this anomaly occurs
when a router with a private AS number advertises a series of prefixes to the outside
world (or networks with public AS numbers). NePAS does not support private AS
numbers currently and when one is manually provided, it is automatically changed
to a public one and a warning log message is generated. This algorithm which
automatically replaces a private AS number with a public one ensures that this
anomaly does not occur during low level configuration.
5. Export Misconfiguration: the automated configuration process of NePAS ensures
that the proposed network policy intention is generated based on the routing policy
graph supplied. NePAS will generate the low level configuration commands based
on the combination of both the network routing policy intention and network
layout graphs supplied.
5.5 BGP Compilation
This section outlines the process NePAS takes to configure low level BGP policy com-
mands on network routers across a proposed network. The configuration process is done
over five stages discussed in the following section.
The first stage of the configuration process is used to automatically generate an AS
number for BGP realms that have not being assigned one in the policy intention graph.
NePAS will go through the nodes of the policy intention graph expressed by the network
administrator and checks the asn node option whether the value is NULL and a public
AS number that has not been specified by any other realm in the policy intention graph is
generated. Therefore, if NePAS randomly generates an AS number that is already in use
by another realm, another new AS number will be generated. The new AS numbers must
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be unique within the proposed network. NePAS checks and automatically generates new
AS numbers for any realm in the policy intention that has a private AS number specified
as well. This is to ensure that no private AS announcement is done when the proposed
network is finally deployed.
The second stage of the configuration process deals with grouping or assigning AS
numbers to routers (with no bgppol value assigned), servers and firewalls in a proposed
network. Routers with no assigned bgppol value, firewalls and servers will take the AS
numbers of the closest router that have been assigned a bgppol value. All devices that
have the same AS numbers will have similar BGP routing policies.
The third stage of the configuration process deals with generating low level com-
mands for default routes within an AS. The addresses of devices that have the same
AS numbers as assigned in the second stage described above will be appended to the
network node option. It should be noted that NePAS automatically allocates IP addresses
with a /24 mask for each link in the proposed network layout. NePAS moves on to check
all the prefixes in the network option of all the routers in the proposed network to make
sure no two routers have the same prefix(es). This is to ensure no multiple origin AS
(MOAS) anomaly occurs when the network is deployed. NePAS then generates low level
commands for configuring the default routes using all the addresses within the network
node option. By doing this, NePAS ensure no non-existent connectivity anomaly occurs
when a proposed network is finally deployed.
The fourth stage of the configuration process deals with generating low level com-
mands for back up links within the proposed network. NePAS goes through the edges
of the network layout so as to check which backup edge options have been specified as
’TRUE’ during the compilation process. The edges that have the value of backup edge
option of ’TRUE’ are considered to be backup links and NePAS generates backup link
configuration on those edges. NePAS uses local preference attribute in order to configure
backup links.
It should be noted that all the links in NePAS have the default local preference value
of 100 during the compilation process.
The fifth stage of the configuration process deals with generating low level commands
for routing policies to be configured on routers that have been assigned bgppol value.
This stage of the configuration process is split into two to handle: import and export
policies.
5.5.1 Import Policies
This stage of the configuration process is used to generate low level commands of
import policies between all BGP sessions in a proposed network. Import policies have
been employed at this stage in order to label ASes advertised by neighbouring routers
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according to the business relationship between them. This way appropriate export
policies can be configured that will not violate the high-level policy intention expressed.
A warning message will be generated during the configuration process by NePAS. NePAS
at this stage goes through the network layout graph supplied for a proposed network and
checks the bgppol option has been assigned for the two routers that will be configured
with an eBGP session. NePAS will not generate low level configuration commands for
eBGP sessions between any two routers that do not have a business relationship in the
policy intention graph expressed. Any two routers that have been assigned a bgppol node
option and the values do not represent any realm or AS in the policy intention graph
will not have BGP policies configured on them as well. On the other hand, if the two
routers in the network layout graph have the bgppol value specified, NePAS will use a
combination of route-maps, community attributes and local preference to label the routes
received from eBGP neighbours. As stated in the Community part of Chapter 5.1.1
above, the community attributes will use the AS number of the router in the first two
octets and an administratively defined identifier for the last two octets. NePAS will label
community attributes based on this for the various routes in any experiment depending
on the BGP business relationship between the routers according to the following:
1. Provider Routes - the AS number will be the asn value of the bgppol for the router
that is being handled. The last two octets for all peer routes will be 222. These
routes will have a local preference value of 50 during the configuration process.
2. Peer Routes - the AS number will be the asn value of the bgppol for the router that
is being handled. The last two octets for all peer routes will be 111. These routes
will have a local preference value of 100 during the configuration process.
3. Customer Routes - the AS number will be the asn value of the bgppol for the
router that is being handled. The last two octets for all peer routes will be 333.
These routes will have a local preference value of 150 during the configuration
process.
4. Sibling Routes - the AS number will be the asn value of the bgppol for the router
that is being handled. The last two octets for all peer routes will be 444. These
routes will have a local preference value of 200 during the configuration process.
5.5.2 Export Policies
This stage of the configuration process is used to generate low level commands of export
policies between all BGP sessions in any proposed network. The export policies that will
be generated at this stage depend on the BGP business relationship between the various
autonomous systems as specified in the policy intention graph. NePAS after generating
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BGP import policies as described in the previous section will also generate export policy
community filters for all BGP sessions. As stated in Chapter 5.2 of this thesis, there are
four BGP business relationships supported by NePAS: peer, sibling, transit (which is
split into provider and customer) and hybrid.
The following section gives a detailed explanation of the various community filters
used in generating BGP export policies by NePAS.
• Provider to Customer
In this relationship, the routers have a bgppol option that belongs to realms
connected with an edge labeled provider in the policy intention specification. The
router belonging to the source policy realm will have provider export policies
generated for it. As the router is the provider of the other connected router, it will
be configured with a community filter that permits advertisement of all routes:
peer, provider, customer and sibling.
The router with destination policy realm however will have customer export
policies generated for it. As the router is a customer of the connected router, it will
be configured with a community filter that permits advertisement only its customer
routes if any while denying advertisement of routes it has learned through peers
and other providers.
• Customer to Provider
In this relationship, the routers have a bgppol option that belongs to realms
connected with an edge labeled customer in the policy intention specification. The
router belonging to the source policy realm will have customer export policies
generated for it. As the router is the customer of the other connected router, it
will be configured with a community filter that permits advertisement of only
its customer routes if any while denying advertisement of routes it has learned
through peers and other providers.
The router with destination policy realm however will have provider export policies
generated for it. As the router is a provider of the connected router, it will be
configured with a community filter that permits advertisement of all routes: peer,
provider, customer and sibling.
• Peer
In this relationship, the routers have a bgppol option that belongs to realms
connected with an edge labeled peer in the policy intention specification. Both
routers in this case will have peer export policies generated for them. As both
routers have a peer BGP business relationship, they will be configured with a
community filter that permits advertisement of only routes learned from their
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respective customers while denying advertisement routes learned from other peer
relationships and providers.
• Sibling
In this relationship, the routers have a bgppol option that belongs to realms
connected with an edge labeled sibling in the policy intention specification. Both
routers in this case will have sibling export policies generated for them. As both
routers have a sibling BGP business relationship, they will be configured with a
community filter that permits advertisement of all routes: peer, provider, customer
and sibling to each other.
• Hybrid
A warning message is currently generated whenever a hybrid BGP business rela-
tionship is specified due to lack of IPv6 support by NePAS.
5.6 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis gives a thorough review of inter domain routing protocol (BGP),
BGP attributes, how BGP is used to influence routing policies and the various types of
BGP business relationships. The chapter proceeds to showcase how we implemented our
BGP business relationship abstractions which include: provider, customer, peer, sibling,
hybrid and backup links. The chapter then goes through a phase-by-phase assessment of
how NePAS can be used to evaluate our proposed inter domain routing abstractions. An
example is used to give a step-by-step assessment of how NePAS handles BGP business
relationship abstractions. The next chapter will be used to discuss firewall policies and
our proposed firewall policy intention abstractions.
Chapter 6
Firewall Abstractions
6.1 Background
A firewall is a system of computer hardware or software that is used to protect both
individual computers and corporate networks from hostile attacks. A firewall achieves
this by filtering (or blocking) the passage of undesirable data traffic from crossing into
or out of a network. Firewalls are usually placed between the edge of a network where
traffic pass through. A badly configured or a firewall that is inadequate can seriously
damage the network it is meant to protect. If a firewall fails, all the traffic that is meant
to go through it to the other side of a network will be interrupted.
Firewalls are not a single security solution for an enterprise network. A layered
security approach should be used when designing the network security policy of an
organisation. A network security policy is a document prepared by an organisation
outlining the rules regarding data access; passwords; encryption and network segment-
ation (zones). The zones detailed in a network security policy document outlines how
the network devices will be divided into and their respective access requirements. The
security policy of an organisation is used to have a comprehensive document that will
be used to guide the security of the organisation when attackers try to penetrate the
network amongst many other possible events. Firewalls are configured based on the
security policy of the organisation and its effectiveness is only as good as the defined
policy. Therefore having an effective and comprehensive security policy can never be
overemphasised especially in an enterprise network. A firewall will need the following
in order to achieve its objectives adequately: (1) It needs to be placed at a point in the
network where traffic must pass through, (2) It must be able to differentiate between
allowed and denied network traffic, (3) It must work very fast so that it does not increase
the latency of the network traffic.
Firewalls generally have the following properties: (1) outline actions that will be
taken in response to circumstances, (2) constantly evolving and changing to meet new
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security needs, (3) dictates both acceptable and unacceptable usage parameters.
Some applications of network firewalls include amongst others: (1) It is used to filter
network traffic, (2) It is used as a network address translator, (3) It is used to prevent
denial of service attacks, (4) It can be used as an anti IP address spoofing device.
Some limitations of firewalls include amongst others[21]: (1) they are ineffective
against users with authorised access or internal attacks using malware and other such
devices, (2) they cannot defend a network from attacks using software bugs, malicious
codes or trojan horses etc, (3) They cannot stop internal users from accessing websites
with malicious code, (4) They are ineffective against nonethical security risks such as
social engineering.
6.1.1 How Firewalls Work
Firewalls block or allow network traffic based on a set of rules established by the
organisation in its security policy and configured by the network administrator. The rules
define a specific pattern based on a tuple that the firewall detects and an action to be
taken. A firewall tuple comprises of a source and destination IP addresses; source and
destination ports; protocol and action to be taken when the network traffic matches the
tuple options. Therefore a firewall rule has the following tuple options:
<action> <protocol> <source IP> <source port> <destination IP> <destination port>
Action - this firewall tuple option is used to indicate the decision to be taken when the
network traffic match the firewall rule pattern. The decision that can be taken is to either
permit or deny the network traffic into or out of the network.
Protocol - this firewall tuple option is used to indicate the protocol that will be used for
the firewall rule relation. The possible options here include amongst others: TCP, UDP,
ICMP, IP, GRE, AH, etc.
IP Addressing - this firewall tuple option is used to indicate the addressing (both source
and destination) option of the firewall rule relation. There are three different ways to
specify this tuple option, these are as follows:
Option 1 - this option specifies all computing devices both within the proposed network
layout and outside the network. This option is represented in the firewall rule relation as
"any".
Option 2 - this option is used to specify the source or destination IP address representing
a single computing device that is either within the proposed network or outside. This
option is represented by an IP address being preceded by "host" in the firewall rule
relation for Cisco devices.
Option 3 - this option specifies a whole subnetwork that employs similar firewall rule
relations for all the computing devices within the subnetwork. This is represented using
an IP network and network mask in the firewall rule relation.
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Ports - this firewall tuple option is used to indicate the potential port number (either
source or destination) that will used for the communication in the firewall rule relation.
There are three different ways to specify this tuple option, these are as follows:
Option 1 - this option is specified when a single value is used to represent the port (source
or destination) number in the firewall rule relation. This is usually represented by either
the name of the service (e.g www, dns, ftp-data etc.) or port number (e.g 80, 21, 8080
etc.) preceded by ’eq’ in the firewall rule relation.
Option 2 - this option can be used when a group of port numbers have the same firewall
rule relation in the security policy. This is usually represented by the starting and ending
numbers preceded by ’range’ (e.g 1250-1300) in the firewall rule relation.
Option 3 - some firewall rule relation do not specify the port number of the two devices
that will be communicating and hence none is given. This implies the two devices if
permitted can use any port number to communicate with each other. On the other hand,
if its a deny rule, the two devices will not be able to communicate with each other using
any port number.
It should be noted that some firewalls can support other types of actions beyond
permitting or denying network traffic such as sending a log message, applying a proxy,
and passing the matched packets into a VPN tunnel[88]. This functionality is beyond
the scope of this research and will not be discussed further. Firewall rules are stored
in the firewall rule base and are applied when network traffic is about to enter or exit
the interface of the firewall. Firewalls try to match network traffic patterns from the
first rule to the last as contained in the rule base in a sequential order[73]. Firewalls
always enforce the first rule that matches and hence rule ordering in the rule base is very
important. Also the more rules in a rule base, the longer it will take to determine what
action to take with regards to the data packet. The most important and utilised rules
should be at the top of the rule base so as to ensure the firewall works efficiently[54].
The rule base should also be reviewed periodically so as to remove rules that are no
longer needed in the firewall. It is advised that additional firewalls be added to a network
instead of adding more firewall rules into a single device. This is to reduce the number
of rules in a firewall and also enhance shorter rule base traversal for firewall efficiency.
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Figure 6.1: Example of a Distributed Firewall Hypothetical University Network
Networks use different security zones to protect important resources and defend
against hackers. These are the key elements that define security zones.
(i) External network also called outside, Internet or unprotected networks.
(ii) Internal network also called inside or protected networks.
(iii) Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) - is an interface between the internal and external net-
works where critical enterprise servers are located. This zone enables the external
network hosts to have access to servers that have been isolated in the DMZ while deny-
ing them access into the internal network. The ability to confine Internet traffic is the
benefit of using a DMZ. The servers within this zone should not be allowed to "initiate"
connections to other parts of the network. Firewall rule bases should contain rules for
DMZ traffic.
(iv) Perimeter - is the border between the internal and external networks. Firewalls on
the perimeter of a network are responsible for incoming and outgoing traffic. Some con-
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nections that are usually allowed (though not sacrosanct) by the firewall in the perimeter
include amongst others: (1) VPN connections from external to internal networks, (2)
outgoing connections from the internal to external networks, (3) connections from both
internal and external networks to the DMZ.
In Figure 6.1 above, the firewall at the core of the network, fw1, is at the perimeter of
the hypothetical university network and has the Internet as its outside or external network
while the remaining parts of the network is its inside or internal network. However for
firewalls fw2 and fw3, the network core is regarded as their external and unprotected
networks while the Laboratory and Campus networks are regarded as the protected or
internal networks respectively.
Outgoing packets from the internal network to the Internet of an organisation should
be allowed to pass without scrutiny except otherwise stated in the security policy. How-
ever incoming packets are usually filtered based on the predefined set of rules in the
rule base according to the organisation’s security policy. Firewalls also filter packets
with spoofed internal IP addresses at its external interface. Therefore when configuring
anti-spoofing, administrators should be very careful when specifying the interfaces that
go to the Internet and an internal network. There are times when specific requests from
the Internet to the internal network must be allowed and controlled through the firewall.
Example of such connections include VPN connections and legitimate requests to the
DMZ. Allowing a direct connection from the Internet to an internal network host through
a firewall is perilous but common practice. Well implemented firewalls should also be
able to filter traffic from internal to external networks so as to ensure no attacks are
launched from within the enterprise network. There are certain times that an enterprise
network security policy prohibits access from the internal network to the Internet that
should also be configured on the firewall.
As NePAS is designed to generate low-level firewall configuration commands on
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)[58] devices, the following section discusses
how firewall rules are configured and implemented on such devices. It should be noted
that by default, Cisco ASA devices allow traffic to flow from a higher security interface
to a lower security interface. The only exception to this rule is ICMP protocol based
traffic which requires a firewall rule to be configured before such traffic traverses the
firewall device. Apart from that, any other traffic that needs to traverse the device must
have an access list configured before it is allowed. Firewall rules are configured in Cisco
IOS using the access-lists command syntax and are deployed on to the interface of the
device using the access-group command syntax.
• Access Lists:
The access-list command is used to create firewall rules that are designed to
control traffic going either in or out of the network through a Cisco ASA device.
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The command is used to create firewall rules or access control lists (ACLs) that
are used to enforce the organisation’s security policy. Once the ACL have been
configured by the access-list command, it has to be applied on a firewall’s interface
for it to be active. Cisco ASA devices support numerous ACL types including
amongst others[1]: Standard ACLs, Extended ACLs, Named ACLs, Dynamic
ACLs, Turbo ACLs, Reflexive ACLs, Receive ACLs, Transit ACLs, Authentication
Proxy. However for the purpose of the research conducted in this research thesis
only three (standard, extended and named ACLs) will be discussed in detail.
Standard ACLs: these ACLs are used to create filters based on source addresses
of traffic passing through the firewall devices. These ACLs are used for normal
server based filtering because they only use source addresses to control traffic
entering or exiting the network. This ACL type does not support the use of
additional firewall tuple options such as port numbers; protocols and destination
addresses. These ACLs are numbered between 1-99 an 1300-1999 respectively.
This ACL is insufficient for the level of abstraction needed for this research due to
its inflexibility in supporting additional firewall tuple options.
Extended ACLs: these ACLs are used to create filters as dictated by the security
policy document based on the entire firewall tuple options detailed above. The
ACL filter created here is used to control traffic based on a combination of the
firewall tuple options as determined by the security policy for all traffic passing
through the firewall device. This ACL type are numbered between 100-199 and
2000-2699 respectively.
Named ACLs: these ACLs are extended versions of standard and extended ACLs
discussed above. The difference between the two ACLs discussed above and their
named ACL equivalent is the usage of a unique name for the named ACLs instead
of unique numbers being used. It should be noted that named ACLs are exactly
the same as standard ACLs apart from the identification of the ACLs. NePAS will
be using named extended ACLs when generating low-level firewall rule relations.
• Access Groups:
The access-group command is used in applying the configured firewall rules (or
ACLs) on the appropriate interface of the firewall device. It should be noted that
when ACLs are configured but not applied on any interface of the firewall, it will
have no effect. The access-group command is automatically removed from the
firewall device whenever the ACL entry associated with it is removed from the
rule base. This is because access-group commands cannot be configured in an
empty firewall rule base. There are two ways in which the access-group command
can be used to apply ACLs on an interface, these are: interface rules and global
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rules.
Interface ACLs: these are ACLs that are applied on a specific interface of the
firewall device so as to match traffic that is going either in or out of the network.
There are two types of interface ACLs: incoming and outgoing.
Incoming Interface ACLs - these interface ACLs allow/deny network traffic that
have been matched to them which are destined to pass through the firewall and go
into the network. These ACLs usually have source addresses of devices outside
the network trying to communicate with device(s) inside the network.
Outgoing Interface ACLs - these interface ACLs allow/deny network traffic that
have been matched and are destined to go out of the network. These ACLs usually
have the source address of devices inside the network to communicate with devices
outside the network.
Table 6.1 below provides a step-by-step guide of configuring named extended
ACLs in Cisco ASA devices.
Table 6.1: Step-by-Step Cisco ASA Firewall Rule Configuration
1 Enter privileged exec mode asa>enable
2 Enter global config mode asa#configure terminal
3
Create and configure named
extended ACL entry
NB: Repeat as needed
asa(config)#access-list <acl-name>
extended <permit | deny> <protocol>
<source IP> <source port>
<destination IP> <destination port>
4
Apply ACL to the appropriate
interface.
NB: interface name is matched
with configured nameif value
asa(config)#access-group <acl-name>
<in | out> interface <interface-name>
asa(config)#access-group <acl-name>
global
Global ACLs: these are ACLs that do not need to be configured on individual
interfaces of the firewall device unlike the interface ACLs. This is because these
ACLs are automatically applied on all configured interfaces of the firewall device.
It should be noted that global ACLs are only considered if no interface ACL match
the traffic that is going either in or out of the network through the firewall device.
Listing 6.1 below show a sample excerpt of some Cisco ASA firewall rules syntax
for firewall fw1 in Figure 6.1 above.
Listing 6.1: Excerpt of a Cisco ASA Firewall Rule Configuration File
1| access-list dmz-out extended deny ip any any
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2| access-list dmz-in extended permit tcp any any
3| access-list dmz-in extended permit udp any 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0
4| access-list dmz-in extended permit udp any 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0
5| access-list cam-out extended permit ip 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 any
6| access-list cam-out extended permit tcp host 10.0.1.1 eq 80 host
10.0.2.4 eq 8080
7| access-list cam-out extended permit udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 eq 80
8| access-list cam-out extended deny udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 eq 53
9| access-list cam-out extended permit ip 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 host
107.23.58.1
10| access-list cam-out extended permit ip 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
host 86.67.42.5
11| access-list cam-out extended deny tcp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
host 1.2.3.4
12| access-list cam-out extended deny ip host 10.0.1.1 host
4.5.6.7
13| access-list cam-out extended permit tcp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
host 10.0.3.5 eq 21
14| access-list cam-out extended permit tcp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
any eq 21
15| access-list cam-in extended permit tcp any 10.0.1.0
255.255.255.0 eq ssh
16| access-list lab-out extended permit udp 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0 any eq 40728
17| access-list lab-out extended permit udp 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0 any eq 3689
18| access-list lab-out extended deny udp host 10.0.2.4 eq
3000 host 10.0.3.5 eq 21
19| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 range 0-256
20| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp 10.0.0.0
255.255.255.0 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 range 128-512
21| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp host 10.0.2.3
10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80
22| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 eq 80
23| access-list lab-out extended deny tcp host 10.0.2.3 any
eq 80
24| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp any any
25| access-list lab-out extended permit tcp 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0 any eq 80
26| access-list lab-out extended deny tcp host 10.0.2.4 any
eq 80
27| access-list lab-in extended permit ip host 1.2.3.4 eq
54321 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0
28| access-list lab-cam extended permit tcp host 10.0.1.1 eq 23456
10.0.2.3 eq 65432
29| access-list lab-cam extended permit udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0
30| access-list lab-cam extended deny udp host 10.0.1.1 10.0.2.0
255.255.255.0
31| access-list out extended deny tcp any 107.23.58.1
32| access-list out extended deny tcp any 86.67.42.5
33| access-list out extended permit udp 10.0.5.0 255.255.255.0 any
34| access-list out extended permit icmp any any
access-group dmz-out out interface outside
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access-group dmz-in in interface inside-1
access-group cam-out out interface outside
access-group cam-in in interface inside-3
access-group lab-out out interface outside
access-group lab-in in interface inside-2
access-group lab-cam global
access-group out global
6.1.2 Firewall Anomalies
Firewall rules designed and configured by network administrators may be prone to
anomalies that can render parts of the network either unaccessible or open to malicious
attacks. Inter-rule relation or dependency is very important for determining anomalies in
a security policy. The following are however different ways to define rule relations in a
firewall security policy[55][13]:
• Disjoint Rules - there are two variation of these types of firewall rules:
(1) completely disjoint rules is when every firewall tuple option in a given rule Rx
is neither a subset nor a superset and not equal to the corresponding tuple option
in another rule Ry. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 are said to be
completely disjoint:
Rule 6| extended permit tcp host 10.0.1.1 eq 80 host 10.0.2.4 eq 8080
Rule 18| extended deny udp host 10.0.2.4 eq 3000 host 10.0.3.5 eq 21
(2) partially disjoint rules between rules Rx and Ry occurs when at least one
firewall tuple option in Rx is a subset or superset or equal to the corresponding
tuple option in rule Ry. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 are said to
be partially disjoint:
Rule 7| extended permit udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 eq 80
Rule 8| extended deny udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 eq 53
• Correlated Rules - two rules Rx and Ry are said to be correlated when some fire-
wall tuple options in Rx are a subset or partially intersects with the corresponding
firewall tuple option in Ry and the rest of the tuple options in Rx are supersets of
the corresponding tuple options in Ry. The following two firewall rules in Listing
6.1 are said to be correlated rules:
Rule 19| permit tcp 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 range 0-256
Rule 20| permit tcp 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 range 128-512
• Exactly Matching Rules - this occurs between any two given rules Rx and Ry
when every given firewall tuple option in Rx is equal to the corresponding firewall
tuple option in Ry. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 are said to be
exactly matching rules:
CHAPTER 6. FIREWALL ABSTRACTIONS 88
Rule 3| extended permit udp any 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0
Rule 4| extended permit udp any 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0
• Inclusively Matching Rules - this occurs between two rules Rx and Ry when the
two rules do not exactly match and every firewall tuple option in Rx is a subset or
equal to the corresponding firewall tuple option in Ry. The following two firewall
rules in Listing 6.1 are said to be inclusively matching. Rule 21 is said to be a
subset match of the relation, while Rule 22 is the superset match:
Rule 21| extended permit tcp host 10.0.2.3 10.0.3.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80
Rule 22| extended permit tcp 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 eq 80
The following section discusses the various well-known firewall anomalies in detail.
There are two categories in which firewall anomalies can be grouped into, these are:
intra firewall anomalies and inter firewall anomalies.
1. Intra-Firewall Anomalies[7] [47][14]
The anomalies that fall within this section are those that affect a single firewall
device. Intra-firewall anomalies include the following:
• Shadowing[95]:- this anomaly occurs when two rules Rx and Ry have dif-
ferent firewall rule actions and rule Rx with higher priority order matches
all the packets that match a rule Ry. This anomaly causes rule Ry to never
be activated. This anomaly is considered an error in the firewall because it
can cause a permitted traffic to be denied or a denied traffic to be permitted.
The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 show an intra firewall shadow
anomaly.
Rule 29| extended permit udp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0
Rule 30| extended deny udp host 10.0.1.1 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0
To fix this anomaly, the filtering list should be re-ordered with the superset (or
general) rule coming after the subset (or specific) rule. In this situation, Rule
30 should be moved above Rule 29 for the network to behave as intended.
• Irrelevance:- this anomaly occurs when a firewall rule cannot match any
network traffic that might flow through the firewall. This anomaly adds
unnecessary overhead to the firewall because the size of the rule base is
increased and other network traffic have to traverse this extended rule base if
it is not removed from the firewall. The following firewall rule in Listing 6.1
show an intra firewall irrelevance anomaly.
Rule 33| extended permit udp 10.0.5.0 255.255.255.0 any
• Correlation:- this anomaly occurs when two firewall rules Rx and Ry specify
different filtering actions and some packets that match Rx also match Ry
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and vice versa. This implies an action that is not explicitly handled by the
policy. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 show an intra firewall
correlation anomaly.
Rule 23| extended deny tcp host 10.0.2.3 any eq 80
Rule 24| extended permit tcp any any
To fix this anomaly, the proper rule order that complies with the security
policy requirements should be used.
• Generalisation:- a firewall rule Rx is a generalisation of Ry if they have
different filtering actions and the fields in Rx (which has higher priority order
than Ry) can match all the fields in rule Ry. This anomaly is considered a
warning when the specific firewall rule makes an exception of the general
firewall rule. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 show an intra
firewall generalisation anomaly.
Rule 25| extended permit tcp 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 80
Rule 26| extended deny tcp host 10.0.2.4 any eq 80
• Redundancy:- this anomaly occurs when a firewall rule Rx performs the
same action on a network traffic that another firewall rule Ry can perform
as well. All the packets that satisfy Rx also satisfy Ry such that when either
of the two rules Rx or Ry is removed, the security policy of the firewall will
not be affected. This anomaly is considered an error because it increases
the size of the rule base and hence increases the search time and space of
packet filtering. The following two firewall rules in Listing 6.1 show an intra
firewall redundancy anomaly.
Rule 13| extended permit tcp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 host 10.0.3.5 eq 21
Rule 14| extended permit tcp 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 21
To fix this anomaly, the shadowed rule should be removed from the firewall
rule base.
2. Inter-Firewall Anomalies[12][35] [106]
The distributed nature of firewalls in large enterprises has the potential to signific-
antly increase the anomalies in the network. An inter-firewall anomaly occurs if
any two firewalls in the network path have different filtering actions on the same
traffic. When dealing with inter-firewall anomalies, the preceding firewall between
two subdomains is called upstream firewall whereas the following firewall is
called a downstream firewall. The closest firewall to the source domain is called
the most upstream firewall. The closest firewall to the destination domain is
called the most downstream firewall. A anomaly exists between two hosts in
different subdomains crossing multiple firewalls if: (1) the most downstream
firewall permits traffic that is denied by any of the upstream firewalls; (2) the most
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upstream firewall permits traffic that is denied by any of the downstream firewalls;
(3) a downstream firewall denies traffic that is already denied by the most upstream
firewall.
All upstream firewalls should permit any traffic that is permitted by the most
downstream firewall so as to enable network traffic reach its destination. The
following are the various types of anomalies that occur between inter-firewall
networks.
• Redundancy:- this anomaly occurs when a downstream firewall denies the
network traffic already denied by an upstream firewall. This unnecessarily
adds the search time on the downstream firewall due to the presence of an
unnecessary rule and hence might have an impact on the performance of the
firewall.
• Spuriousness:- this anomaly occurs when unwanted network traffic is allowed
by an upstream firewall to flow in the network when a downstream firewall
has been configured to deny such network traffic. Complete spuriousness
is said to occur when the fields of the two rules exactly match. However
when the fields of the two rules inconclusively match, partial spuriousness is
said to have occurred. Spuriousness is a critical anomaly because it allows
unwanted traffic to flow across the network increasing the vulnerability of
the network to attacks such as port scanning and denial of service.
• Shadowing:- this anomaly occurs if an upstream firewall rule denies some
network traffic that has been allowed by a downstream firewall rule. Complete
shadowing anomaly occurs when the firewall rule fields of both upstream
and downstream firewalls exactly match each other. On the other hand, if the
rules in the two firewalls inconclusively match each other, partial shadowing
is said to have occurred. This is considered an anomaly because it prevents
the traffic desired by the destination node from flowing through the network.
• Correlation:- this anomaly occurs as a result of having two correlated rules
in the upstream and downstream firewalls of the network. Correlated rules
having any action are always a source of anomaly in distributed firewalls
because of the implied rule resulting from the conjunction of the correlated
rules. This creates not only ambiguity in the inter-firewall policy but also
spuriousness and shadow anomalies.
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6.2 Firewall Policy Intention Abstraction
This section outlines how the firewall policy intention abstraction for the research thesis
was implemented. The nodes in this policy intention abstraction are used to represent a
group of network devices that have identical firewall relationships in any experiment.
The labels on the nodes will be used in the network layout to determine the firewall realm
(or group) a network device belongs to during an experiment. The edges in this policy
intention abstraction are used to indicate the action to be taken in a firewall relationship
between the two interconnected realms. The label permit on the edges in the graph is
used to abstract firewall relationships between two interconnected realms that allows
communication based on certain protocols in any experiment. The label deny on the
edges in the graph is used to abstract firewall relationships between two interconnected
realms that deny communication base on certain protocols in any experiment. It should
be noted that color of the edges in the graph has no effect during the execution of the
experiment as our system uses the labels and custom properties that have been defined
by the network administrator during the design of any experiment.
Realms (or nodes) in the policy intention abstraction are used to represent a group of
devices that have identical firewall relationship in relation to other devices within the
proposed network. The name of the realm is very crucial as it will be used in the network
layout phase to specify the firewall relationships a firewall device in the network layout
has in relation to other firewall devices within the proposed network. The realms in a
firewall policy intention graph do not have any node options and hence no abstractions
have been provided. Realms labeled with the keyword any have been implemented
to apply the abstracted firewall rule(s) on all firewall enabled devices in the proposed
network. A realm labeled any with a link looping back to itself depicts an any-to-any
firewall rule according to NePAS. The example provided in Figure 6.1 below depicts the
high-level firewall policy intention abstraction with three realms (lab, campus and any)
for a proposed hypothetical university network.
The edges in a firewall policy intention graph are used to represent the action to be
taken by the firewall rule between the two realms. The action in this case is to either
deny or permit traffic between the two realms the edge connects according to the security
policy intention. The edges between firewall policy intentions cannot have default values
and any edge between two realms that has no label (either permit or deny) will not be
processed by NePAS. There are ten rules abstracted for the proposed university network
depicted in Figure 6.2 below. There are a total of six permit and four deny rules in the
proposed high-level firewall policy intention.
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Figure 6.2: Proposed University Firewall Policy Intention
The edges in a firewall policy intention graph have the following custom properties
that will give network administrators a way of specifying the remaining firewall tuple
options: protocol; dPort; dest; and sPort.
The first edge option that was implemented for NePAS is called protocol and is used to
state the transport layer protocol to be used for the firewall rule. Some of the options
that can be selected include amongst others: TCP, UDP, IP, GRE, ICMP amongst others.
All the protocols supported by Cisco ASA firewalls are also supported by NePAS. The
default value for this option is IP except otherwise stated by the user. Multiple protocols
can be specified by using a comma to separate each protocol option. This feature enables
the network administrator to specify firewall rules with protocols during experiments.
The second edge option is called dPort. This option is used to state the destination
port number or name the firewall rule will be using to communicate. This option can
either be expressed using a service name such as www, dns, dhcp or a port number such
as 80, 22, 443. This option has a default value of ’NULL’ which will make NePAS
configure a firewall rule that the two communicating devices in a proposed network
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can use any port. Multiple service names, port numbers or a combination of service
names and port numbers can be specified for the firewall rule. The multiple destination
ports specified here must be separated using a comma symbol so as to enable NePAS
process the firewall rule properly. It should be noted that for a firewall rule with multiple
destination ports, the ports must be using identical protocol if not the firewall rule
configured on the firewall will not behave as intended by the security policy.
The third edge option implemented for firewall policy abstraction in NePAS is called
dest. This option is used when dealing with rules that have a destination or source outside
the proposed network. The default value for this option is set to ’NULL’ except otherwise
stated by the user. This option takes a string comprising of a character of either s or d, a
white space and then a string of IP address or IP network that represents the destination
or source of the rule in question respectively. This option can also take the web address
of the rule instead of an IP address. It should be noted that if the character of either s
or d is omitted from the edge option, NePAS will generate a warning message and not
process the firewall rule. Multiple destinations can be specified by using a comma to
separate the various options. An example of how this option works is when a network
administrator wants to represent a firewall rule between a realm and some device or
network on the Internet. A realm must have an edge linking back to it in order to achieve
this abstraction technique.
The last edge option implemented by NePAS is called sPort. This option is used to
specify the source port number of the given firewall rule. This edge option is optional and
has a default value of ’NULL’ and hence overlooked by NePAS except when otherwise
specified during the design process. This option is implemented to make NePAS very
flexible and give users the option of specifying low level firewall details of the port the
source device(s) of the realm will be using to communicate.
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Table 6.2: Proposed University Firewall Policy Intention Details
S Realm D Realm Action Protocol D Port Destination Address S Port
any any permit ICMP NULL NULL NULL
any any deny TCP 80, 8080
d www.gorillavid.in,
d www.twitter.com
NULL
lab any permit TCP
40728,
3689
NULL NULL
lab lab deny ICMP NULL NULL NULL
lab lab permit IP NULL s 1.2.3.4 NULL
lab campus deny IP NULL NULL NULL
campus lab permit TCP 54321 NULL 54321
campus any deny TCP telnet, ftp NULL NULL
campus campus permit IP 80, 8080
d www.gorillavid.in,
d www.twitter.com
NULL
any campus permit TCP ssh NULL NULL
Table 6.2 above details the edge options abstracted for each individual firewall rule
relation for the proposed university network presented in Figure 6.1 above.
From the example in Figure 6.1 above, there are ten firewall rules abstracted for
the various realms in the proposed university network introduced. The first rule R1
is used to permit all the devices both within the university network and outside the
network to communicate over ICMP protocol. The second rule R2 is used to deny any
device within the university network from accessing social media (represented as d
www.twitter.com) and online streaming websites (represented as d www.gorillavid.in) on
ports 80 and 8080 over TCP protocol. The third rule R3 is used permit the any device
that is within the lab realm to communicate using Skype with any device both within
and outside the university on port 40728 or 3689 over TCP protocol. The fourth rule
R4 is used to deny devices within the lab realm from communicating with each other
over ICMP protocol. The fifth rule R5 is used to permit an external host (represented as
s 1.2.3.4) to initiate communication with devices within the lab realm over IP protocol.
The sixth rule R6 is used to deny communication from devices within the lab realm to
devices within the campus realm over IP protocol. The seventh rule R7 is used to permit
communication of devices within the campus realm on port 54321 to devices within the
lab realm on port 54321 over TCP protocol. The eighth rule R8 is used to any device
within the campus realm from communicating with any other device both within the
university network and outside using telnet and ftp over TCP protocol. The ninth rule
R9 is used to permit the devices within the campus realm from accessing social media
(represented as d www.twitter.com) and online online streaming websites (represented
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as d www.gorillavid.in) on ports 80 and 8080 over TCP protocol. The tenth rule R10
is used to permit any device both within and outside the university from accessing the
campus realm using ssh over TCP protocol.
6.3 Firewall Network Layout Abstraction
This section outlines how the network layout abstraction for firewall-enabled networks
in NePAS was implemented. The ellipse nodes in this network layout abstraction is used
to represent routers; rectangular nodes are used to represent user computing devices;
6-pointed star are used to represent firewalls; trapeziod nodes are used to represent
backend network servers. It should however be emphasised that all these devices need to
specified using the custom property, dtype, explained Chapter 4.2.1 before our system
will accept and know what type of network device it will be dealing with during execution.
There are two types of edges in this abstraction, these are - edges that represent logical
links and edges used to abstract additional firewall rules. The first type of edges or
pointed edges and edges that have no labels are used to represent logical links between
the two devices in the graph. The second type of edges or the edges with labels are
used to abstract firewall relationships in the network layout graph between the two
interconnected nodes. The firewall relationships are abstracted in the same manner as the
firewall policy intention. The label permit on the edges in the graph is used to abstract
firewall relationships between two interconnected nodes that allows communication
based on certain protocols in any experiment. The label deny on the edges in the graph
is used to abstract firewall relationships between two interconnected nodes that deny
communication base on certain protocols in any experiment. It should be noted that
color of the edges in the graph has no effect during the execution of the experiment as
our system uses the labels and custom properties that have been defined by the network
administrator during the execution of the experiment.
The firewall devices are connected to routers which then connect to switches, servers
or other routers when designing the proposed network layout. This is because connecting
firewall devices directly to servers or to switches will cause the firewall to disrupt network
connectivity within the proposed network layout. The disruption will be caused by the
firewall device not being able to route traffic adequately to its proposed destination.
The first set of policy intention node options is called fwpol and is used to state
the firewall realm a network device belongs to in the policy intention of the proposed
network. The node option requires a string value of the realm’s policy intention label for
the network device. The value entered must be an exact match of the characters used as
the realm’s label from the network policy intention graph if not NePAS will not process
the proposed network adequately. A network device can belong to multiple firewall
policy intention realms. This is implemented by having multiple firewall policy intention
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realms attached to the network device.
All the sequence of steps discussed in the previous Chapter 6.2 can also be used
in the network layout layout graph. This is to further give the network administrator
flexibility of representing firewall rule(s) on individual network device(s). Edge labels
such as deny or permit are also used in the network layout graph. All edges that have
labels will not be considered as physical links and will not be allocated any IP addresses.
This is because the edges are considered to be a part of the network layout firewall
policy intention abstraction. Edge options used in Chapter 6.2 such as protocol; dPort;
dest; and sPort are used to represent firewall rule tuple options in this section as well.
This enables specific devices within the proposed network to have unique or isolated
firewall rules that other devices in the same realm as the device in question will not
have. For example, if a device belongs to a firewall realm that has a rule denying secure
communication (ssh), this abstract representation will enable network administrators
represent an isolated firewall rule to enable a device with the realm to communicate
using ssh. It should be noted that NePAS will not work properly if the edges representing
firewall rules are not adequately labeled as either permit or deny and the edge options
not specified adequately as discussed in Chapter 6.2.
Figure 6.3: Proposed University Network Topology
Figure 6.3 above depicts the network layout of the proposed hypothetical university
that have its security policy intention represented in the previous section. Table 6.3
below shows the firewall-enabled devices and the realm(s) each of them belongs to in
the example.
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Table 6.3: Firewall Device-Realm Mapping in Proposed University Network
S/No Devices Realm
1 C1-Server campus
2 L1-Server lab
The example in Figure 6.3 above shows the abstraction of four additional firewall
rule relations for the proposed hypothetical university network. Table 6.4 below shows
the detailed firewall tuple options for the four additional firewall rule relations. The four
firewall rules abstracted in the network layout of the proposed university network are
detailed below.
Table 6.4: Proposed University Network-Level Firewall Policy Detail
Rule No S Device D Device Action Protocol D Port S/D Address S Port
R1 L1-Server C1-Sever permit TCP 65432 NULL 23456
R2 C1-Server L1-Server deny TCP, UDP sftp NULL NULL
R3 L1-Server L1-Server permit UDP 62300 s 2.3.4.5 56431
R4 C1-Server C1-Server deny IP NULL d 4.5.6.7 NULL
The first rule R1 is used to permit communication from L1-Server on port 23456
to C1-Server on port 65432 over TCP protocol. The second rule is used to deny
communication from C1-Server to L1-Server using secure file transfer protocol (sftp)
over TCP and UDP protocols. The third rule R3 is used to permit an external host, 2.3.4.5,
on port 56431 to communicate to L1-Server on port 62300 over UDP protocol. The
fourth or last rule R4 is used to deny C1-Server from communicating with an external
host, 4.5.6.7, over IP protocol.
6.4 Firewall Anomaly Resolution
This section outlines the techniques that have been implemented for NePAS to ensure
the final low level firewall configurations to be generated for deployment are anomaly-
free. The techniques employ a range of algorithms to resolve well-known firewall
anomalies that can amongst others deny or exclude a significant part of a network from
communicating due to various anomalies in the firewall rules as discussed in Section
6.1.2 above. NePAS uses the techniques discussed in the following section to ensure
firewalls are anomaly-free and consistent before the final low level configurations are
generated for deployment. The techniques adopted by NePAS in this phase are also
to ensure final network deployments are completely accessible behind firewalls as the
policy intention dictates. The techniques developed here are embedded within NePAS
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and can be classified into two major parts: (i) intra firewall anomalies and (ii) inter
firewall anomalies.
6.4.1 Intra Firewall Anomaly Resolution
This section looks at how NePAS resolves anomalies within a single firewall rule base.
The following discussion does not imply the sequential order in which NePAS goes
about resolving anomalies within a proposed network.
• Shadowing Anomaly - NePAS does not group IP addresses of devices within
the proposed network into a combination of network address and mask when
generating firewall rules for deployment. Due to the design concept, there is no
way shadow anomalies can occur during low level firewall rule generation except
when dealing with rules that have either the source or destination address set to
any. To mitigate the possibility of shadow anomalies, NePAS has been designed to
ensure device rules (which are specific or subset rules) come before rules that have
their source and/or destination addresses of any (which are general or superset
rules). NePAS thus employs address rule ordering during low level compilation as
follows :
<permit> <protocol> <host> <host> ...
<deny> <protocol> <host> <host> ...
<permit> <protocol> <host> <any> ...
<deny> <protocol> <host> <any> ...
<permit> <protocol> <any> <host> ...
<deny> <protocol> <any> <host> ...
<permit> <protocol> <any> <any> ...
<deny> <protocol> <any> <any> ...
• Redundancy Anomaly - NePAS generates low level firewall rules on a per device
basis between all firewall-enabled devices within a proposed network. This method
on its own cannot ensure no additional or redundant firewall rules are generated
during low level compilation. There are two ways in which redundant firewall
rules can manifest during low level NePAS compilation of configuration files:
(i) when a node belongs to multiple realms and the realms it belongs to have some
identical firewall rule policy abstraction intention; and
(ii) when a node has a network layout firewall rule abstraction that is identical to
one of the firewall rule abstraction of the realm it belongs to in the policy intention.
NePAS however checks every firewall rule that is being generated to ensure no
identical copy of that firewall rule exists in the internal data structure it keeps them
before the final configuration files are deployed. This technique ensures the final
low level configuration generated for NePAS does not have any redundant firewall
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rule.
• Irrelevance Anomaly - NePAS handles this anomaly conveniently because it
generates firewall rule relations from either high level policy intentions or network
layout intention abstractions on a per device basis. It uses the IP addresses it has
automatically generated or specified by the user for each device when generating
low level firewall rules and hence will not use an IP address outside the proposed
network layout.
6.4.2 Inter Firewall Anomaly Resolution
This section discusses the techniques implemented for NePAS to ensure low level firewall
rules generated are anomaly free during compilation:
• Spuriousness Anomaly - NePAS during low level firewall rule generation gets all
the firewall devices between any two firewall-enabled network devices. It then
proceeds to determine whether the action to be taken is to permit or deny network
traffic as indicated in the policy intention. NePAS then adds the appropriate
firewall rule in all the firewall devices between the two firewall-enabled network
devices accordingly if its a permit rule. This technique ensures all firewall devices
between two network devices are adequately configured to ensure no spuriousness
anomaly occurs during low level firewall rule compilation. The redundancy
anomaly resolution section below details what happens in the event the action to
be taken is to deny network traffic.
• Redundancy Anomaly - As stated in the spuriousness anomaly resolution section
above, NePAS gets all the firewall devices between any two firewall-enabled
network devices. NePAS when dealing with a deny rule in an inter-firewall
proposed network, configures a firewall rule relation only on the most upstream
firewall only. This technique ensures no redundant firewall rules are configured
in subsequent downstream firewalls between the two firewall-enabled network
devices.
• Shadowing Anomaly - NePAS generates low level firewall rules for all firewall
devices between any two firewall-enabled devices concurrently. This is to ensure
all downstream firewalls between the two devices are adequately configured to
permit communication between them. As already stated in the Intra Firewall Shad-
owing Anomaly above, all firewall devices within a distributed firewall proposed
network will undergo the intra firewall shadow anomaly resolution technique. This
will ensure no downstream firewall between the two firewall-enabled devices will
be affected by this anomaly after low level compilation.
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6.5 Firewall Compilation
This section discusses how low level configurations of firewall devices are generated by
NePAS. To generate low-level platform specific firewall configurations for any proposed
network, the following have been implemented. There are two sets of firewall rule
abstraction as discussed above, these are as follows: (i) network layout rules, and (ii)
policy intention rules. It should be noted that for all the two groups of firewall rule
abstractions before they are generated, NePAS ensures no such identical rule has been
generated. This technique is used by NePAS to ensure final firewall deployments are
intra-firewall redundancy anomaly free.
6.5.1 Network Layout Rules
This section discusses the implementation methodology for generating firewall rules that
have been abstracted within the firewall network layout graph as detailed in Chapter 6.3
above.
6.5.1.1 Device-Device Rules
This is the first stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for any
proposed network using NePAS. Two network devices or nodes that are connected by an
edge that has been labeled either deny or permit will be selected to start the configuration
process. NePAS checks the neighbours between the two nodes and if they both have the
same switch or router, a warning message will be logged and no firewall rule will be
generated. This is because it will be a futile effort as the switch or router will forward
packets before it reaches the firewall device. NePAS moves on to generate the associated
firewall rule if both nodes are not behind the same switch or router. The system moves
on to get the following tuple information from the connected edge options: protocol,
destination port(dPort) and source port(sPort) as specified in the network layout graph.
A list of all firewall devices along any path between the two selected firewall-enabled
devices is compiled. At this point there are two options NePAS can take depending on
the action to be taken as specified in the edge label.
Deny - this option occurs if the action to be taken as specified by the edge label is to
deny communication between the two nodes. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule on the firewall device with the
associated tuple options as specified in the edge option values. The firewall rule will be
configured with an ACL name of nepas-out and will be applied on the outside interface
of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule on the most upstream firewall with
the associated tuple options as specified in the edge option values. This is to ensure inter
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firewall redundancy anomaly does not occur when the proposed network is deployed.
The firewall rule will be configured with an ACL name of nepas-out and will be applied
on the outside interface of the most upstream firewall device.
The firewall rule abstraction R2 in Table 6.4 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Two firewall
rules with different protocols were configured with an access list named nepas-out in
firewall fw3 as shown in Listing 6.2 below. The firewall rules were only configured on
firewall fw3 so as to avoid inter firewall redundancy anomaly.
Listing 6.2: Proposed University Device-Device Deny Rules
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 host 20.0.1.3
eq sftp
access-list nepas-out extended deny udp host 20.0.0.2 host 20.0.1.3
eq sftp
Permit - this option occurs if the action to be taken as specified by the edge label is
to permit communication between the two nodes. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule on the firewall device with the
associated tuple options as specified in the edge option values. The firewall rule will be
configured with an ACL name of nepas-out and will be applied on the outside interface
of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as specified in the edge option values. The first set of firewall rule relations will be
configured on the most upstream firewall device with an ACL name of nepas-out and
is applied on its outside interface. The second set of firewall rule relations will be
configured on subsequent firewalls between the two nodes and the most downstream
firewall with an ACL name of nepas-in and is applied on the inside interfaces of all the
firewalls.
The firewall rule abstraction R1 in Table 6.4 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Two sets of
firewall rules were configured in the firewalls in the university network. The first rule
configured on firewall fw2 using an access list named nepas-out is used to permit L1-
Server traffic going out of fw2 towards C1-Server. The second firewall rule configured
on firewall fw3 using an access list named nepas-in is used to to permit C1-server to
receive traffic from L1-Server. Listing 6.3 shows an excerpt of both from firewalls fw2
and fw3 respectively.
Listing 6.3: Proposed University Device-Device Permit Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
eq 65432
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Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
eq 65432
6.5.1.2 Device-External or External-Device Rules
This is the second stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for
any proposed network using NePAS for this group of abstractions. NePAS during the
configuration process ensures that both the source and destination node of an edge
labeled either deny or permit is the same value when going through the network layout
graph of the proposed network in order to process these types of firewall rules. The
edge options: protocol, dPort, sPort and dest are then processed by assigning them into
the configuration snippet so as to generate the low-level platform specific firewall rule.
It should be noted that when the dest value is not specified or specified does not have
characters s or d preceding the IP address or IP network, NePAS will generate a warning
message and not process the firewall rule abstraction.The firewall rule configuration to
be generated come in one of two variants depending on the dest value specified:
(i) the first variant of this firewall rule relation occurs when the dest value specified has
a character d preceding the IP address or IP network and net mask specified. In this
situation, the destination address of the firewall rule will be the specified IP address or
network in the edge option dest provided while the source address will be the IP address
of the network device. The generated firewall rule based on the firewall tuple information
above is then applied on the most upstream firewall of the network device involved. This
firewall rule will be configured using an ACL name of nepas-out and applied on the
outside interface because the host device that has this firewall rule is the source trying to
communicate with an outside IP Address or network.
The firewall rule abstraction R4 in Table 6.4 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A firewall rule
was configured with an access list named nepas-out on firewall fw3 as shown in Listing
6.4 below.
Listing 6.4: Proposed University Device-External Rules
access-list nepas-out extended deny ip host 20.0.0.2 host 4.5.6.7
(ii) the second variant of the firewall rule relation occurs when the dest value specified
has a character s preceding the specified IP address or network. In this situation, the
source address of the firewall rule will be the specified IP address or network in the edge
option dest provided while the destination address will be the IP address of the network
device. The generated firewall rule based on the firewall tuple information above is then
applied on the most upstream firewall device. This firewall rule will be configured using
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an ACL name of nepas-in and applied on the inside interface because the host device
that has this firewall rule is the destination.
The firewall rule abstraction R3 in Table 6.4 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A firewall rule
was configured with an access list named nepas-in on firewall fw2 as shown in Listing
6.5 below.
Listing 6.5: Proposed University External-Device Rules
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 2.3.4.5 eq 56431 host
20.0.1.3 eq 62300
6.5.1.3 Device-Any Rules
This is the third stage of generating low-level firewall rule configuration commands
for any proposed network using NePAS for this group of abstractions. A specialised
node labeled any will need to be created in the network layout graph to achieve this
abstraction. NePAS gets all the firewall tuple information from the edge options that
connects a network device with the node any that has been created. Depending on the
action to be taken as specified by the edge label, there are two ways in which NePAS
configures these types of firewall rule relations:
Deny: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to deny commu-
nication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values. The firewall rule is configured with an ACL
named nepas-out and is applied on the outside interface of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation however configures the command on the most upstream
firewall to the device in question. This is to ensure that no inter firewall redundancy
anomaly occurs by configuring the other firewalls in the proposed network. The firewall
rule is configured using an ACL named nepas-out which will be applied on the outside
interface during low level configuration deployment.
Permit: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to permit
communication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options as
indicated in the edge option values on the firewall device. The firewall rule is configured
with an ACL named nepas-out which will be applied on the outside interface of the
firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures on all the firewall devices within the network
layout a firewall rule with the associated tuple options as indicated in the edge option
values. The firewall rule in the most upstream firewall device is configured using an ACL
named nepas-out which will be applied on the outside interface of the device. For all
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the other firewalls in the proposed network, the firewall rule is configured using an ACL
named nepas-in and will be applied on their inside interfaces.
6.5.1.4 Any-Device Rules
This abstraction is the inverse of the rule discussed above. NePAS gets all the firewall
tuple information from the edge options that connects a network device with the node any
that has been created. Depending on the action to be taken by firewall rule as indicated
by the edge label, there are two ways in which NePAS configures these types of firewall
rule relations:
Deny: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to deny commu-
nication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values. The firewall rule is configured with an ACL
named nepas-in and is applied on the inside interface of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation however configures the command on all the firewall devices
in the proposed network except the most upstream firewall. This is to ensure that no inter
firewall redundancy anomaly occurs by configuring the most upstream firewall device
in the proposed network. The firewall rule is configured with an ACL named nepas-in
and is applied on the inside interface of all firewall devices within the proposed network
except the most upstream firewall.
Permit: this occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to permit communica-
tion. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options as
indicated in the edge option values on the firewall device. The firewall rule is configured
with an ACL named nepas-in and is applied on the inside interface of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values on all the firewall devices including the most
upstream firewall in the proposed network. The firewall rule is configured with an ACL
named nepas-in and is applied on the inside interface of the most upstream firewall
device. All the other firewalls in the proposed network will however have a firewall rule
configured with an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the outside interface.
6.5.2 Policy Intention Rules
This section discusses the implementation methodology of firewall rules that have been
generated within the firewall policy intention graph detailed in Chapter 6.2 above.
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6.5.2.1 Realm-Realm Rules
This is the first stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for any
proposed network using NePAS for this group of firewall abstractions. Two network
layout nodes that have a firewall policy assigned using the fwpol option in the network
layout graph are selected to start the configuration process. NePAS checks the neighbours
of the two nodes and if they both have the same switch or router, a warning message will
be logged and no firewall rule will be generated. This is because it will be a futile effort
as the switch or router will forward packets before it reaches the firewall device. NePAS
moves on to generate the associated firewall rule if both nodes are not behind the same
switch or router by getting the following firewall tuple options from the policy intention
graph: protocol, dPort and sPort between the two realms. Next, a list of all firewall
devices between the two selected firewall enabled devices is compiled. NePAS then
checks whether the edge label between the two firewall realms in the policy intention
graph is deny or permit. There are two ways in which NePAS will deal with such an
abstraction depending on the edge label:
Deny: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to deny commu-
nication between the two nodes. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation, a firewall rule is configured on the firewall device with
the associated tuple options as specified in the edge (connecting the realms of the two
nodes in the policy intention graph) option values. The firewall rule is configured using
an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the outside interface of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule on the most upstream firewall
with the associated tuple options as specified in the edge (connecting the realms of the
two nodes in the policy intention graph) option values. This is to ensure inter firewall
redundancy anomaly does not occur when the proposed network is deployed. The fire-
wall rule will be configured with an ACL name of nepas-out and will be applied on the
outside interface of the most upstream firewall device.
The firewall rule abstraction R6 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A firewall rule
was configured with an access list named nepas-out on firewall fw2 as shown in Listing
6.6 below. The firewall rule was only configured on firewall fw2 so as to avoid inter
firewall redundancy anomaly.
Listing 6.6: Proposed University Realm-Realm Deny Rules
access-list nepas-out deny ip host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
Permit: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to permit
communication between the two nodes. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation, a firewall rule is configured on the firewall device with the
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associated tuple options as specified in the edge option values. The firewall rule will be
configured with an ACL name of nepas-out and applied on the outside interface of the
firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation, an access rule is placed in all firewall devices in the
compiled list of firewalls between the two devices. This is to ensure inter firewall
spuriousness anomaly is resolved during deployment of low level firewall rule relations.
The firewall rule is configured using an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the
outside interface of the most upstream firewall. All the other firewalls between the two
devices will have a firewall rule relation with ACL named nepas-in and applied on their
various inside interfaces.
The firewall rule abstraction R7 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for
the proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Two sets
of firewall rules were configured in the firewalls of the university network. The first
rule configured on firewall fw3 using an access list named nepas-out is used to permit
C1-Server traffic going out of fw3 towards L1-Server. The second rule configured on
firewall fw2 using an access list named nepas-in so as to permit L1-server to receive
traffic from C1-Server. Listing 6.7 shows an excerpt of both from firewalls fw2 and fw3
respectively.
Listing 6.7: Proposed University Realm-Realm Permit Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-in permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 eq 54321 host 20.0.1.3
eq 54321
Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 eq 54321 host 20.0.1.3
eq 54321
6.5.2.2 Realm-External or External-Realm Rules
This is the second stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for any
proposed network using NePAS for this group of firewall abstractions. NePAS checks
the fwpol of network devices in a proposed network and ensures that both the source and
destination realms of an edge in the firewall policy intention graph are the same. The
edge options such as: protocol, dPort, sPort and dest are then processed by assigning
them into the configuration snippet so as to generate the low level platform specific
firewall rule. It should be noted that when the dest value is not specified, NePAS will
generate a warning message and not process the firewall rule abstraction. The firewall
rule configuration to be generated can come in one of two variants depending on the dest
value specified:
(i) the first variant of this firewall rule relation occurs when the dest value specified has
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a character d preceding the IP address or IP network and net mask specified. In this
situation, the destination address of the firewall rule will be the specified IP address or
network in the edge option dest provided while the source address will be the IP address
of the network device with the assigned fwpol value. A firewall rule is generated based
on the firewall tuple information above and applied to the most upstream firewall of
the network device involved. This firewall rule will be configured using an ACL name
of nepas-out and applied on the outside interface because the host device that has this
firewall rule is the source.
The firewall rule abstraction R9 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Four sets of
firewall rules are configured on firewall fw3 with an access list named nepas-out for
this rule abstraction. Each destination port will have a firewall rule configured for each
destination IP address as shown in Listing 6.8 below.
Listing 6.8: Proposed University Realm-External Rules
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.facebook.com
eq 80
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.facebook.com
eq 8080
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.gorillavid.in
eq 80
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.gorillavid.in
eq 8080
(ii) the second variant of the firewall rule relation occurs when the dest value specified
has a character s preceding the IP address or IP network specified. In this situation, the
source address of the firewall rule will be the IP address or IP network specified in the
edge option dest provided while the destination address will be the IP address of the
network device with the assigned fwpol value. The generated firewall rule based on
the firewall tuple information above and applied on the most upstream firewall device.
This firewall rule will be configured using an ACL name of nepas-in and applied on the
inside interface because the host device that has this firewall rule is the destination.
The firewall rule abstraction R5 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A firewall rule
was configured with an access list named nepas-in on firewall fw2 as shown in Listing
6.9 below.
Listing 6.9: Proposed University External-Realm Rules
access-list nepas-in extended permit ip host 1.2.3.4 host 20.0.1.3
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6.5.2.3 Realm-Any Rules
This is the third stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for any
proposed network using NePAS for this group of firewall abstractions. All firewall policy
intention realms that have some relationship with the any realm from the policy intention
graph are added into a list. As we go through the network layout graph, NePAS gets
network nodes that have been assigned fwpol value that are contained in the list created.
NePAS then takes the firewall policy intention realm of the network node and goes
through the policy intention graph till we get a match with the any realm. NePAS then
gets all the firewall tuple properties from the edge (connecting the node to any) options
of the policy intention graph. Depending on the action to be taken by the firewall rule,
there are two ways in which NePAS configures these types of firewall rule relations:
Deny: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to deny commu-
nication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options as
indicated in the edge option values on the firewall device. The firewall rule is configured
using an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the outside interface of the firewall
device. This is because the node that has the realm label as its fwpol will be the source
address of the firewall rule while any will be the destination address.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values on the most upstream firewall device of the node
that carries the fwpol value. This is to ensure that no inter firewall redundancy anomaly
occurs by configuring any other firewall device within the proposed network with the
same rule that has already been denied communication by the most upstream firewall.
The firewall rule is configured using an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the
outside interface of the most upstream firewall device.
The firewall rule abstraction R8 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Two sets of
firewall rules will be configured on firewalls fw3 with an access list named nepas-out for
the two protocols specified. The firewall rules were only configured on firewall fw3 so
as to avoid inter firewall redundancy anomaly. The firewall rules configured are shown
in Listing 6.10 below.
Listing 6.10: Proposed University Realm-Any Rules
access-list nepas-out deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 any eq ftp
access-list nepas-out deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 any eq telnet
Permit: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to permit
communication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options as
indicated in the edge option values on the firewall device. The firewall rule is configured
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with an ACL named nepas-out and applied on the outside interface of the firewall device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values on all the firewall devices within the network
layout. The firewall rule is configured using an ACL named nepas-out and applied on
the outside interface of the most upstream firewall device. For all the other firewalls in
the proposed network, the firewall rule is configured using an ACL named nepas-in and
applied on their inside interfaces.
The firewall rule abstraction R3 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for the
proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. Four different
firewall rules will be on the firewalls within the proposed network layout. The first two
firewall rules will be configured on firewall fw2 using an access list named nepas-out
that will enable L1-Server to initiate communication over TCP protocol on ports either
40728 or 3689. The other two firewall rules will be configured on firewall fw3 using an
access list named nepas-in that will enable C1-Server receive communication over TCP
protocol on ports 40728 or 3689. The firewall rules configured are shown in Listing 6.11
below.
Listing 6.11: Proposed University Realm-Any Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 40728
access-list nepas-out permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 3689
Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-in permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 40728
access-list nepas-in permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 3689
6.5.2.4 Any-Realm Rules
This is the fourth stage of generating low-level firewall rule configuration commands for
any proposed network using NePAS for this group of firewall abstractions. The approach
carried out in the initial stages of this approach is the same as the one discussed above.
Depending on the action to be taken by the firewall rule, there are two ways in which
NePAS configures these types of firewall rule relations:
Deny: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to deny commu-
nication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation, a firewall rule is configured with the associated tuple
options as indicated in the edge option values. The firewall rule is configured with an
ACL named nepas-in and applied on the inside interface of the firewall device. This is
because the node that has the realm label as its fwpol will be the destination address of
the firewall rule while any will be the source address.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation however configures the command on all the firewall devices
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in the proposed network except the most upstream firewall. This is to ensure that no inter
firewall redundancy anomaly occurs by configuring the most upstream firewall device
in the proposed network. The firewall rule is configured with an ACL named nepas-in
and applied on the inside interface of all firewall devices within the proposed network
except the most upstream firewall. This is because the firewall rule is aimed at denying
communication from devices both within and outside the network to the network device
with the fwpol value.
Permit: this option occurs if the action to be taken by the firewall rule is to permit
communication. NePAS when dealing with an:
(i) intra firewall rule relation, a firewall rule configured with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values on the firewall device. The firewall rule is con-
figured with an ACL named nepas-in and applied on the inside interface of the firewall
device.
(ii) inter firewall rule relation configures a firewall rule with the associated tuple options
as indicated in the edge option values on all the firewall devices in the proposed network.
The firewall rule is configured with an ACL named nepas-in and applied on the inside
interface of the most upstream firewall device. All the other firewalls in the proposed
network will however have a firewall rule configured with an ACL named nepas-out
and applied on their outside interfaces.
The firewall rule abstraction R10 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for
the proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. There are
two sets of firewall rules configured for this rule abstraction in the proposed network
topology. The first firewall rule was configured on firewall fw3 using an access list
named nepas-in which is meant to permit L1-Server to initiate communication with
C1-Server over TCP using ssh. The second firewall rule to be configured on firewall
fw2 using an access list named nepas-out which is meant to permit L1-Server to initiate
communication with C1-Server in the proposed network. The firewall rules configured
are shown in Listing 6.12 below.
Listing 6.12: Proposed University Any-Realm Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-out permit tcp any host 20.0.0.2 eq ssh
Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-in permit tcp any host 20.0.0.2 eq ssh
6.5.2.5 Any-Any Rules
This is the last stage of generating low-level firewall configuration commands for any
proposed network using NePAS for this group of firewall abstractions. The rules gener-
ated in this part will be configured in all firewall devices within the proposed network.
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NePAS goes through the policy intention graph and match the edges where both the
source and destination nodes are any. The firewall tuple information from the edge
options are then gotten and a rule based on them is appended into all the firewalls of the
proposed network. There are three types of firewall rules that can be configured for this
group of policy intention firewall rules:
1. This type of any-any rule is generated when both source and destination addresses
that will be configured for the firewall rule relation will be set to any and assigned
to all firewalls in the proposed network. These firewall rules are configured when
the dest option of the edge option (tuple details) is set to ’NULL’. These firewall
rules will be configured using an ACL named nepas-any and applied to the global
interface on all the firewall devices within the proposed network.
The firewall rule abstraction R1 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for
the proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A
firewall rule was configured with an access list named nepas-any on both firewalls
fw2 and fw3 as shown in Listing 6.13 below.
Listing 6.13: Proposed University Any-Any Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-any permit icmp any any
Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-any permit icmp any any
2. This type of any-any rule is generated when the dest option of the edge options
(tuple details) has been specified. The first set of these firewall rules occurs when
the dest value specified has a character d preceding the IP address or IP network
specified. In this situation, the destination address of the firewall rule will be the
specified IP address or network in the edge option dest provided while the source
address will be set to any. This firewall rule will be configured on all firewall
in the proposed network using an ACL name of nepas-out and applied on their
outside interfaces.
The firewall rule abstraction R2 in Table 6.2 above illustrate this abstraction for
the proposed university distributed firewall experiment in Figure 6.3 above. A
firewall rule was configured with an access list named nepas-any on both firewalls
fw2 and fw3 as shown in Listing 6.14 below.
Listing 6.14: Proposed University Any-External Rules
Firewall fw2
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq 80
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq 80
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access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq 8080
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
8080
Firewall fw3
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq 80
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq 80
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq 8080
access-list nepas-out deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
8080
3. This type of any-any rule is generated when the dest option of the edge options
(tuple details) has been specified. The first set of these firewall rules occurs when
the dest value specified has a character s preceding the IP address specified. In this
situation, the source address of the firewall rule will be the specified IP address or
network in the edge option dest provided while the destination address will be set
to any. This firewall rule will be configured on all firewall in the proposed network
using an ACL name of nepas-in and applied on their inside interfaces.
6.6 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis gives a thorough insight into firewalls, their classifications and
how they work. The chapter proceeds to showcase how we implemented our firewall
relationships abstractions using two sets of firewall specifications: policy intention rules
and network layout rules. The chapter then looks at how the various phases of NePAS
are used for expressing high level firewall abstractions down to generating anomaly-free
low level platform specific configurations. A small example is used to give a step by step
assessment of the how NePAS handles firewall policy intention abstractions. The next
chapter will be used to discuss how cyber security competitions are organised and our
proposed high level competition intention abstraction.
Chapter 7
Cyber Security Competition
Abstractions
7.1 Background
Cyber security competitions (CDX) are computer security exercises where participants
compete in information assurance. During such competitions, participants are given
a piece of infrastructure composed of vulnerable services (also called flags). The
participants are sometimes required to defend these flag by fixing the flaws and/or
exploiting the the flags of the opponents depending on the competition’s objectives. Such
game environments are deployed in well controlled sandpits due to the consequences of
activities carried out during the competitions. These competitions provide a very effective
way of gaining hand-on practical computer security training for participants involved.
These competitions have been wildly adopted by various educational institutions as
part of their curricula and other professional competitions. As highlighted by Kenneth
Geers [48], robust cyber security competitions need a team-oriented approach. The
participants of a CDX competition can be broadly grouped into two: non-combatants
and combatants.
1. Noncombatant - this category of participants is composed of people who design,
deploy, monitor and evaluate the infrastructure before, during and after the compet-
ition. There are two distinct groups of participants with different responsibilities
under this group which are as follows:
• Organising teams
This group of participants are usually called the white team and are respons-
ible for among others:-
– design and implementation of the competition infrastructure,
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– deciding whether the scoring mechanism of the competition should be
automated or manual. This group are responsible for creating the scoring
engine if an automated system is chosen.
– recording the network traffic of the infrastructure during the competition.
• Management teams
This group of participants is usually composed of information security profes-
sionals or academic faculty members as the case maybe. These participants
are usually called the green team and are responsible for among others:-
– assessing the teams participating in the competition in terms of their
ability to carry out their objectives[76]
– maintaining the equipment of the infrastructure during the competition[67]
– handling disputes between red and blue teams such as flag definition
when the teams are at an impasse[67]
– administering competitions from a list of scenarios[76]
– injecting business tasks to be carried out by the participating teams of
the competition[76]
2. Combatants - this category of participants is composed of people who actively
participate in exploiting and/or fixing vulnerabilities during the competition. There
are two teams here which are as follows:
• Defensive Teams
This group of participants are usually composed of students or people trying
to learn or improve their cyber security skills. These participants are usually
not information assurance experts. These participants are usually called the
blue team and their objectives include among others:
– setting up and securing hardware provided by the green team[24]
– carrying out business injects such as network redesign, account updates,
blocking protocols and writing reports or presentation[24]
– applying appropriate patches to the services in their infrastructure so as
to prevent other teams from exploiting such services[30]
– ensure all network services are always available as more service uptime
equal greater score in some competitions.[48]
Some of the benefits of being in blue team include among others:
– give participants a sense of risk associated with hostile network environments[8]
– reinforce importance of good communication skills[76]
– platform to apply computer and network security related concepts and
how it helps solve real-world problems[76]
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– helps participants improve team work skills [76]
– provides motivation for participants to win hence investing time to
ensuring their services are working securely.
To avoid the blue team from completely patching or locking down their
network infrastructure, the blue teams are not allowed to filter or block entire
network traffic during compeitions[96].
• Offensive teams
This group of participants are usually composed of penetration testing profes-
sionals from the military, government organisation or cyber security industry
representatives. However in some cases these team members are composed
of students [68]. These participants are usually called the red team and their
objectives include among others:
– disrupting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the blue team’s
infrastructure.
– effectively penetrating the blue team’s infrastructure and performing
some tasks as a way of demonstrating they have achieved their objectives
such as creating a user or root owned text file after exploiting some of
the blue teams’ services.
Red teams are expected to attempt the same exploit they have carried out
on a particular blue team on the other blue teams accordingly. In some
competitions, the red teams are given detailed prior knowledge of the blue
teams infrastructure called white box test or they gather their own information
independently called black box test. The red teams in some cases have some
attack limitations that they are expected not to carry out such as:-
– in most competitions, red teams are strictly prohibited from attacking
the management infrastructure such as the scoring server[48]
– not disrupting services, bringing down hosts or deleting files that could
damage the effectiveness if the detection systems
– red teams are barred from launching denial of service (DoS) attacks on
the blue teams or management infrastructures in some competitions [24]
In the following section, the various components that are needed to organise cyber
security competitions will be studied in a fashion similar to Furtuna et al’s [44] proposed
seven stage process for organising such competitions. The seven stage process are as
follows: exercise objectives, approach, technical specifications, scenario, rules, metrics
and lessons learned.
CHAPTER 7. CYBER SECURITY COMPETITION ABSTRACTIONS 116
7.1.1 Approach
The white team members after identifying the set of objectives for a competition will
then move on to deciding the approach to be used. This generally sets the tone for the
subsequent sections of a cyber security competition. The approach a competition can
take can be classified into three - defensive, offensive and comprehensive.
• Defensive Approach Competitions
This competition approach features blue teams that are expected to in some cases
setup or build their network infrastructure and defend it from internal and/or ex-
ternal red team attacks as the case maybe. The emphasis here is for the participants
to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of their network infrastructure
for the entire duration of the competition. This competition approach only ap-
praises the blue team’s ability to defend their network as red teams are usually
brought in to exploit the blue team infrastructure. No score is awarded for blue
teams that launch attacks on either the red team or management servers during
the competition. In fact some competitions might decide to punish blue teams by
deducting their points for launching any type of exploits during the competition.
Some competitions that have used this approach in the past include:
Figure 7.1: Example of a Typical CDX competition with a Defensive Approach
– NSA CDX [8] which pits various US military academies is one of the oldest
and most popular competitions that uses a defensive approach. Some of
the objectives of the participants in the competition include the following:
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(i) confidentiality, integrity and availability; (ii) complete various business
injects during the competition; (iii) submit reports with all the required
documentation of how they defended their infrastructure.
– The Baltic Cyber Shield 2010 [48] used this approach whereby the parti-
cipants of the competition were required to defend the computer network of a
power supply company that was under sophisticated cyber attacks sponsored
by a terrorist group (the red team).
There are many other competitions that have chosen to use this approach in the
past, these include [78] [36] [24] [76].
• Offensive Approach Competitions
These competitions feature only red teams that are expected to launch attacks on
the infrastructure that have been provided to them by the white team. This approach
does not feature a blue team as all participating teams are expected to capture
the flags in the infrastructure supplied to them. The emphasis of this approach
is predominantly based on how well the teams are able to successfully exploit
vulnerabilities or capture the flags within their opponent’s network infrastructure
and no score is awarded for defending the their own infrastructure.
Figure 7.2: Example of a Typical CDX competition with an Offensive Approach
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An example of a competition that uses this kind of approach is the Blunderdome
exercise [68], where participants are expected to capture the flags within a given
infrastructure by performing various exploits from kernel-level exploits to creating
root-owned files in order to achieve part of their objectives. Many competitions
such as [57] [38] [27] [3] have chosen to use this approach in the past.
This approach comes with some legal issues where by participants need to be
aware of the ethical and legal repercussions of trying some of the attack methods
they have learnt during the competition in the real-world.
• Comprehensive Approach Competitions
These competitions feature teams that are expected to defend their network in-
frastructure while at the same time exploiting the infrastructure of opponents.
The teams are scored for defending their infrastructure and also scored for each
successful exploit they were able to achieve against their opponents.
Some competitions that have used this approach include among others:-
– University of Wisconsin developed a "cyberwar" competition using a com-
prehensive approach where participants competed in a variant of capture the
flag called plant the flag. During the competition participants were expected
to fulfil the following objectives: (i) defending the infrastructure that has
been provided to them (ii) try to penetrate the infrastructure of opponents
by leveraging weak accounts and passwords and placing a file with certain
contents on the opponents’ machines.
– In [99], the organisers also used a comprehensive approach of cyber security
competitions were the objectives of the participants include among others:
(i) install, configure and secure their systems with services such as telnet,
SMTP, HTTP and many others; (ii) ensuring competition opponents do not
exploit the services in their infrastructure; (iii) exploit the services in the
infrastructure of their opponents.
Many other competitions such as [99] [79] [102] have chosen to use this approach
in the past to improve the particiants’ defensive and penetration testing skills.
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Figure 7.3: Example of a Typical CDX competition with a Comprehensive Approach
7.1.2 Technical Specification
The technical specification of a competition details the infrastructural requirement for
the design, configuration and deployment by white team. The technical specification of
a competition infrastructure details the various network devices, network policies and
deployment methodology to be used. This section is where the competition approach
detailed in 7.1.1 above is implemented.
All other participating teams whether red or blue teams are expected to have an
identical infrastructure, equal bandwidth and maintain reliable communication during
the competition so as to ensure a level playing field amongst the teams. Some white teams
have chosen to isolate the competition infrastructure from other networks including the
Internet so as to avoid any collateral damage that may arise. Most competitions prohibit
participants from launching (i) denial of service (DoS) attacks as it affects the entire
infrastructure and may disrupt the competition, and (ii) attacks against the management
network especially the scoring and monitoring systems are prohibited and in some cases
are filtered using firewalls.
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The following are the major network devices; interconnection methods; configuration
processes; and deployment platforms that have been used by various white teams during
past competitions. We categorise this section into four major parts: servers, networking,
configuration and deployment.
7.1.2.1 Servers
The servers used in a competition is a combination of services and applications installed
on various kinds of operating systems that will be used for various purposes and with
different security requirements as defined by the white team. We have grouped servers
used by white teams during past competitions into three broad categories: attack servers;
vulnerable servers; and management servers. These server groups and their respective
requirements and usage are discussed in the following section:
1. Management Servers
These servers are used by the green team members for the entire duration of the
competition. The servers here are strictly for management purposes. The servers
typically have access to the entire infrastructure of all the teams (blue and red)
throughout the competition duration. Its is generally good practice to ensure the
servers here are not part of the actual competition network if possible. This is so
as to eliminate instances where participants try to filter the management servers
from monitoring their infrastructure. The decision on whether to have distributed
or centrally managed servers is taken by the white team. The servers deployed
here include amongst others:
(i) Repository servers - these servers are mainly used as a sort of warehouse for
the participants to download applications and tools as required by the objectives of
the competition. Many white teams have provided their participants such servers
during competitions.
(ii) Monitoring servers - these servers are mainly used to help automate green
team responsibilities by using networking tools to monitor the infrastructure.
These servers are considered so vital that Vasireaddy [94] sought to automate the
configuration of the network monitoring tool Nagios for such competitions. In
some competitions, a web dashboard is provided to help green teams to visualise
and perform snapshots and revert servers to previous states.
(iii) Scoring servers - these are the servers that host the various scoring scripts
that are used for appraising the participating teams during a competition. The
organisers create the various scripts that will be used here depending on the
objectives of the competition. The server can also incorporate a submission
mechanism where participants submit flags they have gotten through exploitation
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of vulnerable services. The scoring server can also have a dashboard to show the
points acquired by all participating teams during and after the competition. The
use of scoring servers is highly popular amongst organisers of CDX competitions
due to the ease with which points are awarded and displayed.
(iv) Situational awareness servers - these systems are used to visualise network
traffic moving across the competition infrastructure. This functionality does not
visualise real-time traffic but has some few minutes delay so as not to negatively
impact the exercise. The system has a delay functionality so that participants will
not be able to take pre-emptive measures when they realise opponents are trying
to exploit flaws within their infrastructure.
(v) Illegal attacks: some traffic patterns such as denial of service (DoS) amongst
others need to be mitigated as they can choke the entire competition infrastructure
if not dropped accordingly. This functionality should be implemented using a
firewall or an intrusion prevention system strategically placed at the exit points of
all the network of the various teams.
2. Vulnerable Servers
These servers are very important as they are composed of various vulnerabilities
(or flags) to be used during the competition. Some competitions have chosen to go
with operating systems that have not been patched so as to have more flags during
the competition. These vulnerable operating systems host the flags that needs to
be captured or planted as the requirement of the competition dictates. As already
stated the white team is responsible for selecting the operating system type and
version; service type and version, and vulnerable application to be used for the
competition. Traffic generators have also being used by white teams such as [38]
to simulate virtual user and may have some vulnerabilities in their make up as well.
Mirkovic et al [75] decided to use a Skaion traffic generator to generate telnet, SSH
and web application traffic which was considered legitimate for their Distributed
Denial of Service(DDoS) competition coming from semi autonomous agents(bots).
Table 7.1 above shows some of the flags used in some of the competitions reviewed
for this thesis.
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Team sheet
Competition Type of Service Vulnerability
iCTF 2009
Stormlog Off-by-One Overflow
WeirdTCP TCP IP Spoofing
LityaHot Session Fixation
BCS 2010
Apache Path Traversal
Linux Accounts and Password Hacks
Wordpress File inclusion
oCTF
BlooperSurf Port Knocking
WarpZone Format String
Dr Mario Input Checking Injection
SecLab
SMB LSA Heap Overflow
SMTP
WEP WEP Replay Attack
2009 NSA CDX
SSH Server SSH Reverse Tunnel
Web server Cross Site Scripting
Windows Domain Cont. Windows DNS Stack Overflow
Small Scale
FTP Misconfiguration
VNC Starts silently at boot
iCTF 2008
PHP web server Command Injection
MySQL database SQL Injection
Application Server Format String
CyberAttacks
Sohos Antivirus Batch file viruses
Poor definitions
Lavasoft Anti Spyware Default configurations
Table 7.1: Vulnerable services used in previous CDX competitions
3. Attack Servers
These servers are very important because they contain the various tools and scripts
that will enable participants (blue or red team members) to either exploit their op-
ponent’s infrastructure or fix vulnerabilities within their own infrastructure. These
servers have access rules that will enable them access both their infrastructure
and that of their opponents as the competition policy dictates. A good example of
a server that can be used here is Kali Linux due to its wide range of specialised
tools for penetration testing. There are instances where participants are expected
to develop custom exploits or tools to fix vulnerabilities during the competition.
There are also instances where participants are expected to download scripts or
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tools that will be used for exploitation or fixing vulnerabilities from a repository
server hosted within the management network of the competition. These servers
are used by participants and sometimes the green teams to have access to the
infrastructure as configured by the white teams with the help of documentations.
Example of access methods used in previous competitions include: (i) Willems
and Meinel [104] used a VNC connection embedded in web applications to allow
participants to join competitions through their web browsers, (ii) During the NSA
CDX, the white team used a virtual private network (VPN) technology such as
SSH. Many other competitions[86] have used this VPN technology for enabling
the participants access their infrastructure.
7.1.2.2 Networking
The network infrastructure of competitions need to be networked to achieve a number of
objectives depending on the approach and in extension objectives. Competitions of an
offensive nature such as the ones mentioned in 7.1.1 above need the individual teams to
be isolated from each other so that the traffic from one team does not interfere with other
teams for the entire duration. The open capture the flag(oCTF) [3] had a Fedora 13 router
that was used to isolate the various participating teams and direct traffic across various
VLANs during the competition. Another major networking concept used by white
teams during competitions and sometimes integrated into the scenarios or objectives
are sub networks (or firewall zones) within a participant team’s infrastructure. During
the Baltic Cyber Shield 2010 [48], the white team used a Linux-based firewall to create
four zones comprising a DMZ, HMI, Internal and PLC within each participating team’s
infrastructure and strategically placed with various vulnerable servers and applications.
Many other competitions such as [27] have used zones in their infrastructure for a variety
of reasons in the past.
7.1.2.3 Configuration
After the white team has made a decision about the various types and specification of
servers to be used and how to network the competition infrastructure, the next thing
to think of is how to go about configuring the various devices in the infrastructure.
Competition infrastructures are configured in one of the following two methods to
achieve outlined objectives:
(i) manually by having the participants configure their respective network infrastruc-
ture using devices (such as routers, switches, firewalls, e.t.c.) provided and as required
by the white teams during the competition. During some competitions, participants are
required to configure their infrastructure to the specifications given by the white teams
as part of tasks to be accomplished and are scored accordingly.
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(ii) another means of configuration is the semi automated configuration of the
competition infrastructure in which the white team only configures one virtual machine
and replicates it using tools such as Norton Ghost. Many competitions have used this
method of creating a virtual machine image and then replicating and distributing it to the
various participating teams. This configuration methodology is not the same as the one
proposed in this work as this configuration is only partially automated.
7.1.2.4 Deployment
At some point, usually before the configuration step discussed above, the white team
needs to decide how the competition infrastructure will be deployed. There are two ways
in which white teams deploy the competition infrastructure - physical and virtual. A
number of factors tilt their decision in picking which way to go including but not limited
to: (i) costs of acquiring the equipment; (ii) number of participants; (iii) availability of
physical space for the equipment to be used e.t.c.
• Physical
A number of white teams have decided to deploy their competitions using physical
network devices. The main reason given by most white teams for this is to give the
participants a more realistic environment to conduct competitions. For example
in some competitions, all the participating teams were hosted within the same
building so as to make it more realistic. Some other competitions that have used
physical network devices for their infrastructure include but not limited to NSA
CDX, DETER project, CCDC, DEFCON [5] e.t.c.
• Virtualisation
Some other white teams have utilised virtualisation technology due to cost factors,
availability of physical space and the flexibility it provides for taking snapshots of
machines in a known working state as highlighted by the organisers of oCTF [3].
There are two types of virtualisation technologies used by white teams: para virtu-
alisation and full virtualisation. Some examples of para virtualisation technologies
used by white teams during their competitions include among others: OpenVZ
[27], user mode linux(UML) [99] e.t.c. Some examples of full virtualisation
technologies used by white teams during their competitions include among others:
VMware [3] [79] [78] [30], KVM/QEMU [103]. Some limitations of virtualisation
to deploy such competition infrastructures include: (i) they require real hardware
firewalls, routers and switches cannot be achieved using virtualisation, (ii) perform-
ance of virtual machines running on the host machine gradually reduces as more
virtual machines are created on it. (iii) in the case of para virtualisation technology,
it limits the operating system to be used to the one used by the underlying host
machine
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7.2 CDX Policy Intention Abstraction
This section details the implementation methodology of CDX policy intention abstraction
developed for NePAS. The nodes in this policy intention abstraction are used to represent
group of network devices that belong to a particular cyber security competition team.
The labels on the nodes are used in the cyber security competition infrastructure of a
particular team during the compilation phase of any proposed experiment. The labels on
the edges which includes comprehensive, defensive and offensive are used to represent
the relationship between the two interconnected teams. It should be noted that color
of the edges in the graph has no effect during the execution of the experiment as our
system uses the labels and custom properties that have been defined by the network
administrator during the execution of the experiment.
A realm in this policy intention abstraction is used to represent an entire cyber security
competition infrastructure of a particular competing combatant team. Specifying a red
team has been abstracted for NePAS by having the label of the realm prepended with
RT- before the name of the team. Any team that has RT- before its name is considered
a red team and no vulnerable infrastructure will be deployed for the team during the
compilation phase of NePAS. The realms in CDX policy intention graph have two custom
options: management and member.
The first realm option called management is itself an abstraction of all typical
management servers described in section 1 above. As stated, the management servers
depending on the underlying base image used to deploy it can include amongst others:
scoring server, monitoring server, repository server, situational awareness server, etc.
The management option takes a boolean value of either "TRUE" or "FALSE" and is used
to enable management services for the particular team in question. The default value for
this option is set to "TRUE" and management services is provided for the team except
otherwise indicated.
The second realm option is called members and has been implemented for NePAS to
identify the number of team members within a particular competing team. The number
of team members indicated here is used to determine the number of attack servers
(discussed in section 3 above) to be deployed. This option takes an integer value and has
a default value of 1 when no other value has been specified. It should be noted that when
an integer value of 0 is assigned to any team, the team is considered to be a blue team
and only a vulnerable infrastructure will be deployed.
The example in Figure 7.4 below has one red team, RT-TeamX; and two teams that
have a mixture of both defensive and offensive teams called Team A and Team B which
will be engaged in competitive cyber security competitions amongst themselves.
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Figure 7.4: Proposed CDX Policy Intention
Table 7.2 below details the management options and the number of team mates
(members) for the various teams in the example of Figure 7.4 above.
Table 7.2: Proposed CDX Policy Intention Details
Team Management Members
RT-TeamX False 1
Team A True 1
Team B True 1
The edges between teams in the CDX intention graph is used to specify the competi-
tion approach between them. During the design of CDX intention policies, the edges
can be labeled with any of the competition approaches (discussed in 7.1.1 above) such
as: comprehensive, offensive or defensive. The labels on the edges goes a long way
in determining the access rules between the attack servers and vulnerable servers of
the various participating teams. Edges labeled comprehensive indicate a relationship
whereby the attack servers of the teams connected by the edge can access each others’
respective vulnerable servers. Edges labeled offensive indicate a relationship whereby
only the attack servers of the source team connected by the edge can access the destina-
tion team’s vulnerable servers. The destination team in this relationship is in defence
formation and only has access to it’s own vulnerable servers. Edges labeled defensive
indicate a relationship whereby only the attack servers of the destination team connected
by the edge can access the source team’s vulnerable servers. The source team in this
relationship is in defence formation and only has access it’s own vulnerable servers. It
should be noted that any edge that does not have any of these three labels will not be
adequately processed by NePAS during low level compilation of the CDX competition
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infrastructure. Also edges in a cyber security competition policy intention do not require
any edge options to abstract details and hence none are provided.
As indicated by the defensive label in Figure 7.4, Team A and Team B are expected to
defend their infrastructure from attacks being launched by RT-TeamX during the compet-
ition. During the competition, the comprehensive label on the edge between Team A and
Team B implies they will be tasked with both fixing their vulnerable infrastructure from
other team while trying to exploit the vulnerabilities in the opposing team’s infrastructure
except for the red team (RT-TeamX) that does not have any vulnerable infrastructure.
7.3 CDX Network Layout Abstraction
This section details how we implemented the network layout abstraction for CDX
competitions in NePAS. The ellipse nodes in this network layout abstraction is used
to represent routers; rectangular nodes are used to represent user computing devices;
6-pointed star are used to represent firewalls; and trapeziod nodes are used to represent
backend network servers. It should however be emphasised that all these devices need to
specified using the custom property, dtype, explained Chapter 4.2.1 before our system
will accept and know what type of network device it will be dealing with during the
development of any cyber security competition infrastructure. The edges (both directional
and non-directional) used in the graph are used to represent the logical links between the
two interconnected nodes (or network devices) in any experiment.
The entire network layout graph represents a single participating team infrastructure
for the competition. This is due to the fact that the network layout graph will be replicated
across all participating teams. This is so as to make sure all the participating teams
have exactly the same network devices and a level playing field. It is imperative that
all network layout abstraction graphs of a CDX competition have a central firewall
represented as a node labelled cfw. The central firewall node is designed to indicate how
a team infrastructure will be connected to other sections of the competition network once
deployed. This is because the central firewall node is where the attack servers and various
vulnerable servers of the various participating team’s infrastructure are connected.
The network layout graph in a CDX competition can have both BGP and firewall
policies that will determine network connectivity and access rules for the devices within
the proposed network. Hence all the network layout devices specified here can take all
the custom property options used in specifying firewall policies in exactly the same way
as the ones discussed in 6.2 above. The routers in the network layout graph of a CDX
competition can also have various BGP business relationships and hence can take the
bgppol option similar to the ones discussed in 5.2 above.
Figure 7.5 below depicts the cyber security competition infrastructure that has been
designed for the high-level competition policy proposed in Figure 7.4. At the core of the
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proposed competition infrastructure is a central firewall, cfw, that will be used to connect
the various attack servers, various team vulnerable infrastructure and management
server. The devices within the proposed network layout infrastructure except the central
firewall will be replicated for the participating teams A and B during low level NePAS
compilation phase.
Figure 7.5: Proposed CDX Team Infrastructure
7.4 Network Anomaly Resolution
This section outlines the network anomaly resolution that is carried out to ensure the
CDX infrastructure deployed is conflict free. This section can be split into two groups:
• The central firewall anomaly resolution - this section has to do with the access
rules between the management server, attack servers and vulnerable servers. The
anomaly resolution mechanism to be conducted here will be based on algorithms
developed in 6.4 above. This will ensure all low level firewall rules generated
for the management server to vulnerable servers and attack servers to vulnerable
servers are conflict free. This will also ensure that these firewall rules are generated
and deployed as dictated by the policy intention of the cyber security competition.
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• The network layout anomaly resolution - this has to do with the network anomaly
resolution of the CDX network layout of the vulnerable infrastructure of individual
teams. The algorithms that will be employed in this section will ensure conflict
free BGP and firewall rule configurations are generated during the deployment of
the cyber security competition infrastructure. The algorithms used to achieve this
are the same ones discussed in 5.4 for BGP and 6.4 for firewall rule configurations.
7.5 CDX Compilation
This section outlines the details of how NePAS generates the low level configuration
commands of a competition infrastructure using the policy intention and network layout
graphs designed by white team members. NePAS processes the policy intention graph
and creates a specialist list of realms that have CDX relationships when dealing with a
policy intention graph abstracting multiple network policies. This is achieved by looking
at realms connected by edges with labels comprehensive, defensive or offensive. Next a
new graph is created that will be used to create the specialised servers and replicate the
infrastructure for the various teams participating in the competition. All the following
procedures are done using a graph created for this reason. In order to fully explain the
processes involved, we have divided this phase into three sections, these are: creation of
specialised servers; replicating the team infrastructure; and infrastructure access rules
for the various servers within the infrastructure.
7.5.1 Creation of Specialised Servers
1. Management Server
A node called MgtServer which is based on an image of a server containing all
the management services needed for the competition as discussed in 1 above will
created be for the infrastructure. As only routers are designed to be connected to
firewalls, a router will be created called MgtRouter that will be used to connect
the management server to the central firewall which in turn gives it access to the
entire competition infrastructure.
2. Attack Servers
Once the management server, management router and central firewall have been
created, the next step is the creation of attack servers that will be used by members
of various teams during the competition. The attack servers are created using a base
image that has a number of specialised tools for attacking the vulnerable systems of
the opponent’s network or fixing the vulnerabilities within a team’s infrastructure.
These attack servers will be created and labeled using the specialised list of
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teams/realms created above and the node option members determines the number
of servers to be created. The servers created here will be be connected to the router
called Attack-Router so as to link them to the competition infrastructure via the
central firewall. The image currently used by NePAS to deploy the attack router
used here has support for only fourteen (14) devices to be connected to it during
any experiment. This means multiple routers will be created so as to connect
the attack servers to the competition infrastructure. As explained in 7.2 above,
blue team realms are those that have a value of 0 for members option and hence
no attack servers will be created for such a team at this stage of the compilation
process.
7.5.2 Replicate Team Infrastructure
After NePAS has created the specialised attack servers, it proceeds to make a duplicate
copy of the entire network layout graph which includes the nodes, edges and their various
attributes for the various teams as indicated in the policy intention graph. This is done
because the entire premise of cyber security competitions is to have a level playing field
and hence the competition infrastructure must be identical for all the participating teams.
The node labels of the new duplicates will have their respective team names prepended
to the original node labels. The only network layout node that will not be duplicated
from the network layout graph is the central firewall.
NePAS moves on to deep copy the new graph created with the duplicate infrastructure,
management server, central firewall, attack router(s) and attack servers back to the
original graph. Next the IP addresses of the various interfaces of respective devices are
then allocated by NePAS according to the option selected in the configuration file which
can be either random or sequential. As mentioned earlier in 7.2 above, any realm that has
RT- prepended before its name is considered to be a red team and hence no vulnerable
infrastructure will be deployed for it at this point.
Figure 7.6 below shows the final replicated infrastructure of the proposed competition
introduced in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 above. As can be seen, there is only one
attack router labeled Attack-Router that has been created in order to link the three (3)
participants based on the member option from Table 7.2 and the policy intention of the
competition. All the teams have an exact infrastructure replica of Figure 7.5 as discussed
above. The management router is used to link the management server to the central
firewall and entire competition infrastructure as indicated in the diagram.
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Figure 7.6: CDX Infrastructure with Replicated Teams
7.5.3 Infrastructure Access Rules
Once the IP addresses have been allocated, configuring access rules for the competition
infrastructure will be the next thing to be carried out. There are three categories of access
rules that have been implemented for the central firewall by NePAS so as to ensure
proper security access control for any proposed competition. These categories of access
rules are as follows:
1. Management Server Rules
The first group of access rules has to do with the management server having
access to the various team infrastructure during the competition. There are two
different sets of firewall rules that have been implemented for the management
server functionality. These sets of firewall rules are as follows:
(a) The firewall rules contained in this section are used to allow the management
server, MgtServer, to communicate with all the vulnerable servers of the
various participating teams during the competition. The firewall rules that
will be configured on the central firewall’s rule base for this set of access
rules have an access-list name called nepas-mgt-out. These set if firewall
rules will be applied on the outside interface of the central firewall device
that is facing the management server in the infrastructure. These firewall
rules will enable the management server to monitor and check flags of teams
for scoring during any competition.
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(b) The firewall rules contained in this section are used to allow the vulnerable
servers of various participating teams to communicate with the management
server, MgtServer during the competition. This firewall rule is only con-
figured for participating teams which have their management node option
value set to "TRUE" in the competition policy intention. A deny firewall rule
will be configured if the management node option value is set to "FALSE" in
the competition policy intention. The fact that red team’s do not have any
vulnerable infrastructure means this option will be overlooked even if it is
specified. The firewall rules that will be configured on the central firewall’s
rule base for this set of access rules have an access-list name called nepas-
mgt-in. These set if firewall rules will be applied on the inside interface of
the central firewall device that is facing the management server.
The two sets of management rules configured in the central firewall for the rep-
licated competition infrastructure in Figure 7.6 above is shown in Listing 7.1
below.
Listing 7.1: Excerpt of Management Access Rules for Proposed CDX
’access-list nepas-mgt-out extended permit ip host
20.0.0.1 any’
’access-list nepas-mgt-in extended permit ip host
20.0.1.1 host 20.0.0.1’
’access-list nepas-mgt-in extended permit ip host
20.0.2.1 host 20.0.0.1’
2. Vulnerable Server Rules
The second category of central firewall rules allow all attack servers of a particular
team to access their respective vulnerable infrastructure during the competition.
An allow rule is configured in the central firewall’s rule base so as to enable team
members have access to and fix their vulnerable servers accordingly. The firewall
rules that will be configured on the central firewall’s rule base for this set of access
rules have an access-list name called attack-own-out. These set if firewall rules
will be applied on the outside interface of the central firewall device that is facing
the attack servers in the competition infrastructure.
The access rules that have been configured in the central firewall to allow the two
teams in the proposed CDX in Figure 7.6 above is shown in Listing 7.2 below.
Listing 7.2: Excerpt of Team-to-Vulnerable Access Rules for Proposed CDX
’access-list attack-own-out extended permit ip host
20.0.8.2 host 20.0.1.1’
’access-list attack-own-out extended permit ip host
20.0.6.2 host 20.0.2.1’
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3. Attack Server Rules
The last category of access rules implemented for cyber security competitions in
NePAS determines the access rules between the attack servers of a team and its
opponents. This category of access rules is implemented using the relationship
between any two teams as indicated in the CDX policy intention graph. The access
rules are therefore categorised according to the competition approach as follows:
(a) A comprehensive relationship between two realms in the intention graph per-
mits access to the vulnerable infrastructure of both teams by their respective
attack servers. This translates to an allow rule between the attack servers of
both teams to their opponent’s vulnerable servers in the central firewall’s rule
base of the competition infrastructure.
(b) An offensive relationship between two realms in the intention graph allows
the source team attack servers to access the vulnerable infrastructure of the
destination team while the destination team attack servers are denied access
to the vulnerable infrastructure of the source team.
(c) A defensive relationship relationship between two realms in the intention
graph translates into an allow rule in the central firewall’s rule base so
as to enable the destination team attack servers to access the vulnerable
infrastructure of the source team while the source team attack servers are
denied access to the vulnerable infrastructure of the destination team.
The firewall rules that will be configured on the central firewall’s rule base for this
set of access rules have an access-list name called attack-opp-out. These set of
firewall rules will be applied on the outside interface of the central firewall device
that is facing the attack servers in the competition infrastructure. The access rules
that have been configured in the central firewall to allow the two teams and the
red team attack server to be able to access and exploit the opponent’s vulnerable
servers in the proposed CDX in Figure 7.6 above is shown in Listing 7.3 below.
Listing 7.3: Excerpt of Team-to-Opponent Access Rules for Proposed CDX
’access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host
20.0.8.2 host 20.0.2.1’
’access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host
20.0.6.2 host 20.0.1.1’
’access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host
20.0.7.2 host 20.0.1.1’
’access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host
20.0.7.2 host 20.0.2.1’
It should be noted that whenever NePAS is dealing with a cyber security competition
with firewall device(s) within the individual team infrastructure, these rules will be
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adequately added into all firewall device(s) as the policy intention dictates. Therefore
when two teams are involved in a comprehensive approach competition, access rules
will be configured into the various firewall device(s) in the infrastructure to allow the
respective attack servers of the various teams have access to the vulnerable servers of an
opponent in order to achieve set objectives.
7.6 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis gives a thorough insight into how cyber security competitions
are organised and our proposed abstractions. An example is showcased to analyse how
NePAS is used to support our proposed abstractions and evaluate their limitations. The
next chapter will be used to critically analyse our high level abstractions using complex
experiments. The chapter concludes by evaluating the limitations of the developed
system’s handling of our proposed abstractions.
Chapter 8
Critical Analysis
8.1 Experimentation
This section attempts to provide verification of how our abstraction models can be used
to deploy network experiments from sets of high-level policy intention through to low
level device configurations for each of the network policies discussed in the previous
three chapters. There are three experiments that will be conducted in this section and
each experiment will be focusing on a particular network policy that has been discussed
in the previous three chapters. The experiments will have a couple of policy anomalies
within the proposed abstraction models so as to see how our system, NePAS, will resolve
them before low level device configurations are generated for deployment.
The first experiment to be conducted details how our abstraction models can be used
to deploy a multi-tiered ISP network running BGP between various autonomous systems
from a high-level inter-domain routing policy intention. The second experiment to be
conducted details how our abstraction models can be used to implement a distributed
firewall network for a hypothetical financial service organisation from a high-level
access control policy document. The last experiment to be conducted details how our
abstraction models can be used in designing and running a multi-approach cyber security
competition. Each of these experiments will be discussed using four segments as follows:
1. Experiment rationale - this segment is used to briefly explain the reason for
conducting the experiment and its policy requirement.
2. Policy intention - this segment is used to explain how the policy requirement from
the above segment is translated into a NePAS policy intention graph. Policy anom-
alies contained in these abstraction models will be highlighted in this segment.
3. Network layout - this segment is used to explain the second phase of our abstraction
model or the actual network layout that will be used during the proposed experi-
135
CHAPTER 8. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 136
ment. Policy anomalies contained in these abstraction models will be highlighted
in this segment.
4. Experiment overview - the two segments, policy intention and network layout,
are the basis for the proposed experimental setup. This segment will be used to
explain the relationships between the nodes during the experiment.
5. Expected outcome - this segment is used to analyse the expected outcome (or
expected result) of the experiments conducted using the system, NePAS, developed
from our abstraction models. The segment will also be used to explain how NePAS
handles the various policy anomalies that have been introduced in our abstraction
models in the various experiments. The segment ends with an analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of our abstraction models and our system, NePAS.
8.1.1 BGP Routing Experiment
The experiment conducted in this section hopes to show the effectiveness of our inter
domain routing abstraction models in deploying networks from high-level BGP business
relationships. The first part of this section is used to discuss the rationale for conducting
this experiment and detail the routing policies that have been prepared. The BGP business
relationships between the autonomous systems that will be used to model a mini-Internet
experiment will be discussed in-depth. The second part of this section will be used to
discuss the high-level policy intention of the experiment based on the routing policies
described in the first section. The business relationships between the various autonomous
systems and how they are implemented using NePAS will be discussed in-depth in
the second section. The third section details the network layout of the mini-Internet
experiment that will be deployed in order to show the effectiveness of NePAS in mapping
high-level policy intention of a BGP business relationship on to a proposed network
layout. The last section of the experiment will be detailing the expected outcome of the
experiment conducted. This part will detail how our system, NePAS, will handle the
various anomalies that have been injected and discussed in the previous section. This
part concludes with an examination of some the strengths and weaknesses of our inter
domain routing abstraction models.
1. Experiment Rationale
The purpose for conducting the hypothetical mini-Internet experiment in this
section section is to showcase how our BGP abstraction models can be used to
deploy inter domain routing networks. This section of the BGP experiment details
the routing policies of the various autonomous systems prepared by a group of
service providers called the Internet Council. The Internet Council will be tasked
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with deploying the mini-Internet experiment using NePAS based on policies within
this document and network layout design of the various service provider networks.
There are a total of six autonomous systems that have been identified: Tata, Sprint,
FiberRing, TDC, Local ISP (LISP) and Regional ISP (RISP). There are two sets
of: tier-1, tier-2 and tier-3 AS networks in this experiment. Tata and Sprint
are tier-1 AS networks, they have recently signed an agreement to freely share
routes between their networks. The two tier-1 networks, Tata and Sprint, will be
providing transit services to FiberRing and TDC respectively for an undisclosed
amount. FiberRing realised they need to improve their service quality in order to
keep a growing number of disgruntled customers from leaving and hence have
signed a transit agreement with Sprint for an undisclosed amount as a way of
load balancing customer traffic. The management of FiberRing and TDC have
signed two contracts, the first contract is for an IPv4 agreement that states the two
companies will freely share routes between their networks and the second contract
is for TDC to provide FiberRing IPv6 traffic transit services for an undisclosed
amount. The two tier-2 AS networks, FiberRing and TDC, will be providing
transit services to LISP and RISP networks respectively for an agreed price that
will be announced at a joint press conference. The management of Regional ISP
in their expansion plans supported by their shareholders will be buying Local ISP
for an industry record amount and will be looking to merge the two networks over
a three year period.
2. Policy Intention
This section of the BGP experiment details how the routing policy described in
the section above will be converted into a BGP policy intention that will fit our
abstraction model. The NePAS BGP policy intention for the experiment will be
composed of six realms that will be used to represent the various ISP networks.
The ASes for the proposed experiment are as follows: Tata, Sprint, FiberRing,
TDC, LISP (representing Local ISP) and RISP (representing Regional ISP). Figure
8.1 below shows the high-level business relationship between the ASes in the
proposed experiment. As indicated in the diagram, Tata and Sprint are tier-1 AS
networks with AS numbers 6435 and 1239 respectively. Typical with tier-1 ASes
and as discussed in the routing policy section, these networks have a peering
business relationship between them. FiberRing and TDC are tier-2 AS networks
with AS numbers 38930 and 3292 respectively. These two networks have an
IP version dependent hybrid relationships between themselves with a peering
relationship on IPv4 and a transit (provider to customer) relationship on IPv6.
These two ASes are also customers of Tata and Sprint respectively. FiberRing
is a multi-homed AS and has another transit relationship with Sprint for load
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balancing and redundancy. This is a business decision taken by the management
of FiberRing in order to provide their customers with superior service. LISP has
an AS number 65432 while RISP will depend on NePAS to automatically generate
a public AS number for it during the compilation process. The use of a private
AS number as stated earlier is a BGP anomaly and has been intentionally injected
into our abstraction model in order to see how our system, NePAS, will resolve it.
These two ASes are tier-3 ASes and have a sibling business relationship due to the
fact that LISP was just acquired by RISP’s parent company. Both RISP and LISP
have a transit business relationship with TDC and FiberRing respectively.
Figure 8.1: Experiment 1 Policy Intention
3. Network Layout
This section of the BGP experiment discusses the network layout of the mini-
Internet being developed by the Internet Council based on the network require-
ments of the various ISPs. The network layout is also where the high level BGP
policy intention of the proposed experiment will be mapped on routers. Figure 8.2
below shows the network layout for the proposed experiment.
As indicated in the diagram above, there are three sets of network devices -
servers, routers and firewalls. The network devices are grouped according to the
AS network they belong to within the proposed mini-Internet experiment. The
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Figure 8.2: Experiment 1 Network Layout
members of a group will have the same AS number and the edge routers will be
configured with low-level configurations of the business relationship described
in the previous segment with their neighbours. Routers with ’iR’ appended to
their labels are to be used as internal routers. These routers have directed links
terminating at the edge routers of their respective AS networks. Router with ’eR’
appended to their labels are used as external routers. They will be configured with
external BGP business relationships as dictated in the policy intention discussed
above. The table 8.1 below shows a listing of additional routes that will be
configured on external routers using the network node option.
Router network
RISP-eR 50.0.0.0, 60.0.0.0
S-eR 20.0.0.0, 15.0.0.0
LISP1-eR 30.0.0.0, 25.0.0.0
FR-eR 15.0.0.0, 40.0.0.0
T-eR 50.0.0.0, 55.0.0.0
Table 8.1: Additional Routes on Routers
There are two instances of multiple origin autonomous system (MOAS) from the
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table above. Routers RISP-eR and T-eR have been designed to advertise network
50.0.0.0 which is a BGP anomaly. Also, routers S-eR and FR-eR have been
designed with MOAS anomaly so as to see how our system, NePAS, will handle it.
4. Experiment Overview
There are a total of six service providers in the experiment with eleven BGP
routing connections in the experiment. The following is a general overview of
both the BGP policy intention and network layout setup of the experiment.
From Figure 8.1 above, the nodes such as Tata, Sprint, TDC and others are used
to represent a group of routers that belong to a particular service providers or
identical inter-domain routing policies. The labels on the nodes will be used in the
network layout to determine what service provides or inter-domain routing realms a
network router belongs to during the experiment. For example, a router that has an
inter-domain routing realm of LISP belongs to the LISP service provider during the
experiment. The edges in the Figure 8.1 above are used to indicate the relationship
between the two interconnected realms. The labels such as provider, sibling, peer
and others on the edges states the exact inter-domain routing relationship between
the two realms connected by the edge in the experiment. For example, the edge
with label provider between nodes Tata and FiberRing is used to represent a transit
relationship between the two nodes in question.
From Figure 8.2 in the graph, ellipse nodes such as RISP-eR, wifi1 and others
represent routers; rectangular nodes such as ATM1, C1 and others are used to
represent user computing devices; 6-pointed star such as bfw, fw3 and others are
used to represent firewalls; and trapeziod nodes such as www, app and others
are used to represent backend network servers. It should however be emphasised
that these devices need to specified using the custom property, dtype, explained
Chapter 4.2.1 before our system will accept and know what type of network device
it will be dealing with during execution. Pointed edges are used to represent both
internal and external BGP connections in the graph. It should be noted that the
edges in the network layout abstraction does not use any labels and any labels
added will be ignored by our system during the execution. Three of these pointed
edges or connections marked with red links in 8.2 above have no predefined BGP
relationships. The remaining eight connections marked with black links have
routing relationships defined in the policy intention graph of the experiment.
The following section discusses the connections in the experiment both those
with predefined routing relationships and the connections that have no routing
relationships defined in the policy intention graph.
• The nodes, RISP-eR and LISP2-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms RISP
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and LISP from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, RISP and LISP, have a sibling
relationship hence is expected that they share all routes in the experiment.
• The nodes, TDC2-eR and FR-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms TDC and
FiberRing from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, TDC and FiberRing, have
a hybrid relationship which includes a peering relationship on IPv4 and a
transit relationship on IPv6.
• The nodes, TDC2-eR and S-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms TDC
and Sprint from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, TDC and Sprint, have a
transit relationship between them. Sprint has a provider relationship to TDC
while TDC is a customer of Sprint. Therefore, it is expected that Sprint will
advertise all its routes to TDC to enable it provide quality service to TDC.
However, TDC is only expected advertise its own routes and the routes of its
customers but not its peer or other provider routes to Sprint.
• The nodes, FR-eR and T-eR , from Figure 8.2 belong to realms FiberRing and
Tata from Figure8.1 above. The realms, FiberRing and Tata, have a transit
relationship between them. Tata has a provider relationship to FiberRing
while FiberRing is a customer of Tata. Therefore, it is expected that Tata
will advertise all its routes to FiberRing to enable it provide quality service
and ensure it is globally reachable. However, FiberRing is only expected to
advertise its own routes and routes of its customers but not its peer or other
provider routes to Tata.
• The nodes, RISP-eR and TDC1-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms TDC
and RISP from Figure8.1 above. The realms, TDC and RISP, have a transit
relationship between them. TDC has a provider relationship to RISP while
RISP is a customer of TDC. Therefore, it is expected that TDC will advertise
all its routes to RISP to enable it be globally reachable. However, RISP is
only expected to advertise its own routes and routes of its customers but not
its peers or other provider routes to TDC.
• The nodes, S-eR and FR-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms Sprint and
FiberRing from Figure8.1 above. The realms, Spring and FiberRing, have a
transit relationship between them. FiberRing is a customer of Sprint while
Sprint is a provider of FiberRing. Therefore, it is expected that Sprint will
will advertise all its routes to FiberRing to enable it be globally reachable.
However, FiberRing is only expected to advertise its own routes and routes
of its customers but not its peers or other its other provider routes to Sprint.
• The nodes, FR-eR and LISP1-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms FiberRing
and LISP from Figure8.1 above. The realms, FiberRing and LISP, have a
transit relationship between them. FiberRing has a provider to LISP while
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LISP is a customer of FiberRing. Therefore, it is expected that FiberRing will
advertise all its routes to LISP to enable it to be globally reachable. However,
LISP is only expected to advertise its own routes and routes of its customers
but not its peers or other provider routes to FiberRing.
• The nodes, TDC2-eR and RISP-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms TDC
and RISP from Figure8.1 above. The realms, TDC and RISP, have a transit
relationship between them. TDC has a provider relationship to RISP while
RISP is a customer of TDC. Therefore, it is expected that TDC will advertise
all its routes to RISP to enable it be globally reachable. However,RISP is
only expected to advertise its own routes and routes of its customers but not
its peers or other provider routes to TDC.
• The nodes, LISP1-eR and T-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms LISP and
Tata from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, LISP and Tata have no relations
in the policy intention graph 8.1 above and is considered an anomaly. The
way our system handles such anomalies will be detailed in the Anomaly
Resolution segment in the following section of the experiment.
• The nodes, RISP-eR and S-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms RISP and
Sprint from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, RISP and Sprint have no relations
in the policy intention graph 8.1 above and is considered an anomaly. The
way our system handles such anomalies will be detailed in the Anomaly
Resolution segment in the following section of the experiment.
• The nodes, S-eR and LISP1-eR, from Figure 8.2 belong to realms Sprint and
LISP from Figure 8.1 above. The realms, Sprint and LISP have no relations
in the policy intention graph 8.1 above and is considered an anomaly. The
way our system handles such anomalies will be detailed in the Anomaly
Resolution segment in the following section of the experiment.
5. Expected Outcomes
This section of the experiment will be used to analyse and discuss the expected
outcome of the mini-Internet experiment. This section of the experiment will
be split into three subsections that deal with - business relationships between
the routers; how NePAS handles injected anomalies in the experiment; and the
strengths and weaknesses of our abstraction models and system developed for
testing the models.
Business Relationships
The external BGP link between TDC1-eR and RISP-eR is a backup link and
will only be activated when the TDC2-eR and RISP-eR link fails for whatever
reason. To configure this link, a lower local preference value was configured on
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the BGP session on the link between routers TDC2-eR to RISP-eR. The routers
TDC1-eR and TDC2-eR have a provider BGP business relationship with router
RISP-eR. The routers have been configured with an export policy to RISP-eR
advertising their own routes (composed of IP addresses of network devices within
their AS) and routes router TDC2-eR has learned from S-eR (its customer). The
router TDC2-eR has a BGP customer and peering business relationships with S-eR
and FR-eR respectively. Therefore, TDC2-eR has been configured to advertise
its own routes and routes it has learned from RISP-eR (its customer) to both
S-eR and FR-eR. It has however not been configured advertise to FR-eR routes
it has learned from S-eR and it was likewise not configured to advertise routes
it learned from S-eR to FR-eR because it has a customer and peer relationship
with both routers respectively. The router RISP-eR has a BGP customer, customer
and sibling relationship with TDC1-eR, TDC1-eR and LISP2-eR respectively.
The router been configured to advertise its own routes and routes it has learned
from TDC AS. It was also configured to advertise all its routes and routes it has
learned from LISP2-eR to both routers in TDC AS. The BGP sessions in Figure
8.2 above with red coloured edges indicate links between two ASes with no high
level BGP business relationship in the policy intention graph. The external BGP
links between RISP-eR to S-eR; LISP1-eR to S-eR and LISP1-eR to T-eR are
examples of BGP sessions that have no BGP business relationships. In situations
such as these, NePAS will in addition to generating a warning log message, no
BGP session has been configured between the two routers.
Anomaly Resolution
The first anomaly that has been highlighted in this experiment is the use of a
private AS number by LISP during the deployment of the network. A private AS
number when detected in an abstraction model is converted to a public AS number
automatically by our system, NePAS. The system when it generates a public that is
already in use for a particular experiment, keeps on generating public AS numbers
until a unique one is generated.
The second anomaly that has been highlighted in this experiment is potential mul-
tiple origin autonomous system (MOAS). There are two cases of MOAS present in
the experiment conducted. The first instance of MOAS anomaly in the experiment
is between routers RISP-eR and T-eR advertising network 50.0.0.0 respectively.
The second instance of MOAS anomaly in the experiment is between routers
S-eR and FR-eR advertising network 15.0.0.0 respectively. Our system, NePAS,
generates an error log message and does not generate low level configurations
for advertising the routes with such an anomaly on all the affected routers. This
ensures low level configurations generated for networks being developed using
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our abstraction models do not have MOAS anomalies.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The major strength of our abstraction models and NePAS is the ability to ensure
final low level configuration generations are free of anomalies such as origin
misconfigurations, private AS numbers announcement, multiple origin autonomous
system (MOAS) and export misconfigurations. This goes a long way in ensuring
network experiments behave in conformity with high level policy specifications.
The major weakness of our abstraction model and/or NePAS is its inability to
verify route connectivity to networks before such routes are configured on routers
during experiments. Our abstraction models and system, NePAS, in their current
state do not have any measures built-in to prevent BGP wedgies during network
experiments as well due it being a post deployment anomaly which is not part of
the research conducted in this thesis.
8.1.2 Firewall Relationships Experiment
This experiment hopes to show the effectiveness of using our firewall abstraction model
for deploying a hypothetical financial service provider (bank) network. The security
policy that has been prepared by the management for the organisation’s ICT unit which
responsible for configuration will be discussed in the first part of this section. This
security document will be used to guide the policy intention abstraction of the bank’s
network. It should be noted that the policy document reproduced in this section is
focused mainly on the firewall relationships between devices hosted within the network.
The NePAS policy intention based on the proposed security policy will be discussed
in the second segment of this section. This segment will also be used to discuss the
various firewall policy anomalies that are in our firewall abstraction models. The bank’s
network layout discussed in the third part of the experiment. The bank’s network layout
is composed of various devices (and/or users) in two different office locations. This
section also details some of the features of NePAS firewall rule abstraction. The last
section of the experiment will be detailing the expected outcome of the experiment to
be conducted. This part will detail how our system, NePAS, will handle the various
firewall anomalies that have been injected and discussed in the previous sections of
the experiment. This part concludes with an examination of some the strengths and
weaknesses of our firewall abstraction models.
1. Experiment Rationale
The rationale for conducting this experiment is to showcase how our firewall
abstraction model can be used to deploy a multiple firewall network. This section
of the firewall experiment details the bank’s proposed network security policy as
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prepared by the management composed of a specialised committee comprising
security personnel; human resource department staff; IT department staff and
some senior managers of the bank. The proposed security policy is expected to be
implemented by the bank’s IT department. There are seven separate zones of users
or devices that have been identified by the committee for the bank’s network in this
document. These zones are: external de-militarised zone, internal de-militarised
zone, trading office, management office, front desk, counter and the general staff
office. The various zone outlined will have various devices that share identical
security policies. Each of the zones will be briefly discussed in the following
section:
• External De-Militarised Zone (eDMZ) - this zone of the network is used
to host devices that are openly accessible to any user both within the bank
network and outside it. The devices within this zone are not allowed to
initiate communication with any device both within and outside the bank
network for security reasons.
• Internal De-Militarised Zone (iDMZ) - this zone is used to host devices
that are accessible to users within the bank network only. Therefore, zones
permitted to access the resources within this zone are: management office,
traders, front desk, counter and general staff office. There are network servers
within this zone that backup data from network devices in the external de-
militarised zone.
• Trading Office - this zone is used to host users that work in the stockbroking
unit of the bank. The users within this group are allowed to access the
network resources that are hosted in the internal de-militarised zone of the
bank network. The users are only allowed to access the network of the Stock
Exchange but any other communication both within or outside the bank
network is not allowed by this group of users.
• Management Office - this zone is used to host devices that the management
staff of the bank use. The users in this zone have unfettered access to any
device both within the bank network. The devices within this zone can be
accessed from any device both within and outside the bank network using
virtual private networks such as secure shell (ssh). No one both within the
bank network and outside it is allowed to initiate communication with the
devices in this zone using any other means for security reasons.
• Front Desk - this zone is used by users in the customer care and marketing
departments of the bank network. The users within this zone are permitted
to communicate with any device both within and outside the network using
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web, Skype and WhatsApp. The users in this zone are not allowed to use any
other social media applications so as not to distract the staff members from
work. The users of this zone are allowed to communicate with devices within
the internal de-militarised zone so as serve customers better. No one both
within the bank network and outside it is allowed to initiate communication
with the devices in this zone for security reasons.
• Counter - this zone is used to indicate workstations of the bank that are used
to satisfy customer operations of depositing and withdrawing money from
their respective accounts. The devices in this zone are only permitted to
communicate with a specific application server in the internal de-militarised
zone. No one both within the bank network and outside it is allowed to
initiate communication with the devices in this zone for security reasons.
• General Staff Office - this zone is used for users in the business development,
research, advertising and risk management departments of the bank. The
users in this zone are allowed unfettered access to any device both within and
outside the bank network so as to make their jobs more effective and efficient.
The users within this zone collaborate with another bank on a number of
projects and hence there is a need to punch a firewall hole in the bank network
to allow both groups to communicate with each other seamlessly using any
medium they choose.
• The human resources department staff have realised that there are two highly
addictive websites (1.2.3.4 and 5.6.7.8) that a lot of the staff members are
fund of going and spending a considerable amount of time which impacts
the work rate of the staff. This has been highlighted by the committee and
the IT department is required to deny all staff members from accessing the
websites. The founder of the bank has mandated that his home workstation
should be allowed unfettered access to the entire bank network in a memo to
the committee.
2. Policy Intention
This section of the firewall experiment discusses the NePAS firewall policy inten-
tion that has been designed based on the network security policy detailed in the
above section. The NePAS firewall policy intention will have six firewall realms
based on the possible rule composition and zones from the network security policy
adopted. The firewall realms that have been developed for the experiment are:
mgt is used to abstract firewall rule relations for the management office; iDMZ
abstract internal de-militarised zone rules; eDMZ abstract external de-militarised
zone rules; traders abstract trading office rules; fdesk abstract front desk rules;
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general abstract general staff office rules. Figure 8.3 below shows the high level
firewall rule relationships between the various realms of the proposed experiment.
Figure 8.3: Experiment 2 Policy Intention
In Table 8.2 below, all the firewall tuple details for the various rule relationships
between the realms that cannot be shown in Figure 8.3 are presented. A total of
twenty-four firewall rule relations have been abstracted from the network security
policy statement described in the first segment of this experiment. The firewall
rule relations encompasses everything that is needed to ensure the network security
policy statement of the bank is implemented.
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Table 8.2: Firewall Rule Abstractions for Experiment 2
R/No S Realm D Realm Action Protocol D Port S/D Address S Port
R1 any any permit icmp NULL NULL NULL
R2 any any deny tcp,udp NULL
d 1.2.3.4,
d 5.6.7.8
NULL
R3 any any deny
ah, esp
gre, 41
NULL NULL NULL
R4 any general deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R5 any iDMZ deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R6 any eDMZ permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R7 any mgt deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R8 any traders deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R9 eDMZ any deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R10 iDMZ any deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R11 iDMZ iDMZ permit tcp www, 8080 NULL NULL
R12 mgt any permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R13 mgt iDMZ permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R14 mgt mgt permit ip NULL
s 1.2.3.4,
c 5.6.7.8
NULL
R15 fdesk any permit tcp, udp
www, 8080
80, 5222-5230
NULL NULL
R16 fdesk iDMZ permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R17 fdesk any deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R18 traders any deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R19 general any permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R20 general iDMZ permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R21 general general deny tcp 6881-6999 NULL 6000-7000
R22 general general permit tcp
ftp, ftp-data
ssh, sftp
124.0.0.23 NULL
R23 traders traders permit ip NULL d 7.8.9.10 NULL
R24 traders traders permit ip NULL
s 132.122.76.0
255.255.255.0
NULL
The firewall rules, R12 and R18 in the table above are likely to cause inter-firewall
correlation anomaly during low level configuration of the experiment. Also,
firewall rules, R7 and R8, from the above table are likely to cause inter-firewall
redundancy anomaly during low level configuration. These two anomalies have
been added to our abstraction models in this experiment so as to see how NePAS
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will resolve them during low level configuration.
3. Network Layout
This section of the firewall experiment discusses the network layout that will be
used. The network layout is split into five different networks - the network of the
bank’s head office, the home network of the bank’s founder, the network where
the datacenter of the bank’s resources are hosted and two networks representing
the banks’ branches. The network layout is where the high level firewall policy
intention of the proposed experiment will be implemented. Figure 8.4 below shows
the layout of the proposed hypothetical financial network.
Figure 8.4: Experiment 2 Network Layout
Table 8.3 below shows a break down of the various policy intention realms dis-
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cussed above and the firewall-enabled nodes with their respective realms.
Table 8.3: Network Topology Detail for Experiment 2
S/No Realm Devices
1 iDMZ a1, a2, a3, app, db1, nfs2
2 eDMZ www, db, nfs1,
3 mgt ms1, ms2, ms3, ms4
4 fdesk cc, mkt
5 traders ts1, ts2, ts3, ts4, ms4
6 general ws1, w2, ws3, ws4
7 - hs1, C1, C2
As indicated in Figure 8.4 above, there are some additional firewall rules that have
been implemented so as to conform with the network security policy detailed in
the first section of the experiment. Table 8.4 below shows the detailed firewall
tuple options for the six additional firewall rule relations. The six firewall rules
abstracted in the network layout of the hypothetical financial institution network
are detailed below.
Table 8.4: Network Layout Firewall Rules for Experiment 2
R/No S Device D Device Action Protocol D Port S/D Address SPort
R1 C1 app permit tcp 34567 NULL 45678
R2 C2 app permit tcp 43200 NULL 45678
R3 any app deny tcp 43200 NULL 45678
R4 hs1 hs1 permit tcp 22 d 188.124.125.3 NULL
R5 hs1 any permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R6 hs1 hs1 permit tcp 22 d 188.124.125.3 NULL
R7 ms1 any deny icmp NULL NULL NULL
R8 any hs1 deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R9 any C1 deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R10 any C2 deny ip NULL NULL NULL
The first rule R1 is used to permit communication between the machine used on
the bank’s counter floor C1 on port 45678 and a server app within the iDMZ on
port 34567 over TCP protocol as required in the counter section of the policy
statement discussed above. The second rule R2 is used to permit communication
between the machine used on the bank’s counter floor C2 on port 45678 and a
server app within iDMZ on port 43200 over TCP protocol. The third rule R3 is
CHAPTER 8. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 151
used to permit communication to all the servers and machines within the multiple
bank networks and the workstation of the founder in his home network over IP
protocol. Rules 4-6 are used to deny communication from any device within the
proposed network to devices hs1, C1 and C2 over IP protocol.
The firewall rules, R4 and R6, in the above table will cause intra-firewall redund-
ancy anomaly during low level configuration of the experiment. Firewall rules, R2
and R3, in the above table will cause intra-firewall shadowing anomaly during low
level configuration. Finally, the firewall rules, R7 in Table 8.4 and R1 in Table8.2
above will cause intra-firewall correlation during low level configuration.
4. Experiment Overview
There are a total of six firewalls in the network layout of the experiment and five
networks comprising Branch 1, Branch 2, home - net, HQ and Datacenter. The
following is a general overview of both the firewall policy intention and network
layout setup of the experiment.
From Figure 8.3 above, the nodes such as fdesk, mgt, general and others are used
to represent a group of network devices that have identical firewall relationships
in the experiment. The labels on the nodes will be used in the network layout to
determine the firewall realm a network device belongs to during the experiment.
For example, network devices that belong to the eDMZ firewall realm will have
firewall relationships abstracted in the policy intention graph with other devices
in other realms during the experiment. The edges in Figure 8.4 above are used
to indicate the action to be taken by the firewall relationship between the two
interconnected realms. The label permit on the edges in the graph are used to
abstract firewall relationships between two interconnected realms that allows
communication based on certain protocols in the experiment. The label deny on
the edges in the graph are used to abstract firewall relationships between two
interconnected realms that deny communication base on certain protocols in the
experiment. It should be noted that color of the edges in the graph has no effect
during the execution of the experiment as our system uses the labels and custom
properties that have been defined by the network administrator during the execution
of the experiment.
From Figure 8.4 above, ellipse nodes such as TDC1-eR, owifi1 and others represent
routers; rectangular nodes such as ATM1, ts1 and others are used to represent
user computing devices; 6-pointed star such as hfw, fw3 and others are used to
represent firewalls; trapeziod nodes such as www, app and others are used to
represent backend network servers; and octagon shaped nodes labeled "Internet"
is used to represent an interconnection to the Internet. It should however be
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emphasised that all these devices need to specified using the custom property,
dtype, explained Chapter 4.2.1 before our system will accept and know what type
of network device it will be dealing with during execution. There are two types
of edges in the graph above, these are - edges that represent logical links and
edges used to abstract additional firewall rules. The first type of edges or pointed
edges and edges that have no labels are used to represent logical links between
the two devices in the graph. The second type of edges or the edges with labels
are used to abstract firewall relationships in the network layout graph between the
two interconnected nodes. The firewall relationships are abstracted in the same
manner as the firewall policy intention. The label permit on the edges in the graph
are used to abstract firewall relationships between two interconnected nodes that
allows communication based on certain protocols in the experiment. The label
deny on the edges in the graph are used to abstract firewall relationships between
two interconnected nodes that deny communication base on certain protocols in
the experiment. It should be noted that color of the edges in the graph has no
effect during the execution of the experiment as our system uses the labels and
custom properties that have been defined by the network administrator during the
execution of the experiment.
5. Expected Outcome
This section of the experiment will be used to analyse and discuss the expected
outcome of the hypothetical financial institution network to be deployed. This sec-
tion of the experiment will be split into three subsections that deal with - analysis
of some complex firewall relationships in the experiment; how NePAS handles the
various injected anomalies in the various firewall relationship abstraction models
in the experiment; the section concludes with the analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of both our abstraction models and system used for testing these
models.
Firewall Relationship
This section looks at some interesting sets of firewall relationship abstraction
models expresses for the financial network. We begin by looking at the firewall
devices and network devices with some interesting relationship expressions and
properties.
As indicated in Table 8.3 above, network devices hs1, C1 and C2 do not belong
to any firewall realm in the policy intention. Next, firewall rule relations R1
and R2 from Table 8.4 have been configured in firewall ofw to enable C1 and
C2 to communicate with app server in iDMZ of the proposed bank network.Two
firewall rules, R5 and R6 from Table 8.4, were configured in all the firewall devices
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within the proposed network to deny any device from initiating communication
with C1 and C2 respectively. The firewall hfw has been configured with firewall
rule R1 from Table 8.4 above to enable the workstation in the bank founder’s
house to communicate with any device within the proposed financial network. A
firewall rule that denies any device from communicating with the founder’s home
workstation is configured on all the firewall devices within the proposed network.
All the devices within the proposed network belong to only one firewall intention
realm except ms4 which belongs to both mgt and traders. Firewall ofw has been
configured with firewall rules of both realms so as to handle the network security
policy requirement for ms4 network device.
All the rules in Table 8.2 above can be handled by NePAS except for R11, R14,
R22 due to the following reasons. The first of the three rules, R11, was not
configured for devices belonging to iDMZ realm because NePAS needed a dest
value which was omitted in the firewall rule abstraction model. With the R14 rule,
the second part of the dest value, c 5.6.7.8 will not be configured on the most most
upstream firewall devices of devices within the mgt firewall realm because the
character c is not what NePAS is expecting in the firewall rule abstraction model.
However, the first part, s 1.2.3.4, with the appropriate notation that our system
understands will be configured during the experiment. The third rule, R22, was
not configured on any device that belong to the general firewall realm because
the initial character s or d as required by NePAS was omitted in the firewall rule
abstraction model.
Anomaly Resolution
This subsection looks at the various firewall anomalies injected into our abstraction
models and how our system handles them during the experiment. There are a total
of five intra and inter firewall anomalies that have been injected into the financial
network’s model. Intra-firewall anomalies will be discussed in the beginning and
the inter-firewall anomalies discussed in the latter part.
The first intra-firewall anomaly that will analysed is the redundancy anomaly
in R4 and R6 in Table 8.4. This anomaly in the abstraction model is handled
by NePAS using its automatic removal of identical firewall rule relations within
the financial network during deployment. Therefore in this case, only R4 will
be configured in the affected firewall devices during deployment and hence no
intra-firewall redundancy anomaly will occur. The second intra-firewall anomaly
that will analysed is the shadowing anomaly in R2 and R3 in Table 8.4. This
anomaly in the abstraction model is handled by NePAS using its rule ordering
mechanism at deployment. As indicated in Chapter 6.4.1, R2 will be placed on top
of R3 in the firewall rule table in all affected firewall devices during deployment
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and hence no intra-firewall shadowing anomaly will occur. The third intra-firewall
anomaly that will analysed is the correlation anomaly in R7 of Table8.4 and R1
in Table 8.2. This anomaly in the abstraction model is currently not resolved by
NePAS during deployment. Therefore, both rules will be configured on all affected
firewall devices within the financial network during deployment.
The first inter-firewall anomaly that will analysed is the correlation anomaly in
R12 and R18. The fact that device ms4 belongs to both mgt and traders firewall
intention realms introduced a correlation anomaly due to the presence of rules R12
and R18 from Table 8.2 above in all the firewall devices except hfw of the proposed
network. NePAS for now does not support have a way of resolving such anomalies
and hence both rules were configured in all the firewall rules except firewall ofw.
The second inter-firewall anomaly that will analysed is the redundancy anomaly
in Table 8.4 R7 and R8. NePAS however resolves the inter-firewall redundancy
anomaly as both R7 and R8 from Table 8.2 specify the same firewall relationship
and one is expected to be removed upon deployment on all the firewall devices
within the financial network.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The major strength of our abstraction model is in its ability to totally avoid intra-
firewall irrelevance anomaly as highlighted in 6.4.1. Our abstraction models also
avoid inter-firewall spuriousness and shadowing anomalies during deployment.
NePAS draws its major strength in the fact that it can handle any intra-firewall
redundancy and shadowing anomalies; and also inter-firewall redundancy in any
abstraction model at deployment.
The major weakness of our abstraction model is the lack of support for network
address translation (NAT). Also, NePAs not being able to handle intra-firewall
correlation anomaly is another major shortcoming especially when designing
complex firewall networks. Lastly, while the device central firewall rule generation
makes it easier for NePAS to handle intra-firewall shadowing anomaly, it invariably
makes populated firewall tables to have too many rules and hence raises the issue
of efficiency in rule traversal.
8.1.3 Cyber Security Competition Experiment
The experiment conducted in this section hopes to show the effectiveness of using our
cyber security abstraction model deploying a cyber security competition. The experiment
conducted in this section will be using a combination of high level policy intentions
using all of the three network policies discussed in this thesis - BGP routing, Firewall
rule relations and Cyber security competitions. The first part of this section is used to
CHAPTER 8. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 155
discuss the rationale for conducting the hypothetical competition experiment taking place
including the composition of participants and their respective objectives. The second
part of the section will be used to discuss the NePAS policy intention based on the above
section. As the proposed competition will encompass routing and firewall intentions
within the cyber security competition, this part of the experiment will be split into three
subparts so as to fully explain the various policy intentions for the competition and its
infrastructure. The third part of this section will be used to detail the network layout of
the proposed cyber security competition. This part will also be used to show the routing
and firewall mapping of high level policies to network devices. This section concludes
with an analysis of the expected outcome of the experiment presented. This will also be
used to detail the final rendering of the cyber security competition infrastructure with
additional focus on the firewall and routing devices.
1. Experiment Rationale
The rationale for conducting this experiment is to showcase how our cyber security
competition abstraction model can be used to deploy a complex competition
network. This section of the cyber security competition experiment details the
competitions participation and objectives as drawn up by members of the white
team.
There are heightened tension in the Merman region over a decade long dispute
about the ownership of River Westeros between the four adjoining countries of
Stormland Republic, Westerlands Republic, Dorne Republic and Vale Republic.
The hostilities have led the intelligence agencies of the various countries to create
a specialised computer emergency response team composed of three members.
The teams have stepped up effort to ensure the cyber space of their respective
countries are fortified from external attacks from the other countries. The teams in
recent times have taken the approach "the best form of defence is to attack" and
hence are looking at exploiting vulnerabilities within the other countries in order
to destabilise and subdue them.
A peace mission group, Baratheon, constituted by world leaders has been instructed
to setup a replica cyber infrastructure that can be used by the various security teams
as a training ground. All the security teams of the various countries are expected
to exploit the replica infrastructure and gain cyber currency that can be used to
purchase updates for their vulnerable servers. The green team is therefore expected
to provide a management server where the various security teams can download
updates using their cyber currency to upgrade their vulnerable infrastructure. The
green team is also mandated to monitor and keep track of various exploits so as to
have evidence of what transpired during this critical period for future arbitration
purposes.
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As tensions between the four countries flare, a loosely formed group of hackers
going by the name "Recusants" have threatened cyber nuclear apocalypse on the
the cyber infrastructure of the four countries. The multi-user virtual group has
a decentralised membership of five with no known location of operation. The
security team of the various countries have to contain the attacks being launched
by this nefarious group.
2. Policy Intention
This section of the cyber security competition is used to discuss the high level
relationship of various network policies. As already stated, in addition to the
cyber security competition policy intention, the cyber infrastructure of the various
countries has a combination of firewall and routing policies. The various policies
(competition, inter domain routing and firewall) are taken one at a time and
discussed starting with the cyber security competition intention.
Figure 8.5 below shows the high level competition relationship between the parti-
cipating teams involved in the competition. The black edges are used for repres-
enting competition policy relationships between the various participating teams.
Figure 8.5: Experiment 3 Policy Intention
Competition Policy Intention - this subpart is used to discuss the high level cyber
security competition policy intention of the relationships between the various
combatant teams and other policy details. The specialised computer emergency
response teams of the various countries are labelled: Stormland, Westerlands,
Dorne and Vale respectively. These teams have a comprehensive competition
approach between themselves as they are expected to exploit their opponents’
vulnerable infrastructures while they fix the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure
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so as to stop opponents from exploiting them. The blue team called Baratheon will
be deployed as a replica cyber infrastructure for the peace mission group while
a red team will be labelled RT-Recusants. The four specialised teams have an
offensive competition approach between them and team Baratheon and hence are
expected to exploit the vulnerabilities in that network. Lastly, the various teams
have a defensive competition approach with RT-Recusants and are expected to
stop them from exploiting their respective vulnerable infrastructures.
Table 8.5 below provides a detailed enumeration of all the competition’s policy
details such as number of participants and whether or not the various infrastructure
of the teams are allowed to access the management server.
Table 8.5: Policy Details for Experiment 3
Team Members Managment AS Numbers
RT-Recusants 5 False 123
Stormland 3 True 456
Westerlands 3 True 789
Dorne 3 True 135
Vale 3 True -
Baratheon 0 False 246
BGP Policy Intention - this subpart is used to discuss the high level BGP routing
policy intention between the AS networks within the individual competition infra-
structure. The realms used for representing the cyber security competition teams
will be used to represent AS networks. The ASes used for the proposed competi-
tion’s routing are: RT-Recusants, Stormland, Westerlands, Dorne and Baratheon.
The relationships between the various ASes is as follows RT-Recusants provide
transit services to Westerlands and Stormland. Westerlands provides transit service
to Baratheon while it has a peering relationship with Stormland. Dorne is a cus-
tomer of Stormland while it has a sibling relationship with Baratheon. It should be
noted that the realm Vale is not part of the BGP business relationship abstraction
for the competition. The blue edges in Figure 8.5 above are used for representing
BGP business relationships between the various ASes. Table 8.5 above shows the
AS numbers that will be used for configuring the routing policies of the proposed
competition routing infrastructure.
Firewall Policy Intention - this subpart is used to discuss the high level firewall
policy intention for the proposed competition infrastructure. All the realms used in
Figure 8.5 above will be used for abstracting high level firewall rule relations. The
firewall rule relations will be applied on firewall-enabled devices within the cyber
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space of the various countries. High level firewall rule relations will be abstracted
using red and green coloured edges between the realms for deny and permit rules
respectively. Table 8.6 below shows the full tuple details of the firewall rule
relations abstracted. A total of ten firewall rule relations have been abstracted for
the various firewall-enabled devices for the cyber space of the countries.
Table 8.6: Realm Rule Relations for Experiment 3
S/N S Realm D Realm Action Protocol D Port S/D Address S Port
R1 any any permit ip NULL d 10.0.0.1 NULL
R2 any Baratheon deny tcp,udp NULL NULL NULL
R3 Baratheon Vale permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R4 Dorne any permit ip NULL NULL NULL
R5 Westerlands Baratheon deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R6 Dorne Westerlands deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R7 Westerlands Vale deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R8 Vale Dorne deny ip NULL NULL NULL
R9 Vale any permit tcp, udp NULL NULL NULL
R10 Baratheon Dorne permit ip NULL NULL NULL
3. Network Layout
This section of the cyber security competition is used to discuss the network layout
of the various hostile countries. There are two sets of high level policies that
will be mapped to the network devices within their network layout in this section.
The first set of mappings deal with routing policies that will be configured on the
routers within the respective cyber spaces in the countries. Table 8.7 below shows
the mapping of high-level routing policies on the various routers.
Table 8.7: Routing Policy Mappings for Experiment 3
S/No Realm Devices
1 RT-Recusants R
2 Stormland R1
3 Westerlands R2
4 Dorne R3
5 Baratheon R4
Figure 8.6 below shows the proposed cyber space of the various countries that will
be used for the competition.
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Figure 8.6: Experiment 3 Network Layout
The second set of mappings deal with firewall policies that will be configured
on firewall-enabled devices within the respective cyber spaces of the countries.
Table 8.8 below shows the mapping of high-level firewall policies on the various
firewall-enabled devices.
Table 8.8: Firewall Policy Mappings for Experiment 3
S/No Realm Devices
1 Baratheon SCADA, app2
2 Vale app, nfs
3 Westerlands www, db
4 Dorne user1, user2
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4. Experiment Overview
The following is a general overview of both the policy intention and network
layout setup of the cyber security challenge proposed in this experiment.
From Figure 8.5 above, the nodes such as Dorne, RT-Recusants, any and others
are used to represent group of network devices with identical policy intentions
in the experiment. It should be noted that the graph uses a combination of BGP,
firewall and cyber security competition policy intentions. The labels on the nodes
are used to specify the policy realm of a network device during the design of the
network layout. There are three sets of edges used in the policy intention graph
of this experiment that have been used to abstract BGP relationships, firewall
relationships and cyber security competition relationships. The first set of edges
colored blue are used to represent the BGP business or inter-domain routing
relationships between two interconnected service providers in the policy intention
graph. The labels such as peer, providers, customer and others on these edges
are used to represent the kind of BGP business relationships between the two
interconnected service providers. The second set of edges are colored red and
green and used to represent firewall relationships between two interconnected
realms in the policy intention graph. The edges that are colored red are labelled
deny and are used to abstract firewall rules that deny communication based on
certain protocols between the two interconnected realms. The edges that are
colored green are labelled permit and are used to abstract firewall rules that permit
communication based on certain protocols between the two interconnected realms.
The last set of edges colored black are used to represent the relationships between
two interconnected cyber security competition teams. The labels on the edges
which includes comprehensive, defensive and offensive are used to represent the
relationship between the two interconnected teams. It should be noted that color
of the edges in the graph has no effect during the execution of the experiment as
our system uses the labels and custom properties that have been defined by the
network administrator during the execution of the experiment.
From Figure 8.6 above, ellipse nodes such as R, R1, wifi3 and others represent
routers; the two rectangular nodes user1 and user2 are used to represent user
computing devices; 6-pointed star such as cfw, fw3 and others are used to represent
firewalls; and trapeziod nodes such as nfs, SCADA and others are used to represent
backend network servers. It should however be emphasised that all these devices
need to specified using the custom property, dtype, explained Chapter 4.2.1 before
our system will accept and know what type of network device it will be dealing
with during execution. The edges (both directional and non-directional) used in
the graph are used to represent the logical links between the two interconnected
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nodes (or network devices) in the experiment.
5. Expected Outcome
This section of the experiment will be used to analyse and discuss the deployed
cyber security competition layout which is a combination of the entire individual
team infrastructure. It should be noted that only the firewall within the proposed
infrastructure will be discussed in detail as similar or more complex routing
abstractions have already been discussed in previous sections of the thesis. Figure
8.7 below shows the complete cyber infrastructure that will be used during the
competition.
Figure 8.7: Experiment 3 Replicated Infrastructure
The respective firewall enabled devices of the various teams will belong to firewall
realms as indicated in Table 8.8 above. The firewall rule generation for this
set of policy intention abstractions are as indicated in Table 8.6 above and the
NePAS compilation process carried here is similar to the one discussed in previous
experiments in this research thesis.
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The management server rules for the competition infrastructure are configured in
the central firewall and all other firewall devices so as to enable the management
server access all the devices within the infrastructure. The vulnerable server of
the four combatant teams (Stormland, Westerlands, Dorne and Vale) that have the
management option value specified as TRUE have access rules configured in both
their most upstream firewall devices and the central firewall. This is to enable the
vulnerable servers to have access to the management server.
The attack servers of the competition also have firewall rule relations configured
in both the central firewall and all other firewalls in their respective cyber infra-
structure. This is so as to ensure they have access to all vulnerable servers in their
infrastructure so they can fix the vulnerabilities. The attack servers of all the teams
(Stormland, Westerlands, Dorne, Vale and RT-Recusants) also have access rules in
both the central firewall and other firewall devices in the cyber infrastructure. This
is so as to give them access to the vulnerable servers of their opponents.
8.2 Evaluation of Abstractions and NePAS
The work presented is this thesis has been motivated by the need to provide network
administrators a mechanism for expressing high-level network policies independent of
the network layouts. The goal of any such mechanism is to get rid of low level details
of network policy configuration so that administrators and researchers can focus on
the bigger picture of analysing, measuring and evaluating various network models. A
system has been implemented in this thesis using a methodology based on the template-
design approach of network abstraction called NePAS. The implemented system accepts
two or more graphs, one for high level network policy intention representations and
the other(s) for the proposed network layout. NePAS uses the graphs to generate low
level configuration commands after resolving known anomalies. In this section, we
evaluate our abstraction models based on the system, NePAS developed by listing some
limitations and deficiencies it has based on three areas - scalability, flexibility and how it
eases the network management process. NePAS currently supports abstract models of
three policies - inter domain routing, firewalls and cyber security competitions.
8.2.1 Scalability
This section hopes to assess the scalability of our proposed abstraction and to what extent
can our system handle such specifications. The assessment of scalability will be done in
respect to two aspects as follows - (i) the scalability and limitation of our abstraction
models in terms of the number of policies it can handle, (ii) the scalability of the
network layout for any proposed experiment. For the first aspect which hopes to abstract
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high level network policies, there are no limitations for BGP and firewall relationships.
Therefore network administrators can abstract as much BGP business relationships and
firewall rule relations as their routing or security policy entails. There is however a
limitation on the number of attack servers and hence members option in the cyber security
competition policy abstraction. Our cyber security competition abstraction model while
highly scalable, the system developed, NePAS currently supports the deployment of a
maximum of seventy attack servers for all teams in a competition that will be deployed
during the compilation process. The second aspect of the scalability evaluation deals
with the size or scaling of network layouts that are proposed for experiments to be
conducted. There are no network layout limitations for experiments based on firewall
rule relationships and cyber security competitions except when they have BGP business
relationships within. This is because when no BGP business relationship is running
within a cyber security competition or a firewall experiment, all the network devices are
by default assigned an AS number of 1 and regarded to be within the same AS network.
On the other hand however, when an experiment has BGP business relationships, the
network devices and routers (that have no bgppol values) will automatically belong to
the AS network of the nearest router with a bgppol as stated in Chapter 4.3 above. There
is a limitation of three layers of routers that NePAS supports before it breaks and not be
able to go further in search of routers with bgppol value assigned. This can adversely
affect the scalability of network layouts that are deployed by our system. As far as we
know, our abstractions are highly scalable in terms of design but suffer some limitations
when experiments are to be deployed due to system (or NePAS) limitations. It should
also be noted that as with any virtualised experiment, the hardware resources can affect
the scale of experiments.
8.2.2 Flexibility
This section is used to assess the flexibility of our proposed policy intention abstractions.
The flexibility of the our proposed abstraction models used in this context implies
how various network administrators can express any supported policy intention for any
proposed network experiment. The flexibility of our abstraction models will be evaluated
on a per network policy basis in the following section:
• BGP - Our inter domain routing abstraction model is able to provide network
administrators the ability to express high level BGP business relationships. It
however is not flexible enough to abstract lower level BGP routing policies such
as (i) partial transit relationships or ability to provide transit to customers over a
selected set of routes, (ii) preferring an exit from an AS network amongst multiple
options is not currently supported by our abstraction model as well. However, our
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proposed abstraction model supports the changing of routing relationships in an
experiment by changing the edge label in the policy intention graph.
• Firewall - Our firewall abstraction model is able to provide network administrators
the ability to express high level firewall rule relationships. Our abstraction model is
highly modular and can express any type of rule relation a security policy requires.
The abstraction of firewall rule relationship on the network layout level gives
network administrators greater flexibility to express unique firewall rule relations.
The only limitation of our abstraction model is that it does not support network
address translation (NAT) currently.
• Cyber Security Competitions - Our cyber security competition abstraction model
is able to provide white team members an avenue of implementing the designs of
their competition infrastructure in an easy and modular way. The major limitation
of our abstraction model has to do with its lack of support for white team members
to assign specific IP Addresses on vulnerable machines of the various participating.
This is because only one team infrastructure is given and NePAS automatically
replicates it into the number of participating team infrastructures with IP addresses
generated automatically. However, our proposed abstraction model give organisers
of such competitions an avenue of changing competition infrastructures within
short periods of time compared to other configuration processes or tools.
8.2.3 Ease of Network Management Process
This section hopes to assess how our proposed sets of abstractions make the network
management process less cumbersome for network administrators. The section will be
comparing the manual configuration process to our set of network management process
abstractions. It should be noted that even current projects such as Cisco VIRL require
administrators to configure advanced policies manually on network devices which has
the same set of issues as the manual configuration process. This section will be evaluated
on a per network policy basis in the following section:
• Firewall - The firewall rule abstractions proposed in this research are used to
create multiple firewall rules for network devices in a proposed experiment. For
example, the hypothetical bank experiment discussed in the above section uses
7 realms to abstract 24 high level firewall rule intentions. These realms that the
various network devices in the proposed experiment belong to are used to generate
more than 100 low level Cisco ASA firewall rules at deployment. This goes to
show that low level firewall commands can be easily specified using a high level
language represented as graphs and deployed in an efficient and time sensitive
manner.
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• Cyber Security Competitions - The CDX abstractions proposed in this research
enables organisers of cyber security competitions to design and deploy complex
sandpit environments using two or more graphs depending on the requirements.
For example, the competition proposed in the above section encompasses a network
with both firewalls and routers in addition to vulnerable servers. The above
competition was deployed using 17 Kali Linux servers for the various teams, a
total of 40 linux server that were used as web, database and application servers
amongst others, 15 firewall devices were deployed for the entire teams, 25 network
routers, 15 wireless routers, 2 core routers that were used to connect the Kali Linux
servers of the various teams to the competition, a core firewall device that was
used to restrict access to competition for the various teams and a core management
router and server used for monitoring the competition. A total of 117 network
devices were deployed in a virtual sandpit environment for the above proposed
competition using only graphs - one for the policy intention and the other for
the network layout specification. The policy intention graph was used to specify
the relationship between the various teams and also specify the firewall and inter
domain routing relationships for the network devices that were deployed. The
network layout graph was used to specify the slice of network infrastructure that
was replicated for all teams except the red team, Recusants. This goes to show that
complex network experiments can be specified in an easy, understandable manner
and deployed without too the organisers having to configure hundreds of network
devices which would have taken hours or even days to do.
8.3 Closing Remarks
This chapter of the thesis was used to critically analyse our proposed abstraction models
using complex networks experiments that has policy anomalies injected so as to see how
our system, NePAS will handle them. The first part of the chapter described experiments
of a mini-Internet, a bank’s security policy and a multi-country computer emergency
response team competition. These experiments provided the opportunity to discuss some
complex features of our proposed network policy abstractions and features that do not
work. The second part of the chapter was used to evaluate the usability, flexibility and
scalability of the various network policy abstractions proposed in this research thesis.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Review and Achievements
The Internet has transformed the way we communicate, learn and trade with each across
the world. Behind the revolutionary Internet is however a set of complex network policies
woven together to make it efficient, reliable and secure for users to interconnect. These
network policies used in interconnecting various autonomous networks that make up
the Internet are usually designed on a high level but have to be implemented using
low level vendor specific languages on network devices. The configuration of these
network devices is a labour intensive, tedious and an error-prone process due to human
complacency and the time consuming nature of the process. Network abstractions have
elicited attention in recent years as a way of minimising some of the issues related to the
manual configuration process. Network abstraction aids automated network configuration
by hiding some configuration processes away from network administrators so they
can focus on high level network policy problems. There are two known approaches
used by researchers for abstracting the network management process - template design
approach and language design approach. The proposed set of abstractions in this research
thesis uses template design approach where configuration snippets and contents from
a network information database (NIDB) are used to generate configuration files for
networks. The network information database used in this research uses graphs to allow
network administrators provide both policy intentions and network layouts for any given
experiment. The current network abstraction projects that have been developed by
researchers are at the network device level. The projects such as Autonetkit, Cisco VIRL
and many others only give users the ability to model network devices with basic network
configurations. The research that was presented in this thesis enables administrators
to abstract the network management process on a higher level than any other project
currently available.
The first objective of this thesis was to provide an avenue where network admin-
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istrators will be able to specify high level network policy intentions independent of
network layouts. This objective was achieved by providing a set of graph specifications
for expressing policy intention such as firewall rule relationships. The abstractions
developed use the nodes of a graph as a way of grouping network devices with identical
policy requirements called realms during an experiment. All devices within a realm will
have identical network policies implemented for them during deployment. The edge
labels of the graphs were used to represent the relationship between two realms in an
experiment. Both nodes and edges in the graph can have additional policy details that
have either mandatory or optional property values required in order to fully express
policy intentions.
The second objective of this thesis was to provide an avenue where network admin-
istrators can specify the network infrastructure that will be used during any proposed
experiment. This was achieved by providing network administrators an avenue for
expressing network layouts using graphs. The nodes of the graph were used to represent
network devices while the edges were used as physical links between the two devices in
any given experiment. Multiple graphs can be used to model complex network layouts
during experiments. For example, when modelling a network layout of a financial
institution, individual graphs can be used to represent branch, trading and other networks
as required for the experiment. Node and edge properties are used to provide additional
details such as which realm a network device belongs to and flexibility of allocating IP
addresses by network administrators amongst others.
The third objective of this thesis was to integrate a policy anomaly resolution al-
gorithm so as to ensure all network experiments that will be generated by our abstractions
models behave as intended by the network administrators. This has been and before low
level configuration commands are generated, a policy anomaly resolution algorithm goes
through the proposed network experiment models and resolves some of the major policy
anomalies for both inter-domain routing and firewall relationships.
The fourth objective achieved for this thesis was the development of a system based
on the template design approach to validate our sets of proposed network abstractions.
The system developed, called network abstraction system or NePAS, was made up of
four phases: policy intention; network layout; anomaly resolution and compilation. The
policy intention phase of the system was used to specify high level network policy
intentions abstracts on a graph independent of the proposed network layout for the
various experiments conducted in this thesis. The nodes in this phase were used to
represent realms of network devices with identical network policies. The edges are used
to specify the relationships between the realms. Node and edge optional values are used
to abstract network policy details. The network layout phase of the system was used to
specify the proposed network topologies of the various experiments conducted in this
thesis in a graph-like format similar to the first phase. This phase also provided another
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layer of abstraction even though it was on a lower level compared to the first phase.
The nodes in this phase were used to represent actual network devices and edges were
used to represent the physical links between the devices. NePAS in this phase was used
to specify the network policy intention realm of each device and the type of network
device in all the experiments conducted. The anomaly resolution phase was used to
ensure a number of policy that can manifest during experiments were resolved. The
compilation phase was used to generate low level anomaly free VIRL configurations
for all the experiments undertaken in this thesis. The system developed, NePAS, can be
used to model an existing or proposed network and deployed in a virtual environment.
For example, an ISP can use our BGP abstraction models to design and deploy a replica
of its network in a virtual sandpit so as to analyse possible route leaks or other anomalies
within the network. To do this, the network administrator of the ISP will design both
the policy intention and network topology of their network. Our abstraction models can
also be used to model network experiments before they are deployed in the real-world.
For example, an enterprise network can model their distributed firewall network so as to
ensure there are no firewall anomalies in the design before deploying such configuration
commands on the intended network devices.
The last objective of this thesis was to conduct a set of network experiments deployed
in a virtual environment using our abstraction models with known policy anomalies
purposefully injected so as to see how NePAS will resolve them. A series of experiments
were conducted to critically examine the flexibility, scalability and correctness of the
configuration commands generated by NePAS from our abstraction models.
• The first experiment was a mini-Internet simulation conducted to ensure strict com-
pliance of BGP business relationships between six autonomous systems. In this
experiment, some eBGP links were designed with no BGP business relationships
and NePAS did not generate any configuration commands for such link between
BGP neighbours. The experiment highlighted the strengths of our abstraction
models in ensuring anomalies such as origin misconfiguration, private AS an-
nouncements and export configurations are avoided during low level deployments.
• The second experiment conducted was a financial service provider network with
two branch locations and the bank founder’s home. In this experiment, the policy
intention between some realms were designed with some firewall anomalies. The
various firewall anomalies were resolved by NePAS in accordance to the policy
intention intended. The experiment highlighted the strengths of our abstractions in
avoiding intra-firewall anomalies such as irrelevance, redundancy and shadowing;
and inter-firewall redundancy during low level deployments.
• The third experiment conducted was a comprehensive cyber war between four
countries while a nefarious group of hackers (Red Team) were also launching
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attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the various countries. A peace mission
cyber infrastructure (Blue Team) was also deployed in order to help the countries
improve there information assurance skills. The cyber infrastructure of the various
countries was composed of firewall rules between the various network devices and
BGP business relationships between the routers in the experiment.
As stated the research contribution of this thesis is premised on a set of high level
network policy abstractions based on template design approach. The contributions
detailed in this research are as follows:
The first contribution of this thesis is the specification of a set of highly scalable
and easy to implement high level BGP business relationship abstractions. The BGP
abstractions proposed in this thesis enables network administrators to specify business
relationships such as: provider, customer, peer, sibling and hybrid. These business
relationships are specified as edge labels in the graphs between autonomous systems
with identical routing policies called realms. The nodes of the graph are used to represent
these realms in any proposed network experiment. The edges of the graph are used to
express the relationship between the realms by labelling the edge with the appropriate
business relationship as contained in the routing policy document of the experiment to be
conducted. The only optional node property proposed has to do with the specification of
the autonomous system number which can be automatically generated by our system if a
network administrator omits it when designing high level policy intentions. These high
level BGP business relationships are specified independent of the network layout. BGP
community attribute is used to to label incoming advertised provider, customer and peer
routes while local preference attribute is used in preferring routes based on the following
order - customer, sibling, peer, provider. This makes it easier to export a realms routes
according to the high level policy specification.
The second contribution of the thesis is the specification of a set high level firewall
relationship abstractions that have varying degrees of flexibility and granularity. There
are two ways in which firewall relationships can be expressed using our abstractions -
policy level and network level. The policy level firewall abstractions are independent
of network layouts and group firewall enabled devices with identical security policies
into realms represented as nodes in the firewall policy intention graph. The edges of
firewall policy intention graphs are used to express the firewall rule action that will be
taken. There are various edge properties that have been implemented to get firewall tuple
details from the network administrator. These edge properties have default values in case
any of them are omitted by the network administrator. The second way of specifying
firewall abstractions is at the network layout level and gives network administrators a
more granular way of specifying security policies between two firewall enabled devices
in an experiment. The edge properties of network level firewall abstractions are specified
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in the same way as the policy level firewall abstractions discussed. The firewall rules
generated in both the policy intention and network layout rules go through a number of
anomaly resolution algorithms so as to ensure the deployed firewall configurations do
not have any anomalies.
The third contribution of this thesis is the expression of cyber security competition
high level abstractions in such a way that eases the deployment of proposed infrastructure
in a virtual sandpit environments. The high level cyber security competition abstractions
group cyber infrastructures based on the participating teams. The nodes of the policy
intention graph are used to represent the various participating teams while the edge
labels between the teams are used in specifying the competition approach. The edges
of the graph can have any of the following labels depicting the competition approach -
comprehensive, defensive or offensive. The network layout graph design by organisers
of such competitions will be replicated for all participating teams with the name of
each team prepended before all network devices. A central firewall device is used to
separate the various participating teams and management systems from each other in
the competition infrastructure. A members node option is used to specify the number
of team mates within each participating team. This option influences the number of
attack servers that will be deployed during low level configuration of the competition
infrastructure. The competition approach influences the firewall relationship between
the attack servers and the vulnerable infrastructure of an opponent.
9.2 Future Work
The critical evaluation of our work in Chapter 8 above has helped us to identify several
issues for future work. The issues can be categorised into two groups: (i) existing
network policy abstractions and (ii) additional network policy abstractions.
9.2.1 Existing Network Policy Abstractions
This category deals with improvements on existing network management process ab-
stractions proposed in this research thesis. The future work discussed in this section is
used to proffer possible improvements on the existing sets of abstractions that have been
researched and developed in this thesis. The following section takes all the contributions
made in this research work in order to analyse how they can be improved.
• BGP
We have researched network management process abstraction techniques for
configuring BGP business relationships such as peering, sibling, provider and
customer relations. Trying to extend the abstraction research so as to provide
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additional flexibility to the current research work is a likely avenue for any future
work.
Future work is needed to extend our system to ensure there is adequate network
connectivity to routes inserted using the network node option so as to avoid the
non-connectivity anomaly that may likely arise in abstractions models.
Future work is needed to extend the flexibility of current BGP business relationship
abstraction research to support partial transit abstraction. This functionality will
help provide a more flexible avenue for network administrators to be able to
select the routes that will be advertised by an AS depending on the routing policy
intention of the experiment.
Future work is also needed to extend the flexibility of BGP policies to support
lower levels of abstraction such as choosing a particular exit from a group within an
AS. This functionality will provide network administrators an avenue for deploying
experiments that are a true representation of their respective policy intentions.
• Firewall
We have researched abstraction techniques for firewall relationships in this thesis.
Our abstractions allow for the specification of all kinds of rule relations with
relative ease. However the system implemented to showcase these abstractions is
not very efficient in terms of rule traversal. This is because the system generates
firewall rule relations based on a per device basis without regard for IP address
aggregation which makes firewall traversal cumbersome.
Future work is needed to improve the performance of firewall devices by ensuring
all firewall rule relations that have been abstracted will have the source and
destination IP addresses aggregated whenever it is possible. This will ensure fewer
firewall rules are generated during the low level compilation process and hence
faster rule traversal.
Future work is needed to improve on the anomaly resolution of NePAS to handle
intra and inter firewall correlation anomalies. This will further optimise the
performance of firewall devices configured using our proposed abstractions.
Additional future work is needed to extend the firewall abstraction research to
include Network Address Translation (NAT). As an important policy concept,
including NAT abstraction will make it easier for network administrators in both
the industry and academia to deploy networks that require address translation.
• Cyber Security Competitions
We have researched abstraction techniques for cyber security competitions in this
thesis. However the system built to evaluate the performance and limitations of our
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abstractions is not very scalable at the moment as it only allows for the specification
of seventy participants during any competition. This limitation restricts the number
of team mates and hence the number of teams that can participate in any cyber
security competition.
Future work is needed to handle a higher number of attack servers by adding
more attack routers in the cyber security competition infrastructure. This will
help organisers to have many participating teams and team members during such
competitions.
Researching abstractions that will give organisers of such competitions the flexib-
ility of manually choosing IP addresses for different vulnerable servers will be an
important improvement.
9.2.2 Additional Network Policy Abstractions
This category deals with future work that hopes to abstract more network policies that
will improve the network management process by eliminating issues highlighted with
the manual configuration process.
Researching high level policy intention abstractions for network policies such as
virtual private networks (VPNs), content data networks, software defined networks and
many others will be an important direction of any future work to be carried out. Abstract-
ing such important network concepts and evaluating the limitations and performance
implication of such abstractions on networks will greatly help the network management
community.
9.3 Closing Remarks
The research work presented in this thesis has been motivated by the need to provide
network policy abstractions so as to simplify the network management process and
prevent issues that arise from the manual configuration process. The results of our
research work will benefit the entire network management community. The set of
network policy abstractions presented will benefit those in the industry and academia
with an avenue to experiment, measure and evaluate various network projects. Our
network policy abstraction ideas can be successfully used in both simulated and real-
world network deployments. It constitutes a background basis for helping researchers in
the network policy abstractions area.
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Appendix A
NePAS User Manual
In this section, the system dependencies, requirements, commands and various the
various experiments conducted in this research are discussed in detail. This user manual
is split into three sections - applications, dependencies and NePAS. The three components
of the user manual are discussed in the following section:
A.1 Applications
This section looks at the application required to run experiments using NePAS. There
are two applications needed for designing and deploying NePAS experiments - yED and
Cisco VIRL.
A.1.1 Graphical Editor
This section looks at the graphical editor, yED, is very important because it is used for
populating the network information database needed by NePAS network policy template
snippets for any proposed experiment. The high level policy and network layout graphs
are designed using yED graphical editors and saved using file extension graphml. The
official link to yED including the documentation and how to use it is as follows:-
https://www.yworks.com/yed
A.1.2 Network Simulator
This section looks at the network simulator, Cisco VIRL, which can be used for the
deployment of proposed experiments. After designing the yED graph files, our system
is used to generate Cisco VIRL files that are used for deploying the proposed network
experiments. The following section shows the step-by-step process of loading and
deploying proposed virtual sandpit environments using Cisco VIRL. The official link to
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Cisco VIRL including the documentation and how to use it is as follows:-
virl.cisco.com/
A.2 Dependencies
This section details the various Linux tools or software needed by python in order to run
our system and generate VIRL files for the network simulator described in the above
section. The following shows the various dependencies and the various links that will
help in configuring them:
• NetworkX - NetworkX is a Python library that was used for specification of both
high level policy intentions and network layouts. The official link to NetworkX
including the documentation and how to use it is as follows:-
https://networkx.github.io/
• Netaddr - This is a network address manipulation library for Python. It was used
for issuing IP addresses to interfaces of various machines in an experiment. The
official link to Netaddr including the documentation and how to use it is as follows:
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/netaddr
• LXML - This is a python library used for processing XML and HTML. It was
used in the processing network information database gotten from yED graphs into
generating VIRL files used for deploying network experiments. The official link
to LXML including the documentation and how to use it is as follows:
lxml.de/
A.3 NePAS
This section shows the sample usage of the system developed in order to evaluate
the abstraction proposed during this research. It is expected that both the high level
policy intention of a proposed experiment has been generated and the network layout
as well. The following is the command that is used to run system: python nepas.py
<highlevelpolicy>.graphml <networklayout>.graphml <outputfile>.virl
Appendix B
Result of Experiments
This section shows the complete low level Cisco configuration commands of the various
network devices in the experiments described in the BGP, firewall and cyber security
competition chapters of this research.
B.1 Firewall Chapter Experiment
Listing B.1: Firewall fw2 Configuration for Proposed University
! ASAv Config generated by NePAS
!
hostname fw2
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
enable password cisco
passwd cisco
names
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
description to uniR
duplex full
nameif nepas-outside
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.2.5 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
description to wifi2
duplex full
nameif nepas-outside-1
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.4.6 255.255.255.0
interface Management0/0
description OOB Management
duplex full
management-only
nameif mgmt
security-level 100
no shutdown
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! Configured on launch
no ip address
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
eq 65432
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 2.3.4.5 eq 56431 host
20.0.1.3 eq 62300
access-list nepas-in extended permit ip host 1.2.3.4 host 20.0.1.3
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 eq 54321 host
20.0.1.3 eq 54321
access-list nepas-out extended deny ip host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 40728
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 3689
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp any host 20.0.0.2 eq ssh
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq
80
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
80
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq
8080
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
8080
access-list nepas-any extended permit icmp any any
access-group nepas-out out interface nepas-outside
access-group nepas-in in interface nepas-outside-1
access-group nepas-any global
!
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface
logging enable
logging asdm informational
user-identity default-domain LOCAL
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
http server enable
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
ssh version 2
crypto key generate rsa modulus 768
telnet timeout 15
console timeout 0
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
!
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
!
!
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map
parameters
message-length maximum client auto
message-length maximum 512
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
inspect ip-options
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inspect netbios
inspect rtsp
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect xdmcp
inspect dns preset_dns_map
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect rsh
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sip
inspect skinny
inspect icmp
inspect http
!
service-policy global_policy global
no call-home reporting anonymous
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active
end
Listing B.2: Firewall fw3 Configuration for Proposed University
! ASAv Config generated by NePAS
!
hostname fw3
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
enable password cisco
passwd cisco
names
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
description to uniR
duplex full
nameif nepas-outside
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.3.6 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
description to wifi1
duplex full
nameif nepas-outside-1
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.5.8 255.255.255.0
interface Management0/0
description OOB Management
duplex full
management-only
nameif mgmt
security-level 100
no shutdown
! Configured on launch
no ip address
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access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 host 20.0.0.2
eq 65432
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 eq 54321 host
20.0.1.3 eq 54321
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.
facebook.com eq 80
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.
facebook.com eq 8080
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.
gorillavid.in eq 80
access-list nepas-out extended permit tcp host 20.0.0.2 host www.
gorillavid.in eq 8080
access-list nepas-out extended deny ip host 20.0.0.2 host 4.5.6.7
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 host 20.0.1.3
eq sftp
access-list nepas-out extended deny udp host 20.0.0.2 host 20.0.1.3
eq sftp
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 40728
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp host 20.0.1.3 any eq 3689
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 any eq ftp
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp host 20.0.0.2 any eq telnet
access-list nepas-in extended permit tcp any host 20.0.0.2 eq ssh
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq
80
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
80
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.facebook.com eq
8080
access-list nepas-out extended deny tcp any host www.gorillavid.in eq
8080
access-list nepas-any extended permit icmp any any
access-group nepas-out out interface nepas-outside
access-group nepas-in in interface nepas-outside-1
access-group nepas-any global
!
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface
logging enable
logging asdm informational
user-identity default-domain LOCAL
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
http server enable
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
ssh version 2
crypto key generate rsa modulus 768
telnet timeout 15
console timeout 0
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
!
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
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!
!
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map
parameters
message-length maximum client auto
message-length maximum 512
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
inspect ip-options
inspect netbios
inspect rtsp
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect xdmcp
inspect dns preset_dns_map
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect rsh
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sip
inspect skinny
inspect icmp
inspect http
!
service-policy global_policy global
no call-home reporting anonymous
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active
end
B.2 CDX Chapter Experiment
Listing B.3: Central Firewall Device Configuration for Chapter 6 Proposed CDX
! ASAv Config generated by NePAS
!
hostname cfw
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
enable password cisco
passwd cisco
names
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
description to Team B-R
duplex full
nameif nepas-Team B-R
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.9.2 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
description to Team A-R
duplex full
nameif nepas-Team A-R-1
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security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.3.2 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/3
description to MgtRouter
duplex full
nameif nepas-MgtRouter-2
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.4.2 255.255.255.0
interface GigabitEthernet0/4
description to Attack-Router
duplex full
nameif nepas-Attack-Router-3
security-level 0
no shutdown
ip address 20.0.5.2 255.255.255.0
interface Management0/0
description OOB Management
duplex full
management-only
nameif mgmt
security-level 100
no shutdown
! Configured on launch
no ip address
access-list nepas-mgt-out extended permit ip host 20.0.0.1 any
access-list nepas-mgt-in extended permit ip host 20.0.1.1 host
20.0.0.1
access-list nepas-mgt-in extended permit ip host 20.0.2.1 host
20.0.0.1
access-list attack-own-out extended permit ip host 20.0.8.2 host
20.0.1.1
access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host 20.0.8.2 host
20.0.2.1
access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host 20.0.6.2 host
20.0.1.1
access-list attack-own-out extended permit ip host 20.0.6.2 host
20.0.2.1
access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host 20.0.7.2 host
20.0.1.1
access-list attack-opp-out extended permit ip host 20.0.7.2 host
20.0.2.1
!
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface
logging enable
logging asdm informational
user-identity default-domain LOCAL
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
http server enable
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 mgmt
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
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telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-1
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-2
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-2
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-2
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-3
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-3
telnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 nepas-outside-3
ssh version 2
crypto key generate rsa modulus 768
telnet timeout 15
console timeout 0
username cisco password cisco privilege 15
!
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
!
!
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map
parameters
message-length maximum client auto
message-length maximum 512
policy-map global_policy
class inspection_default
inspect ip-options
inspect netbios
inspect rtsp
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect xdmcp
inspect dns preset_dns_map
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect rsh
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sip
inspect skinny
inspect icmp
inspect http
!
service-policy global_policy global
no call-home reporting anonymous
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active
